|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Kimbell||Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4186913 (D.Or.)||
After filing a complaint challenging certain decisions by the United States Forest Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service authorizing livestock grazing within a national forest, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction seeking an order prohibiting the authorization of livestock grazing on certain public lands until Plaintiffs’ claims could be heard on the merits. The United States District Court, D. Oregon granted Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its claims, and that Plaintiffs made a sufficient showing that irreparable harm would likely occur if the relief sought is not granted.
|Ascencio v. ADRU Corporation||2014 WL 204212 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d)||
A woman, who suffers from a disability that is accompanied by deep depression and anxiety, went to a fast food restaurant with her mother and her two service dogs. Upon entering the establishment, the employees refused to serve them, forced them to leave, and retaliated against them by calling the police and threatening them with arrest. The woman and her mother sued the fast food restaurant for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related California statutes. When the fast food restaurant failed to file an answer, the court entered a default judgment against the fast food restaurant; awarded the plaintiffs with damages, court costs and attorney fees; and placed a permanent injunction against the fast food restaurant.
|AR - Equine - Equine Activity Liability||A.C.A. § 16-120-201 - 202||AR ST § 16-120-201 to 202||This Arkansas statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market are not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of an equine activities activity or a livestock activity. Liability is not limited when the equine activity sponsor or an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market knows or should know the equipment or tack is faulty, fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant, was aware of dangerous latent condition on the land, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or when the participant is intentionally injured. Warning signs alerting participants to the assumption of risk in equine activities are also required by law.||Statute|
|U.S. v. Gibert||677 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2012)||The primary question in this appeal was whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. Defendants were indicted, in violation of the Animal Welfare Act, for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in “gamefowl derbies,” otherwise known as “cockfighting.” Upon the 4th Circuit’s review of the parties' arguments, it held that the animal fighting statute was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. It also held that the statute did not require the government to prove the defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the district court’s decision was affirmed.||Case|
|Cetacean Cmty. v. President of the United States||249 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D.C. Hawaii, 2003)||Plaintiff, a community of whales, dolphins, and porpoises, sued Defendants, the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of Defense, alleging violations of the (NEPA), the (APA), the (ESA), and the (MMPA). The Plaintffs were concerned with the United States Navy's development and use of a low frequency active sonar (LFAS) system. The community alleged a failure to comply with statutory requirements with respect to LFAS use during threat and warfare conditions.||Case|
|NV - Trusts - Chapter 163. Trusts. Creation and Validity of Trusts. 163.0075. Validity of trust providing for care of one or mor||N. R. S. 163.0075||NV ST 163.0075||This Nevada statute allows for a trust created for the care of one or more animals that are alive at the time of the settlor's death (note the statute does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). Such a trust terminates upon the death of all animals covered by the terms of the trust. It further provides that a settlor's expression of intent must be liberally construed in favor of the creation of such a trust.||Statute|
|WA - Ecoterrorism - 4.24.570. Acts against animals in research or educational facilities||West's RCWA 4.24.570 - 580||WA ST 4.24.570 - 580||These Washington sections concern interference with animal research or educational facilities as well as facilities that keep animals for agricultural or veterinary purposes. Both sections provide that any person or organization that plans or assists in the development of a plan to commit an intentional tort described in the laws is liable for damages to the same extent as a person who has committed the tort. However, membership in a liable organization does not in itself establish the member's liability under this subsection. Section 4.24.580 allows an individual employed with an animal facility to obtain injunctive relief if he or she has reason to believe that he or she may be injured. This includes obtaining an injunction to prevent harassment.||Statute|
|American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus||317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003)||55 ERC 1904, 354 U.S.App.D.C. 432||
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits.
|Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service||957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992)||
Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe. Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
|MN - Health - 1721.0500. IMPORTATION OF DOGS, CATS, OR FERRETS.||MN ADC 1721.0500||Minn. R. 1721.0500||This Minnesota regulation states that, unless otherwise provided, a dog, cat, or ferret imported into the state must be accompanied by a certificate of veterinary inspection. A dog, cat, or ferret three months of age or older imported into the state must be currently vaccinated for rabies unless they meet all conditions of subpart 1, item D, or are exempted by the board based on the written recommendations of a licensed veterinarian who has examined the animal and who has determined that vaccination is contraindicated due to a medical condition.||Administrative|