Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Wildlife Conservation - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act | MCL 324.40501 | MI ST 324.40501 | This Section describes the Department of Natural Resource's authority to co-operate with the federal government and to use hunters' license fees for wildlife restoration. | Statute | |
| VA - Exotic Pets - Chapter 30. Definitions and Miscellaneous | 4 VA ADC 15-30-5 to 60 | 4 VAC 15-30-5 to 60 | The following regulations implement Virginia's exotic pet laws. | Administrative | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds | 297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | 2018 WL 1151000 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property. | Case | |
| AL - Equine - Immunity of those involved in equine activities. | Ala. Code 1975 § 6-5-337 | AL ST § 6-5-337 | This Alabama statute embodies the legislature's recognition that persons who participate in equine activities may incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in those activities. This statute provides that for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, and to encourage equine activities, civil liability of those involved in equine activities is limited by law. Liability is not limited when the equine sponsor intentionally injures a participant or engages in willful or wanton behavior that causes injury or death. | Statute | |
| KS - Exotic Pets - Chapter 32. Wildlife, Parks and Recreation. | K. S. A. 32-1301 to 1312 | KS ST 32-1301 to 1312 | This set of Kansas statutes comprises the state's dangerous regulated animals act. Under the Act, a "dangerous regulated animal" means a live or slaughtered parts of lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, cheetahs and mountain lions, or any hybrid thereof; bears or any hybrid thereof; and all non-native, venomous snakes. Except as provided in this section, it is unlawful for a person to possess, slaughter, sell, purchase or otherwise acquire a dangerous regulated animal. | Statute | |
| Stolte v. Hammack | 716 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. App., 2011) | 2011 WL 4116153 (Ga. App., 2011); 311 Ga.App. 710 (2011) |
After home owner’s roommate was attacked by a pit bull inside the home, the victim filed suit against owner under the vicious animal and the premises liability statutes. The Court of Appeals held that, because the roommate knew about the dog’s vicious propensity to the same extent as the owner, the owner was not liable. Plaintiff must present evidence that the owner had superior knowledge of the dog's temperament for the owner to be liable. |
Case | |
| Viilo v. Eyre | 547 F.3d 707 (C.A.7 (Wis.),2008) | 2008 WL 4694917 |
Virginia Viilo sued the City of Milwaukee and two of its police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after an officer shot and killed her dog 'Bubba.' The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the defendants took an interlocutory appeal challenging this denial. The court found that defendants' interjection of factual disputes deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court further held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to shoot and kill a companion dog that poses no imminent danger while the dog’s owner is present and trying to assert custody over her pet. |
Case | |
| Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife |
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Policy | |||
| CA - Service Animal - § 600.5. Intentional injury to, or death of, guide, signal or service dog; penalty; restitution | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 600.5 | CA PENAL § 600.5 | Any person who intentionally causes injury to or the death of any service dog, while the dog is in discharge of its duties, is guilty of a misdemeanor. punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Upon conviction, a defendant must make restitution to the person with a disability who has custody or ownership of the dog for any veterinary bills and replacement costs of the dog if it is disabled or killed. | Statute | |
| Jippes v. van Landbouw | Case C-189/01(ECJ) |
Jippes, an ECJ case from 2001, involved a legal dispute over the hoof and mouth pandemic ravaging Europe at the time. To stem spread of the disease, the EU passed a community directive banning the use of preventative vaccinations and mandating compulsory slaughter. The plaintiff—or “applicant,” as plaintiffs are referred to in Europe—owned a variety of farm animals, and, loathe to kill them, argued that European law embraced a general principle that animals were shielded from physical pain and suffering. Such a principle, the applicant argued, could only be overridden when absolutely necessary; and the compulsory slaughter directive was in direct conflict with this principle. The ECJ, however, rejected the applicant’s argument, holding that the Animal Welfare Protocol of 1997 did not delineate any new important animal-friendly principles in European law, but merely codified old ones. |
Case |
