Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y. | 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) |
In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. |
Case | ||
| Causa No. 09209202301263 | Causa No. 09209202301263, Unidad Judicial de Familia, Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia Norte con Sede en el Cantón Guayaquil, Provincia del Guayas (2023) | Habeas Corpus on behalf of animals at the Narayana Aventura Park | Los demandantes interpusieron un Habeas Corpus argumentando la vulneración de los derechos a la libertad, vida, integridad, libre desarrollo del comportamiento animal y derecho a la salud de los animales alojados en el Narayana Aventura Park. El argumento principal se centró en el estado grave de desnutrición en el que se encontraban los animales, así como en las condiciones de confinamiento inadecuadas a las que estaban sujetos. El Narayana Aventura Park se presenta como un centro de rescate que alberga una variedad de animales exóticos, endémicos y domésticos. Su represéntate negó cualquier violación a los derechos de los animales, asegurando que se les proporcionaban las condiciones mínimas de bienestar requeridas por ley y contaban con todos los permisos necesarios. Tras un exhaustivo análisis del caso y una cuidadosa consideración de las leyes aplicables al caso, la juez decidió conceder el Habeas Corpus a favor de los animales alojados en el Parque reconociendo que si hubo un impacto significativo en los derechos de los animales bajo el cuidado del parque. La juez llegó a esta conclusión basándose en el Artículo 89 de la Constitución de Ecuador, así como en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Sentencia No. 253-20-JH/22 (Caso de Estrellita). No obstante, siguiendo las recomendaciones de los de la comisión de peritos en el caso, el tribunal permitió que los animales permanecieran en el parque y ordenó la readecuación de los espacios y las dietas de todos los animales del parque dentro de un plazo de tres meses tras el fallo de cuerdo a las sugerencias en dichos expertos. Es importante anotar que el demandado apeló esta decisión y actualmente está en proceso de revisión. | Case | |
| PA - Hunting, Internet - § 7641. Computer-assisted remote harvesting of animals | 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7641 | 18 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 7641 (West) | This statute prohibits computer-assisted remote hunting and the operation of computer assisted hunting facilities in the state of Pennsylvania. Violation is a misdemeanor of the third degree. | Statute | |
| LA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | LSA-R.S. 13:5544 - 45; LSA-R.S.3:2451 - 2778; LSA-R.S. 56:124.1, 141; LSA-R.S. § 40:1269.1 - 4; LSA-R.S. 49:165 | These statutes comprise Louisiana's dog laws. Included among the provisions are dangerous dog laws, impoundment provisions, and the relevant licensing requirements. | Statute | ||
| DE - Exotic Pets - CHAPTER 72. POSSESSION OF MAMMALS OR REPTILES EXOTIC TO DELAWARE | 3 Del.C. § 7201 - 7203 | DE ST TI 3 § 7201 - 7203 | This Delaware law requires a permit to possess, sell, or import any non-native wild animal. No such permits will be granted for non-native venomous snakes. | Statute | |
| PA - Permits - Chapter 133. Wildlife Classification. | 58 PA ADC § 133.1 - .6; 58 PA ADC § 133.21; 58 PA ADC § 133.41 | 58 Pa. Code § 133.1 to .6; 58 Pa. Code § 133.21; 58 Pa. Code § 133.41 | This set of Pennsylvania regulations defines terms used such as protected mammals, protected birds, endangered species, threatened species, and furbearers. | Administrative | |
| US - Permits - Subpart D. Conditions. § 13.42 Permits are specific. | 67 FR 12824 | 50 C.F.R. § 13.42 | This regulation provides that permits issued to collect or otherwise take wildlife or plants are strictly construed. | Administrative | |
| Raymond v. Bujold | 199 A. 91 (N.H.,1938) |
A finder of a lost dog did not become the "keeper" of the dog when he tied it up and summoned the owner to retrieve it. The finder was therefore entitled to sue the owner for damage caused by the dog. |
Case | ||
| Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc. | 634 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.App., 2006) | 2006 WL 1550709 (Ga.App.), 280 Ga.App. 629 (2006) |
In this Georgia case, the Court of Appeals held that, on issue of first impression, an alligator farm was not a "farm" within meaning of the state statute that exempted "farm laborers" or their employers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (Gill was bitten while cleaning out a pen and subsequently developed both a bone infection and salmonella). In construing the relevant statutes, the court found that in the chapter on Employment Security Law (ESL), the legislature meant that individuals who raise or tend wildlife perform "agricultural labor," but only when they do so on a "farm," which is "used for production of stock, dairy products, poultry, fruit, and fur-bearing animals." Accordingly, the court concluded that when Gill cleaned out the alligator pens, he was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor." However, his employer, an alligator farm, was not a "farm" because alligators are "wildlife," not "[live]stock ... [or] fur-bearing animals." |
Case | |
| IA - Dog License - 351.27. Right to kill tagged dog | I. C. A. § 351.27 | IA ST § 351.27 | This Iowas statute makes it lawful for any person to kill a dog, wearing a collar with a rabies vaccination tag attached, when the dog is caught in the act of worrying, chasing, maiming, or killing any domestic animal or fowl, or when such dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person. | Statute |