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Displaying 6171 - 6180 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Montana - Health - 32.3.213. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DOGS AND CATS | MT ADC 32.3.213 | Mont.Admin.R. 32.3.213 | This Montana regulation states that dogs and cats may enter the state of Montana provided they are accompanied by an official health certificate of the state of origin issued by an accredited veterinarian and officially vaccinated by a licensed veterinarian against rabies in accordance with procedures recommended in the latest version of the U.S. Public Health Compendium for rabies vaccine. Rabies vaccination requirements do not apply to puppies and kittens under three months of age. | Administrative | |
| Baughman v. City of Elkhart, TX | Slip copy, 2018 WL 1510678 (E.D. Tex., 2018) | Plaintiff Tammy Baughman filed a complaint on May 31, 2017 seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of her Fourteenth amendment rights; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that she was discriminated against; the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), alleging a failure to make reasonable accommodations; and 42 U.S.C. § 3613. Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled due to a failed back surgery. She also has fibromyalgia, depression, and other health issues. Plaintiff has a seven pound ring tail lemur that she claims is an emotional support animal that improves her quality of life. Plaintiff's lemur bit a mail carrier on December 5, 2012 which left lacerations on the carrier's hand and wrist. Plaintiff then moved to Elkhart, Texas in December 2014 where her lemur bit another person on June 25, 2015. In both instances the lemur was quarantined for 30 days and then returned to Plaintiff. The City of Elkhart enacted an ordinance on October 5, 2015 that bans all non-human primates from the city. Plaintiff claims she requested an accommodation form the City to keep her lemur as an emotional support animal, but her request was denied. The defendants, which include the mayor and city council members, claim the plaintiff never requested an accommodation. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants "showed deliberate indifference in refusing to give [her] a hearing and defend her lemur,' which violates the FHAA and ADA. On February 15, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims. Defendants claim that Plaintiff's lemur was involved in two documented attacks in Houston County, Texas and a third in Elkhart. Defendants assert that Plaintiff runs a retail resale shop out of her home and that in the third attack on June 25, 2015, the lemur jumped on a customer in plaintiff's store. Defendants assert that the ordinance was enacted as a legitimate exercise of the City's legislative power and police power. The District court concluded that the defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their conduct because the act of voting in favor of an ordinance is an undeniable legislative action. As for Plaintiff's 1983 claim, the District Court concluded that she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether her due process rights were violated nor does she have a basis for a procedural due process claim. The ordinance is rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in the safety and welfare of its citizens. The ordinance does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As for Plaintiff's ADA claim, the District Court concluded that the Plaintiff had not shown that the reasonable accommodation that she requested - an exemption from the animal control ordinance - did not place an undue burden on the City of Elkhart. No facts were provided by the Plaintiff that would show that her interest in keeping her lemur outweighs the interest of the City in protecting its citizens. As for Plaintiff's ADA claim, in order to succeed on an ADA claim, there must be some evidence that set the animal apart from an ordinary pet. The Plaintiff failed to show any evidence that her lemur is specifically trained to perform tasks that help her in her daily life. The District Court held that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. | Case | ||
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| State v. Devon D. | 90 A.3d 383 (Conn.App, 2014) | 150 Conn.App. 514 (2014) | The defendant, Devon D., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of eleven offenses, in three separate files with three different docket numbers, pursuant to three separate informations, involving three different victims. Devon asserted that the prosecution as to the charges concerning C1 should have been separated from the charges as to C2 and C3, and that the evidence from C1’s case should not have been cross-admissible as to C2 and C3, an argument the Connecticut Appellate Court accepted as justifying reversal. Devon also argued on appeal that “the court improperly permitted the state to have a dog sit near C1 while she testified to provide comfort and support to her.” The appellate court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the use of the dog to comfort and emotionally support C1 while she testified without requiring the state to prove that this special procedure was necessary for this witness. At trial, defense counsel specifically told the trial court he was not making a confrontation clause claim as to the presence of the dog, and the appellate court therefore considered such a claim waived. Despite the absence of statutory authority for permitting a facility dog, the appellate court did conclude that the trial court had “inherent general discretionary authority” to permit such a dog, but also determined that this discretion was abused under the facts of the case. The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for new trials. | Case | |
| US - AWA - 1970 Public Law 91-579 | 1970 PL 91-579 |
There were four areas of significant change to the AWA in the 1970 amendments: (1) the definition of "animal" was expanded to include warm-blooded animals generally, (2) more human entities were brought under the regulatory provisions of the Act: animal exhibitors (i.e., circuses, zoos and roadside shows), and wholesale pet dealers, (3) the lab door of research facilities was opened more, requiring that certain humane standards be maintained at all times, (4) the Secretary's enforcement powers were strengthened and protection for government inspectors was provided from individuals who interfered with enforcement actions under the Act. |
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| Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. United States Department of Agriculture | 398 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 2005) |
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals decided not to allow Nebraska Beef to pursue a Bivens remedy --remedy allows a party to recover damages when federal officials violate a person's constitutional rights when Congress has not provided an adequate remedy-- after the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) allegedly breached a mutual consent decision agreed upon after the USDA issued Noncompliance Records for perceived regulatory violations. |
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| Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 113 F.Supp.2d 1048 (N.D.Tex.,2000) |
North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary. |
Case | ||
| Fallo Kattan Alberto c/ Estado Nacional. Año 1982 | 42.470/83 | Before the Argentina National Constitution of 1994, the attorney Alberto Kattan and Juan Schroder brought an action of amparo (protection of rights) against the national government to prevent the hunting of 14 Commerson's dolphins that had been authorized by the national government. The question was whether these people had a cause of action as they had not suffered any direct or personal harm. The court declared the action of amparo valid leaving the administrative authorizations that allowed the hunting of Commerson's dolphins without effect. | Case | ||
| NE - Exotic Wildlife - 008 Keeping Wildlife in Captivity | 163 NE ADC Ch. 4, § 008 | Neb. Admin. R. & Regs. Tit. 163, Ch. 4, § 008 | This Nebraska regulation lists species that are unlawful to keep unless a person is issued a Captive Wildlife Permit, a Controlled Shooting Area Permit, a Rehabilitation Permit or a Scientific Collectors Permit, issued by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission or under a captive cervine permit issued by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. Captive Wildlife Permits shall not be issued for wild birds or wild mammals which have been taken or removed from the wild. Provisions for public auctions that deal in captive wild bird or mammals are described in 008.004. Importation and exportation of wildlife are also detailed in this rule. | Administrative | |
| Noway - Cruelty - Norwegian Animal Welfare Act (2010) | Norwegian Animal Welfare Act |
This comprehensive Animal Welfare Act from Norway covers nearly all aspects in the treatment of animals, including research, farming, and general care. The intention of this Act is to promote good animal welfare and respect for animals. |
Statute |
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