Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Facility dog - § 92.55. Judicial or other proceedings involving victim or witness under the age of 18 | West's F.S.A. § 92.55 | Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.55 | This statute allows any party at a judicial proceeding to protect a victim or witness under the age of 18 from severe emotional or mental harm due to the presence of the defendant. With respect to facility dogs, the law states that the court may set any other conditions it finds just and appropriate, including the use of a service or therapy animal that has been evaluated and registered according to national standards, in any proceeding involving a sexual offense. When deciding whether to permit a child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness to testify with the assistance of a registered service or therapy animal, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the age of the child victim or witness; (2) the age of the sexual offense victim or witness at the time the sexual offense occurred; (3) the interests of the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness; (4) the rights of the parties to the litigation; and (5) any other relevant factor that would facilitate the testimony by the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness. | Statute |
| Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty | 71 A.D.3d 734 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2010) | 2010 WL 818490 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 896 N.Y.S.2d 440 |
Animal rights protestors appealed the decision of the Supreme Court, Westchester County that permanently enjoined the protestors from engaging in protest activity that constituted a private nuisance (to wit, participating in targeted protest at the home of the plaintiff Mark L. Bibi). This court found that the protestors failed to refute the evidence from the lower court that showed the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law (including evidence of the appellant's federal conviction conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992). While the court did find that the appellant-protestor's incarceration did not render the appeal academic, imposition of the injunction was a reasonable and constitutional restriction on protest activity. |
Case |
| ME - Disaster - Chapter 307. State of Maine Animal Response Team. | 7 M.R.S.A. § 1901 - 1902 | ME ST T. 7 § 1901 - 1902 | The Commissioner of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources is directed to develop a State of Maine Animal Response Team to support a network that protects human and animal health through preparation, response and recovery for animal emergencies. The Team is to facilitate a response to a natural or man-made disaster and minimize the economic and environmental impacts of animal emergencies. The Treasurer of State is mandated to establish the State of Maine Animal Response Team Fund to pay costs incurred by the Team. | Statute |
| Bard v. Jahnke | 791 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. 2005) | 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 01979 |
A subcontractor was injured at a dairy farm he was working at when he was pinned up against a stall by a bull . The subcontractor brought claims against the dairy farm and carpenter for negligence and strict liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed. |
Case |
| Ohio v. George | 2014-Ohio-5781 (App. Ct, 2014) | Clayton George was convicted of raping two children of his girlfriend, age six and eight at the time of the crime. Among assignments of error on appeal was that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing Avery, a facility dog, to accompany the two children during their testimony without a showing of necessity. On appeal, the defense argued that (1) unlike the facility dogs in Tohom, Spence, and Dye, Avery was “recognizable on the record while he was in court,” (2) the prosecution failed to show necessity for having Avery at trial, and (3) the standards set in Tohom, Spence, and Dye should have applied to determine whether Avery was permitted at trial. The appellate court noted that the defense had not objected to the presence of the dog during the trial nor had he made these three points at trial, meaning that the appellate court did not need to consider them for the first time on appeal under Ohio appellate law. The assignments of error were all overruled and the judgement of the trial court was affirmed. | Case | |
| Savory v. Hensick | 143 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2004) |
Contractor brought a premises liability action against homeowners after falling over their dog. Contractor was descending from a ladder while working on homeowners' premises and stepped on the dog at the base of the ladder. The trial court held in favor of the contractor because the homeowners' dog made the yard foreseeably dangerous and the appellate court affirmed. |
Case | |
| IL - Hunting - 5/48-3. Hunter or fisherman interference | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-3 | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-3 | A person commits hunter or fisherman interference when he or she intentionally or knowingly obstructs or interferes with the lawful taking of wildlife or aquatic life by another person with the specific intent to prevent that lawful taking. This includes things such as blocking or impeding the person hunting, using objects or barriers, using artificial or natural stimuli to hinder the lawful taking, or even using a drone in a way that interferes with another person's lawful taking of wildlife or aquatic life. A first violation is a Class B misdemeanor with enhacements for subsequent offenses. | Statute |
| In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation | 627 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C.,2009) | 2009 WL 1750413 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiffs Safari Club International and Safari Club International Foundation brought this action under the APA challenging the FWS's legal determination that the listing of the Polar Bear as "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act was a final agency action. At issue here is defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that plaintiffs fail to challenge a final agency action as required for judicial review under the APA. Alternatively, defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. This Court found that the action challenged by SCI and SCIF is final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to the APA. On the issue of standing, defendants argue that plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs have not alleged facts to establish that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the “procedures in question” threaten a “concrete interest" - an interest in conservation that is impacted by the import ban. Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was denied. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Felts (unpublished) | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 124390 (N.D.Iowa) |
Defendant kennel operator was found to violate the AWA on multiple occasions when inspected by APHIS representatives. From 2005 to 2009, defendant repeatedly failed inspections where APHIS found that he provided inadequate veterinary care, did not maintain complete records on the dogs, and did not properly maintain the housing facilities for the dogs. The Administrator of APHIS filed and served on Defendant an administrative complaint for violations. Defendant never filed an answer, and so a Default Decision and Order was entered against Defendant. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part because Defendant failed to file an answer to the administrative complaint, and so was deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint. |
Case | |
| Cornett v. Red Stone Group, Inc. | Cornett v. Red Stone Group, 41 N.E.3d 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) |
Cornett filed suit against Red Stone Group, Inc. alleging negligence and premise liability. Cornett argued that Red Stone Group maintained a defective gate and fence that led to the Red Stone Group's horses escaping and trampling Cornett which caused her serious injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Red Stone Group on the basis of that it was immune from liability under the equine activities statute. Cornett appealed the court’s decision and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ultimately, the court of appeals needed to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was immune from liability under the statute. In order to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was covered under the statute, the court of appeals looked to the language of the statute. After looking at the language of the statute, the court of appeals found that Cornett was an “equine activity participant” at the time of her injury and therefore Red Stone Group could not be liable for her injuries. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and granted summary judgment for Red Stone Group. |
Case |