Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Rehabilitation, wildlife - Subchapter P. Wildlife Rehabilitation | 58 PA ADC § 147.301 - 312 | 58 Pa. Code § 147.301 - 312 | Under this Pennsylvania chapter of regulations, the Director may issue a permit to an individual who meets the requirements of 34 Pa.C.S. § 2901(a) (relating to authority to issue permits) and this subchapter for the purpose of wildlife rehabilitation, wildlife capture and transportation, and educational use of rehabilitation wildlife. "Wildlife rehabilitation"is defined as the treatment and temporary care of injured, diseased and displaced wildlife, and the subsequent release of healthy wildlife to appropriate habitats in the wild. | Administrative | |
| Kollman v. Vilsack | Slip Copy, No. 8:14-CV-1123-T-23TGW, 2016 WL 4702426 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2016) |
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159) regulates the housing, sale, transport, treatment, and exhibition of animals. Defendants, United States Secretary of Agriculture, licensed Plaintiff, Lancelot Kollman, as an exhibitor under the AWA. However, after the death of two lions and Kollman’s failure to contest charges, the Secretary revoked Kollman's license. Still, Hawthorn, a company that holds an exhibitor license, hired Kollman to train a “tiger act” for performance at circuses throughout the United States. Hawthorn then asked Kollman to travel with the tigers and perform the act. However, the USDA received complaints about Kollman's participation in the act, despite having his license revoked. The USDA investigated and determined that Kollman was prohibited from exhibiting animals as an employee of Hawthorn. Kollman, sued Thomas J. Vilsack, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, and Chester A. Gipson, a deputy administrator of animal care. Kollman sued for a declaration that, at a circus maintained by his employer, Hawthorn Corporation, he could publicly perform the tiger act. The Defendants moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division, held that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment was Granted. The court reasoned that Kollman was barred from presenting animals on behalf of Hawthorn because regardless of his status as a Hawthorn employee, Section 2.10(c) of the Animal Welfare Act clearly prohibited Kollman, as an individual with a revoked license, from exhibiting an animal. Secondly, Section 2.10(c) was unambiguous. |
Case | ||
| Chadd v. U.S. | 794 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 4509174 (9th Cir., 2015) | The issue in this case was whether the United States may be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) relating to a mountain goat that attacked and killed a Park visitor. Wife of the visitor, on her own behalf and as representative of his estate, sued the NPS, claiming officials breached their duty of reasonable care by failing to destroy the goat in the years leading up to her husband’s death. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied. The court found the NPS’s management policies manual did not direct or mandate the NPS to take action to kill the mountain goat, and thus the NPS's management of the goat fell within the discretionary function exception. Further, the NPS’s decision to use non-lethal methods to manage a mountain was susceptible to policy analysis, which fell within the discretionary exception as well. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. Senior Circuit Judge Kleinfield filed a dissenting opinion. | Case | |
| FL - Dogs - Florida Dog /Dangerous Dog Laws | West's F. S. A. § 509.233; § 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | FL ST § 509.233; §§ 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | These Florida statutes outline the state's dog provisions, which mainly cover dangerous dog/dog bite laws. The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident. If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The dog will be impounded for a period of ten days during which time the owner of the dog may request a hearing. | Statute | |
| State v. Cowan | 814 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2004) | 103 Ohio St.3d 144 (2004) |
A neighbor of the owner of 3 dogs complained to the dog warden, alleging that two of the dogs bit her. The dog warden then advised the owner that her dogs were dangerous and vicious and that she must follow the statutory rules for owning vicious dogs. When she failed to follow those statutory rules, she was criminally prosecuted. The Supreme Court of Ohio said that her constitutional right to due process was infringed because she had no chance before trial to challenge the designation of her dogs as vicious. |
Case | |
| Simons v. State | 217 So. 3d 16 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) | 2016 WL 661284 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016) | In this case, defendant was convicted of a Class C felony of cruelty to a dog or cat and was sentenced to twenty years in prison (the conviction stems from the beating a kitten to death with his bare fists). The lower court applied the Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) which allowed the court to sentence defendant beyond the maximum penalty (defendant had 16 prior felony convictions). Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that HFOA did not apply to his Class C felony of cruelty to a dog or cat. Ultimately, the court held that HFOA did not apply to the Class C felony here. The court maintained that the animal cruelty statue was plainly written and explicitly stated that a first degree conviction of animal cruelty would not be considered a felony under HFOA. As a result, defendant's conviction was upheld but remanded for new sentencing. | Case | |
| MN - Veterinarian Issues - Professional Conduct | MN ADC 9100.0700 | Minnesota Rules, part 9100.0700 | The following acts by a licensed Minnesota veterinarian constitute unprofessional conduct and are grounds for disciplinary action against the licensee. | Administrative | |
| CT - Hunting of bald eagle prohibited - Chapter 490. Fisheries and Game | C. G. S. A. § 26-93 | CO ST § 30-15-105 | Connecticut law prohibits the harassment and killing of bald eagles. Violation of the statute can result in a fine of not more than $100 or up to thirty days in jail, or both. | Statute | |
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