Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOYLE v DEPUTY SHERIFF'S | 758 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y.Sup. 2003) | 195 Misc.2d 358, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 23494 (N.Y.Sup. 2003) |
In this New York case, a minor child was injured when he was kicked by defendant's horse while defendant was in the process of the setting up a petting zoo at a picnic. The court was posed with the question of whether limited circumstances exist to support a negligence claim where a person is injured by a domestic animal and there is no proof of the animal's vicious propensities (the pony in this case never kicked anyone or showed any vicious propensities). The court answered the question in the affirmative. Here, defendant is subject to the enhanced duty of horse owners to young children. There were triable issues of fact as to defendant's negligence in the manner in which the horses were unloaded while in the presence of children that precluded summary judgment for defendant.
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Case |
| Naruto v. Slater | 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) | 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) | A seven-year-old monkey named Naruto that lived in a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia got ahold of a wildlife photographer’s unattended camera in 2011 and took several photos of himself. David Slater, the owner of the camera, and Wildlife Personalities, Ltd., (“Wildlife”) published the photos in a book that identifies Slater and Wildlife as the copyright owners of the photographs. In 2015 PETA and Dr. Engelhardt filed a complaint against Slater, Wildlife, and Blurb (the website that helped create the book) for copyright infringement on behalf of Naruto. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to establish standing under Article III or statutory standing under the Copyright Act. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. PETA and Dr. Engelhardt appealed on Naruto’s behalf. Dr. Engelhardt ended up withdrawing from the litigation, so PETA remained as the next friend of Naruto. The Court of Appeals held that PETA cannot validly assert a “next friend” status to represent Naruto because they failed to allege any facts to establish the required significant relationship between a next friend and a real party in interest and secondly an animal cannot be represented by a “next friend” under the laws of the United States. The Court pointed out, however, that lack of a next friend does not destroy an incompetent party’s standing entirely. “Article III standing does not compel a conclusion that a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a case or controversy.” Based on precedent, the Court concluded that Naruto did not have standing to sue under the Copyright Act because the statute did not expressly state that animals have standing. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that held that Naruto and animals in general lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act. The Court also awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees. Circuit Court Judge N.R. Smith wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the case must be dismissed but disagreeing with the Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional. Judge Smith stated that “the Majority ignores its own conclusion by determining that 1) next-friend standing is non-jurisdictional; and 2) even if the elements of next-friend standing are not met, any third party may still bring suit on behalf of anyone or anything – without the real party in interest’s permission – as long as the real party in interest has an Article III injury; and the real party in interest is adequately protected by the purported next friend’s (or self-appointed lawyer’s) representation. In his opinion, this fails to follow both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Judge Smith further concludes that Supreme Court precedent bars next friend standing for animals because the scope of next friend standing is limited by historical practice and there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend, absent an act of Congress. There is also no textual support in the habeas corpus statute or Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is because only a natural person can have a habeas corpus petition filed on their behalf. Rule 17 only authorizes next friend suits on behalf of “a minor or an incompetent person.” The Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional and, therefore, allowed the case to go forward is incorrect and is legally unsupportable by precedent. In his opinion, the case must be dismissed if there is no next friend standing and the Majority should have never reached the merits of the Copyright Act question. The question before the court was whether a third-party had next friend standing allowing it to invoke the authority of the court and stand in Naruto’s shoes to advance his claims. The question was not whether Naruto was properly protected or was brought into the litigation as a defendant. | Case |
| UT - Wolves - Chapter 29. Wolf Management Act | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as U.C.A. 1953 § 23-29-101 - 102; § 23-29-201 - 202) | UT ST § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as UT ST § 23-29-101 - 202) | Under the Utah Wolf Management Act, the division shall manage wolves to prevent the establishment of a viable pack in all areas of the state where the wolf is not listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act until the wolf is completely delisted under the act and removed from federal control in the entire state. | Statute |
| Leider v. Lewis | 2 Cal. 5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055 (2017) | 2017 WL 2276526 (Cal. May 25, 2017) | The Plaintiffs, Residents of Los Angeles, brought a taxpayer action against the Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Zoo, alleging elephant abuse in violation of various Penal Code provisions. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, granted the Defendants summary judgment. The Residents appealed. At trial, the Residents were awarded injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court rejected many of the Resident’s claims, but issued limited injunctions prohibiting use of particular forms of discipline, requiring the elephants to have specific amounts of exercise time, and requiring the rototilling of soil in exhibit. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the prior Court of Appeals decision was not law of the case as to the argument that the Residents was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated Penal Code, and (2) the Residents' challenge to the city's treatment of elephants improperly sought injunctive relief for Penal Code violations. | Case |
| Free v. Jordan | 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928) | 178 Ark. 168 (1928) |
In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog. |
Case |
| AU - Livestock - Australian Meat and Live-stock Industry Act 1997 | Act No. 206 of 1997 |
The purpose of this Act is to control meat and live-stock exports both within and outside Australia. 'Live-stock' includes cattle, calves, sheep, lambs and goats, however this definition is not exhaustive and may include other animals if prescribed. The Act covers export licences, quotas and enforcement. It also outlines the role of industry bodies and policies. |
Statute | |
| KS - Dodge City - Breed - §§ 2-401 - 2-410 PIT BULL DOGS | DODGE CITY, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-401 - 2-410 (2004) |
In Dodge City, Kansas, it is illegal to own, keep, harbor, or possess a pit bull dog, with an exception for dogs registered with the city of Dodge City, whose owners obtain a permit and comply with certain standards. Such requirements include keeping the dog confined, and if outside of a pen, the use of a leash and a special collar, microchipping, "Beware of Dog" signs, and $100,000 liability insurance, and identification photographs. Violations may result in the seizure, impoundment, and/or removal of a dog from the city. A violation may incur a fine of $2,500 and/or imprisonment of up to one year.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hosp. | 723 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) | 2012 WL 539989 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) |
After an animal hospital caused the death of a dog due to an improperly placed feeding tube, the dog owners sued for veterinary malpractice under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals held that the replacement value of the dog was the appropriate measure of damages, and not the intrinsic value. Owners’ emotional bond with the dog was not compensable under North Carolina law. |
Case |
| Colombia, Resolución 8430, 1993 | Resolución 8430, 1993 | Resolution 8430, 1993 of the Colombian Ministry of Health, establishes scientific, technical, and administrative norms for investigation in the health field. Title V of this resolution regulates the biomedical research on animals. | Statute | |
| SC - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal Laws | Code 1976 § 31-21-70; Code 1976 § 2-7-35; Code 1976 § 47-3-910 - 990; Code 1976 § 43-33-10 - 70; Code 1976 § 56-5-3200 - 3220; Code 1976 § 43-26-80 | SC ST § 31-21-70; SC ST § 2-7-35; SC ST § 47-3-910 - 990; SC ST § 43-33-10 - 70; SC ST § 56-5-3200 - 3220; SC ST § 43-26-80 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. | Statute |