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Displaying 6141 - 6150 of 6637
Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
CO - Emergency - § 25-3.5-203. Emergency medical service providers--certification C. R. S. A. § 25-3.5-203 CO ST § 25-3.5-203 This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat. Statute
VA - Property - § 3.2-6585. Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6585 VA ST § 3.2-6585 This Virginia statute provides that all dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. It further grants authority to animal control officers to seize a stolen dog or cat pending court action. Statute
MI - Melvindale - Breed - DIVISION 5. - PIT BULL TERRIERS MELVINDALE, MI., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 4-136 - 4-148 (2006)

In Melvindale, Michigan, there is a ban on owning or keeping pit bull dogs, with an exception for dogs licensed as of April 1990. Such dogs are allowed, as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as confinement or leash and muzzle, $100,000 liability insurance, and an ID number tattoo. A violation may result in a misdemeanor conviction punishable by a fine of up to $100 and imprisonment of up to 30 days.

Local Ordinance
Carbasho v. Musulin 618 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2005)

Owner's dog was killed by a negligently driven car.  The owner sued to recover damages for loss of companionship.  The court held that dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable.

Case
Wales - Dogs - The Microchipping of Dogs (Wales) Regulations 2015 2015 No. 1990 (W. 300) Regulations providing for the compulsory microchipping of dogs and the recording of each dog’s identity and its keeper’s contact details on a database. Statute
SD - Hunting - 41-1-8. Interference with lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing prohibited--Violation as misdemeanor S D C L § 41-1-8 to 10 SD ST § 41-1-8 to 10 This South Dakota law reflects the state's hunter harassment provision. The law prohibits a person from intentionally interfering with any person or group of persons lawfully engaged in the process of taking or attempting to take any game or fish. This includes actions specifically intended to harass and any activity intended to scare or disturb game with the specific intent of preventing their lawful taking. Violation is a Class 2 misdemeanor. Statute
Thompson v. Hancock County 539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995)

In this case, the Supreme court of Iowa held that hog confinement buildings were agricultural buildings and thus exempt from county zoning ordinances.

Case
Stanton v. State 395 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2013) 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013)

The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.

Case
State v. Hammond 569 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018) Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed. Case
CO - Exotic Pets and Wildlife - Chapter 11. Wildlife Parks and Unregulated Wildlife. 2 Colo. Code Regs. 406-11:1100 to 11:1116 2 CCR 406-11:1100 to 11:1116 (Per introduction to regulations). In this introduction to chapter 11 we outline possession requirements for live wildlife as found in Colorado wildlife law. There is growing interest in the private possession of live wildlife. At the same time there is considerable confusion over the laws regarding such private possession. Colorado wildlife law generally prohibits the importation, live possession, sale, barter, trade, or purchase of any species of wildlife native to Colorado (33-6-113(1), C.R.S.). In addition, these same laws restrict or prohibit the importation and possession of exotic (non-native) wildlife (33-6-109(4), C.R.S.); and non-commercial (pet) possession of regulated mammals has been prohibited by these regulations since 1983. The Wildlife Commission also maintains a prohibited species list in Chapter 0. The possession of these species is severely restricted. Administrative

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