Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Lien, care - § 3352. Pasturage, food and shelter | 10 M.R.S.A. § 3352 | ME ST T. 10 § 3352 | This Maine law provides that a person who pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by contract or consent of the owner has a lien for the amount due. The lien may be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession. | Statute |
| US - Importation - Mailing of Injurious Article | 18 USCS § 1716 | All kinds of poison, all articles and compositions containing poison, all poisonous animals, insects, reptiles, all explosives, inflammable materials, infernal machines, and mechanical, chemical, or other devices or compositions which may ignite or explode, all disease germs or scabs, and all other natural or artificial articles, compositions, or material which may kill or injure another, or injure the mails or other property, whether or not sealed as first-class matter, are nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or station thereof, nor by any officer or employee of the Postal Service. | Statute | |
| AL - Bear Protection - Legislative findings. Prohibited activities; exceptions; applicability; penalties. | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-480 - 481 | AL ST § 9-11-480 to 481 | These Alabama statutes were signed into law in 2001. The laws declare that black bears are a species that require special protection in the state and make it illegal to hunt, wound, injure, kill, trap, collect, or capture a black bear, or to attempt to engage in that conduct during the closed season for black bear. It also makes it illegal to sell or purchase bear parts. | Statute |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink | 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir., 2011) |
Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands. Plaintiff argued that the 2006 Regulations violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals found for the plaintiff, holding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory changes. BLM also violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. The FLPMA claim was remanded. |
Case | |
| Merced v. Kasson | 577 F.3d 578 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) | 2009 WL 2343172 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) |
Plaintiff José Merced, a Santeria Oba Oriate, or priest, brought action against the City of Euless alleging that city ordinances prohibiting the keeping of animals for slaughter and the slaughtering of animals prevented him from performing animal sacrifices essential to Santeria religious practice. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the city, but denied its request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the city and affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The court found that the city did not prove that the burden it placed on the plaintiff advanced a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so. In fact, the Court noted that prior to the ban, Merced had performed these sacrifices for sixteen years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals. The City's purported interest was further undermined by the fact that hunters are allowed to butcher dead animals at their homes. Thus, Euless failed to assert a compelling governmental interest in support of its ordinances that burden Merced's religious conduct. |
Case |
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case | |
| IN - Transport of Animals - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS ON FOOT) RULES, 2001 | The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, regulate the transport of animals on foot. The rules apply to the transport of animals on foot is five kilometres or more from the boundary of the town/city/village of origin. New born animals whose navels have not completely healed, and those animals that are diseased, blind, emaciated, fatigues or have given birth in the past three days or that are likely to give birth during transport shall not be transported on foot. Animals may only be transported in their farm social groups. The owner of the animals must ensure that the animals have access to veterinary first aid equipment through their journey and that they have access to adequate water and fodder. | Statute | ||
| Viilo v. City of Milwaukee | 552 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Wis. 2008) | The court in this case denied summary judgement for the defendant after two police officers shot plaintiff’s dog four times which ultimately resulted in the dog’s death. The court denied summary judgment because it believed that there was a question as to a material fact of the case. The material fact in this case was whether or not the officers reasonably feared for their lives when the dog was shot the third and fourth time. After the dog was injured from the first two shots, there was inconsistent testimony as to whether the dog was still acting in an aggressive manner, which may have warranted the third and fourth shots. Due to the inconsistent testimony, the court held that a ruling of summary judgment was not appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted as to all claims except the claim that the third and fourth shots constituted an illegal seizure. | Case | |
| CA - Lost Property - Lost and Unclaimed Property | West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 2080 - 2082 | CA CIVIL § 2080 - 2082 | This statutory section comprises California's lost property laws. | Statute |
| EU - Zoos - Council Directive relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos | COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 1999/22/EC |
The European Union has adopted common minimum standards for housing and caring for animals in zoos with a view to reinforcing the role of zoos in conserving biodiversity. |
Statute |