Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Haberman v. United States | 26 Cl. Ct. 1405 (1992) | 38 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 76,420 |
The U.S. Claims Court upheld its jurisdiction over an action brought by individuals who had their Private Maintenance and Care Agreements (PMCA) revoked by the Bureau of Land Management and their adopted wild horses repossessed when the agency learned that the individuals intended to sell the horses to slaughter once they obtained full legal title to them under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act. The court found that the PMCA agreement constituted a contract between the government and the adopter, and thus that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Though the court noted that individual adopters would have to overcome the suggestion that they violated the terms of the PMCA by intending to sell the horses to slaughter. |
Case |
| State v. Ancona | 991 A.2d 663 (Conn.App.,2010) | 120 Conn.App. 324 (Conn.App.,2010), 2010 WL 1190539 |
Defendant Michael Ancona appealed his conviction of permitting a dog to roam at large in violation of General Statutes § 22-364(a). The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly held him responsible as a keeper of a dog when the owner was present and known to the authorities, and (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The plain language of the statute § 22-364(a) states that an “owner or keeper” is prohibited from allowing a dog to roam on a public highway. Either the owner or keeper or both can be held liable for a violation of the statute. The court also found sufficient evidence that defendant was the keeper of the pit bull: the dog stayed at his house, he initially responded to the incident and tried to pull the dog away, and defendant yelled at the Officer Rogers that she was not to take "his dog." |
Case |
| MD - Police animals - § 3-526. Funding for veterinary treatment for retired law enforcement dogs | MD Code, Public Safety, § 3-526 | This law enacted in 2021 provides that a State or local law enforcement agency that removes from duty a dog used in law enforcement work shall reimburse an individual who, under a written agreement with the law enforcement agency, takes possession of the dog on or after October 1, 2020, for reasonable and necessary veterinary treatment provided to the dog. Public donations may be accepted and distributed to the K-9 Compassionate Care Fund. Reimbursement may be only for usual and customary veterinary treatment that is not attributable to abuse or neglect of the dog. Costs may not exceed $2,500 during a calendar year and $10,000 over the life of the dog. | Statute | |
| ID - Dangerous Dogs running at large - Chapter 28. Dogs. | I.C. § 25-2805 | ID ST § 25-2805 | This Idaho statute provides that any person who lets his or her dog run at large after a complaint has been made to the sheriff shall be guilty of an infraction punishable as provided in section 18-113A, Idaho Code. Any person who lets his or her dog physically attack someone when not provoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor in addition to any liability as provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code. For a second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the court may, in the interest of public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the appropriate authorities to destroy the dog. | Statute |
| Klitzka ex rel. Teutonico v. Hellios | 810 N.E.2d 252 (Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2004) | 284 Ill.Dec. 599 (2004); 2004 WL 1109781 |
In this Illinois case, the Appellate Court considered, as a matter of first impression, under what circumstances does a landlord owe a duty of care to his tenant's invitees to prevent injury from an attack by an animal kept by the tenant on the leased premises? A minor invitee (Alexus) of the tenants was bitten by tenants' dog and brought a negligence action against residential landlords. It was undisputed that the tenants held exclusive control over the premises and paid $700 a month in rent to the landlords. The Appellate Court held that even if landlords knew tenants' dog was dangerous, the landlords had no duty to protect the tenants' invitee because landlords retained no control over the leased premises where injury occurred. "Here, the tenants' affirmative conduct of bringing the dog into the living space of the home, an area over which the landlords had no control, is what might have been the proximate cause of Alexus' injuries." |
Case |
| CA - Slaughter - § 598b. Animals commonly kept as pets or companions; use as food; violation; exceptions | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598b | CA PENAL § 598b | This statute makes it a misdemeanor to possess, import into, or export from, California, sell, buy, give away, or accept any carcass of any animal commonly kept as a pet with the intent of using any part of that carcass for food. It is also a misdemeanor to possess, import, export, buy, sell, give away or accept a common pet animal with the intent of killing it for food. | Statute |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink | 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir., 2011) |
Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands. Plaintiff argued that the 2006 Regulations violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals found for the plaintiff, holding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory changes. BLM also violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. The FLPMA claim was remanded. |
Case | |
| Maldonado v. Franklin | Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 4739438 (Tex. App. Sept. 30, 2019) | Trenton and Karina Franklin moved into a subdivision in San Antonio, Texas in September of 2017. Margarita Maldonado lived in the home immediately behind the Franklins’ house and could see into the Franklins’ backyard. Maldonado began complaining about the Franklins’ treatment of their dog. The Franklins left the dog outside 24 hours a day, seven days a week no matter what the weather was like. Maldonado also complained that the dog repeatedly whined and howled which kept her up at night causing her emotional distress. Maldonado went online expressing concern about the health and welfare of her neighbor’s dog, without naming any names. Mr. Franklin at some point saw the post and entered the conversation which lead to Mr. Franklin and Maldonado exchanging direct messages about the dog. Maldonado even placed a dog bed in the backyard for the dog as a gift. In December of 2017, the Franklins filed suit against Maldonado for invasion of privacy by intrusion and seclusion alleging that Maldonado was engaged in a campaign of systemic harassment over the alleged mistreatment of their dog. While the suit was pending, Maldonado contacted Animal Control Services several times to report that the dog was outside with the heat index over 100 degrees. Each time an animal control officer responded to the call they found no actionable neglect or abuse. In June of 2018, Maldonado picketed for five days by walking along the neighborhood sidewalks, including in front of the Franklins’ house, carrying signs such as “Bring the dog in,” and “If you’re hot, they’re hot.” The Franklins then amended their petition adding claims for slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Maldonado, which was ultimately vacated on appeal. Maldonado filed a Anti-SLAPP motion and amended motion to dismiss the Franklins’ claims as targeting her First Amendment rights. The trial court did not rule on the motions within thirty days, so the motions were denied by operation of law. Maldonado appealed. The Court began its analysis by determining whether Maldonado’s motions were timely. Under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) a motion to dismiss must be filed within sixty days of the legal action. The sixty-day deadline reset each time new factual allegations were alleged. Due to the fact that the Franklins had amended their petition three times and some of the amended petitions did not allege any new factual allegations, the only timely motions that Maldonado filed were for the Franklins’ claims for slander and libel. The Court then concluded that Maldonado’s verbal complaints to the Animal Control Service and online posts on community forums about the Franklins’ alleged mistreatment of their dog were communications made in connection with an issue related to a matter of public concern and were made in the exercise of free speech. Therefore, the TCPA applied to the Franklins’ slander and libel claims. The Court ultimately concluded that although Maldonado established that the TCPA applied to the slander and libel claims, the Franklins met their burden to establish a prima facie case on the slander and libel claims. Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the slander and libel claims were properly denied. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case | |
| Jones v. Gordon | 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986) |
A permit was authorized to Sea World to capture killer whales. No environmental impact statement was prepared. Plaintiffs allege that the issuance of the permit without preparation of an environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Court holds that the permit must be reconsidered after an environmental impact statement is prepared. |
Case | |
| KS - Assistance Animal - Consolidated Assistance Animal Laws | K. S. A. 39-1101 to 1113; 21-6416; 8-1542 | KS ST 39-1101 to 1113; 21-6416; 8-1542 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute |