|Wildlife Jurisprudence||David Favre||25 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 459||This article begins by briefly exploring the extent to which wildlife, historically and presently, have a place within our society, culture and legal system. Then, building upon the reality that wildlife, like humans, have personal interests in living their individual lives, suggests five principles for developing laws and programs to better accommodate wildlife interests in the legal system. Individuals, species and geographic groups are presented as focus points for thinking about wildlife interests. Additionally, the three possibilities of who should be the plaintiff for asserting wildlife rights are described: government, private parties, and the wildlife themselves. Finally, the article proposes new paths forward for our system’s wildlife with the goal that their interests in life and habitat can be more forthrightly balanced against competing human interests.||Article|
|Wildlife Protection Association of Australia Inc and Minister for Environment and Heritage and Australian Wildlife Protection Council Inc and Animals Australia and Flinders Council|| AATA 953||
The respondent Minister made declarations under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) that particular plans relating to Bennett's wallabies and Tasmanian pademelons were approved wildlife trade management plans. The applicant questioned whether the plans permitted the inhumane hunting of wallabies and treatment of joeys as well as the basis upon which the quotas were derived. The tribunal found both matters satisfactorily addressed though further monitoring measures were deemed to be prudent.
|Wildlife Rehabilitation||Angela Nicole Johnson||
Brief Summary of Wildlife Rehabilitation Laws
|Wilhelm v. Flores||95 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 2006)||2006 WL 1566461 (Tex.), 49 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 709||
In this Texas case, a deceased worker's estate and his four adult children brought a negligence action against the beekeeper and others, after the worker died from anaphylactic shock caused by bee stings. On petition for review, the Supreme Court held that beekeeper did not owe worker, a commercial buyer's employee, any duty to warn him of dangers associated with bee stings or to protect worker from being stung.
|Wilkerson v. State||401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981)||
Appellant was charged with violating Florida's Cruelty to Animals statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 828.12 (1979). He pleaded nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's order, which denied his motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The supreme court affirmed. Appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the statute failed to provide guidance as to what animals were included and what acts were unnecessary. The supreme court concluded that people of common intelligence would have been able to discern what were and were not animals under the statute and that the legislature clearly intended that a raccoon be included. Additionally, just because the statute did not enumerate every instance in which conduct against an animal was unnecessary or excessive did not render the statute void for vagueness. The conduct prohibited was described in general language. Finally, because appellant's conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute, he did not have standing to make an overbreadth attack.
|Wilkins v. Daniels||Slip Copy, 2012 WL 6644465 (S.D.Ohio, 2012)||
Various owners of exotic and wild animals filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction against the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director, David Daniels. The owners of the exotic and wild animals argued the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, which the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director were trying to enforce, was unconstitutional. The district court denied the owners’ motion for obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction reasoning that the exceptions to the Act’s ban on owning wild and exotic animals does not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, that the legislature had a legitimate purpose so as to not violate procedural due process with regards to micro-chipping wild and exotic animals, and that the Act did not constitute an unconstitutional takings. Significantly, the court recognized that owners of wild and exotic animals have a limited or qualified property interest in said animals.
|Wilkison v. City of Arapahoe||926 N.W.2d 441 (Neb.,2019)||302 Neb. 968 (2019)||Brooke Wilkison (Brooke) got an American Staffordshire Terrier (pit bull) in 2015. In 2016, the city of Arapahoe passed an ordinance regarding dangerous dogs which contained a restriction on owning a Rottweiler or an American Staffordshire Terrier within city limits. The ordinance allowed for dogs licensed prior to January 1, 2017 to be grandfathered in as acceptable. Brooke did not have his dog licensed prior to the that date. Law enforcement told Brooke he could not keep the dog. Brooke filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent Arapahoe from implementing and enforcing the ordinance. The trial court found for Brooke and Arapahoe appealed. Arapahoe's first assignment of error is that the court erred by applying the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to the ordinance. The Court found that Arapahoe was not exempt from the strictures of the FHA. Arapahoe's second assignment of error was that the Court erred by enjoining enforcement of the ordinance against Brooke because Brooke's accommodation is not reasonable and necessary. The Court found that Brooke failed to meet his burden of proof that his requested accommodation is necessary for him to receive the same enjoyment from his home as a non-disabled person would receive. Brooke already owned another dog and the ordinance only covered certain dog breeds. Brooke's other claims for relief were remanded to the district court. In conclusion, the district court erred in entering a declaratory judgment and enjoining Arapahoe from enforcing the ordinance as applied to Brooke.||Case|
|Will the Heavens Fall? De-Radicalizing the Precedent-Breaking Decision||Paul Waldau||7 Animal L. 75 (2001)||
This article offers an extended analogy for the purpose of posing basic questions about proposals for granting legal rights to some nonhuman animals. The analogy is drawn from the precedent-breaking eighteenth century English case Somerset v. Stewart, which liberated an African slave. The article highlights the complex cultural backdrop in each situation, and suggests that the comparison helps one see the nature and possibilities of precedent-breaking decisions that rely on various non-legal resources available to judges who, because of conscience, principle, or policy considerations, choose not to follow established precedent.
|William v. Orange County Animal Control||
This involves a case where owners challenge validity of euthanasia order for "dangerous" dog. "Boo," a bullmastiff (large breed of dog), knocked down a child who had walked into his (the dog's) yard. The child accused dog of biting him. The Orange County Animal Control Department ordered that Boo be euthanized as a "vicious" and "dangerous" animal. The owners filed a Writ of Mandamus to delay the killing of the dog until their challenge could be heard in court.