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| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
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| Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue | 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir., 2019) | 2019 WL 5091876 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2019) | The Plaintiff, Jamie and Sandra Swartz, acquired several horses, goats, and a donkey to keep on their farm in Indiana. In April of 2013, the county’s animal control officer, Randy Lee, called a veterinarian to help evaluate a thin horse that had been observed on the Swartzes’ property. Lee and the veterinarian visited the Swartzes’ on multiple occasions. The veterinarian became worried on its final visit that the Swartzes’ were not properly caring for the animals. Lee used the veterinarian’s Animal Case Welfare Reports to support a finding of probable cause to seize the animals. Subsequently, the Superior Court of Indiana entered an order to seize the animals. On June 20, 2014, the state of Indiana filed three counts of animal cruelty charges against the Swartzes. However, the state deferred prosecuting the Swartzes due to a pretrial diversion agreement. The Swartzes filed this federal lawsuit alleging that the defendants acted in concert to cause their livestock to be seized without probable cause and distributed the animals to a sanctuary and equine rescue based on false information contrary to the 4th and 14th amendments. The district court dismissed the Swartzes' claims to which, they appealed. The Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Swartzes’ claims. The Court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by those who lose in state court challenging state court judgments. Due to the fact that the Swartzes’ alleged injury was directly caused by the state court’s orders, Rooker-Feldman barred federal review. The Swartzes also must have had a reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in state court for the bar to apply. The Court, after reviewing the record, showed that the Swartzes had multiple opportunities to litigate whether the animals should have been seized, thus Rooker-Feldman applied. The case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine at the outset. The Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. | Case | |||||||
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Welcome to the Animal Law Web Center - contact us at Michigan State University College of Law648 North Shaw Lane East Lansing, MI 48824-1300 Primary Contact: animallaw@law.msu.edu Professor David Favre, Editor-in-Chief |
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| VT - Hunting - § 4715. Remote-control hunting | 10 V.S.A. § 4715 | VT ST T. 10 § 4715 | This Vermont statute prevents remote-control hunting. No one may take a wild or captive animal using a remote-control hunting device if the person is in Vermont. No person shall establish or operate a remote-control hunting site in Vermont, or import, export, or possess a wild or captive animal to be taken by a remote-control hunting device. | Statute | |||||||
| China - Wildlife - China Protection of Wildlife | Order No. 9 (1989) |
This law seeks to protect national list and international list of endangered species. |
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| OH - Zanesville - Exotic - CHAPTER 505. Animals and Fowl | Ordinances 505.01 - 99 |
These Ohio ordinances cover a diversity of legal areas pertaining to animals, including the following: animals running at large, registration of dogs, abandoning, killing, or injuring animals, barking dogs, and dangerous animals. |
Local Ordinance | ||||||||
| Strong v. United States | 5 F.3d 905 (1993) |
The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 1 |
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| GA - Restaurant, animals - 511-6-1-.07. Physical Facilities. | GA ADC 511-6-1-.07 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 511-6-1-.07 | This Georgia regulation has an exception for dogs in outdoor dining areas in the subsection of the regulation that prohibits animals in food service establishments. Subsection (5)(o)(vi) states that pet dogs may be allowed in outside dining areas of a food establishment provided patrons access the area from the outdoors and several other conditions are met. Pet dogs must not come into contact with any serving dishes, utensils, or tableware nor are they allowed on chairs, tables, or other furnishings. Employees and consumers must not provide food to pet dogs. The pet dogs must be kept on a leash and under control of the consumer at all times. At no time is the pet dog allowed to travel through the interior portion of the food service establishment. The establishment must also establish processes for training employees not to handle or pet the dogs and a procedure and equipment for the clean up of pet waste. | Administrative | |||||||
| TN - Veterinary - Chapter 12. Veterinarians. | T. C. A. § 63-12-101 - 146; T. C. A. § 63-12-201 - 204 | TN ST § 63-12-101 - 146; TN ST § 63-12-201 - 204 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |||||||
| Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law Information |
Journal of Animal and Natural Resource LawStudents of Michigan State University College of Law |
Policy |