Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MN - Initiatives - Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | Amendment 2 (1998) | This ballot measure asked whether the Minnesota Constitution should be amended to affirm that hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good. The measure was passed in 1998 by 77.2% of voters. | Statute | |
| WV - Dangerous - § 20-2-16. Dogs chasing deer | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-16 | WV ST § 20-2-16 | This West Virginia statute states that, except as provided in § 20-2-5j enacted in 2020, no person may permit or use his or her dog to hunt or chase deer. A natural resources police officer shall take into possession any dog known to have unlawfully hunted or chased deer. If the owner of the dog can be determined, the dog shall be returned to the owner. If the owner of the dog cannot be determined, the natural resources police officer shall deliver the dog to the appropriate county humane officer or facility consistent with the provisions of this code. | Statute |
| WA - Lien, cruelty - 60.56.025. Lien created for care of animal seized by law enforcement officer | West's RCWA 60.56.025 | WA ST 60.56.025 | This Washington law states that if a law enforcement officer authorizes removal of an animal pursuant to chapter 16.52 RCW, the person or entity receiving the animal and aiding in its care or restoration to health shall have a lien upon the animal for the cost of feeding, pasturing, and caring otherwise for the animal. | Statute |
| TX - Dallas - Dallas City Code. Volume I. Chapter 7. Animals. | Sec. 7-1.1 - Sec. 7-8.3 |
This comprises Dallas, Texas' animal control and dangerous dog ordinances. Among the provisions is a requirement that an owner of an animal restrain the animal at all times in a fenced yard, in an enclosed pen or structure, or by a tether or leash. Other provisions of interest include an anti-trapping provision; a section that prohibits the carrying or transporting of an animal within the open bed of any moving pickup; and limitations on the number of dogs or cats that residents can maintain based on the size of the lot and proximity to other dwellings. Dallas has a mandatory spay/neuter requirement; an owner of a dog or cat commits an offense if the animal is not spayed or neutered once over six months old (subject to certain exemptions). Further, a person commits an offense if he or she breeds a dog or cat without a valid intact animal permit for the dog or cat. Other provisions include the keeping of prohibited animals, the keeping of roosters, and noise disturbances by animals. |
Local Ordinance | |
| NH - Divorce - 458:16-a Property Settlement. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458:16-a | NH ST § 458:16-a | This New Hampshire statute defines "property" for purposes of the state's marriage dissolution (divorce) procedure. In August of 2019, a new provision was added to this law related to animals (Subsection II-a). This subsection states that "[t]angible property shall include animals. In such cases, the property settlement shall address the care and ownership of the parties' animals, taking into consideration the animals' wellbeing." | Statute |
| Vanater v. Village of South Point | 717 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Ohio 1989) |
Village criminal ordinance, which prohibited the owning or harboring of pit bull terriers or other vicious dogs within village limits, was not overbroad, even though identification of a "pit bull" may be difficult in some situations, as there are methods to determine with sufficient certainty whether dog is a "pit bull.". |
Case | |
| Rowley v. City of New Bedford | 333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | 2018 WL 4600647 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. | Case |
| Cruelty, Police Shooting Pets, Domestic Violence and Hoarding | Policy | |||
| TX - Fighting - § 42.10. Dog Fighting. | V. T. C. A., Penal Code § 42.10 | TX PENAL § 42.10 | Texas criminal statute that prohibits dog fighting. Actions ranging from causing a dog to fight with another to attending a dog fight as a spectator are prohibited. To constitute an offense, one must demonstrate the requisite intent of intentionally or knowingly. | Statute |
| Posnien v. Rogers | 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) |
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. |
Case |