Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Crimes - § 597. Cruelty to animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597 | CA PENAL § 597 | This statutes states that anyone who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($ 20,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment, or, alternatively, by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($ 20,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment. The statute also defines specific forms of torture and mistreatment that qualifies as a crime under this section. | Statute | |
| NE - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Neb. Rev. St. § 49-801; Neb. Rev. St. § 20-126 - 131.04; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1313 - 1314; Neb. Rev. St. § 54-603; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1009.01 | NE ST § 49-801; Neb. Rev. St. § 20-126 - 131.04; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1313 - 1314; NE St. § 54-603; NE St. § 28-1009.01 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant service animal, assistance animal, and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| United States of America v. Kraft | 2005 WL 578313 (U.S., Dist. of Minn. 2005) |
A man was charged and convicted for violating the Lacey Act after illegally selling a tiger and grizzly bear. The trial court admitted the man's conversation into evidence in which he implicated himself in the illegal sale of a grizzly bear. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding the man's conversation was not protected by the Sixth Amendment because it was made before there were specific charges against him for the illegal sale of the grizzly bear. |
Case | ||
| Hollendale Apartments & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel | --- N.Y.S.3d ---- , 2019 WL 2031263 (N.Y. App. Div., 2019) | 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03718 | The Plaintiff owns and operates an apartment complex with a policy that prohibits defendants from keeping a dog on the premises. The Defendant, Bonesteel, began renting an apartment at Plaintiff's complex in 2011 under a one-year lease. Defendant continued to renew his one-year lease for additional one-year terms until 2014. Defendant's therapist sent a letter to the Plaintiff requesting an exception to the no dog policy so that the Defendant could have an emotional support animal. The Plaintiff denied the request but stated that it would allow a bird or cat or an early termination of Defendant's lease. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking a judgment declaring that the Plaintiff's refusal to permit the Defendant to have an emotional support dog was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Human Rights Law (HRL). The Plaintiff subsequently reduced the Defendant's lease renewal term to three months. The Defendant filed counterclaims on grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court of New York also granted a motion allowing the Attorney General to intervene. The Attorney General asserted counterclaims on similar grounds to those raised by the Defendant. After a nonjury trial, the trial court issued a judgment that the Plaintiff's actions did not violate the FHA and the HRL. The Defendant then appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Plaintiff's claims were justiciable even though the matter was not raised by the parties. Since the Plaintiff had already denied the Defendant's request for an exception to the policy when it filed the action and no harm to the Plaintiff occurred or was impending, it was essentially asking the Court to issue an advisory opinion which is not an exercise of judicial function. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment. The Court then considered the Defendant's counterclaims since concrete injuries were alleged. The only two arguments addressed were whether the Defendant actually had a qualifying disability within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL and whether the accommodation requested was necessary to afford the Defendant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. The Court concluded that the Defendant met his burden to establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA and HRL. The Court also found that the Defendant "offered sufficient evidence that having an emotional support dog would affirmatively enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his disability, and thus demonstrated necessity within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL." Lastly, the Court found that the Plaintiff retaliated against the Defendant by reducing his lease renewal terms to three months. Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to judgment in his favor on the retaliation counterclaims. | Case | |
| CHAPMAN v. DECROW | 93 Me. 378, 45 A. 295 (1899) | 74 Am.St.Rep. 357 (1899) |
In this Maine case, the defendant was found liable for trespass after he killed the plaintiff's dog. Defendant asserted that the dog was trespassing on his premises, and was “then, or had been immediately before the shooting, engaged, with two other dogs, in chasing and worrying his domesticated animals, to wit, tame rabbits." As a result, he claimed that the killing was justified. This court first disagreed with defendant's claim that an unlicensed dog is not property because it constitutes a nuisance. This court found that, by the common law, a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie. Moreover, the statute to which defendant claims authority to kill an unlicensed dog only allows a constable to do so after a proscribed lapse. |
Case | |
| AWA - Birds - Subpart G. Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatment, and Transportation of Birds | 9 C.F.R. § 3.150 - 3.168 | These AWA regulations comprise Subpart G for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatment, and Transportation of Birds. | Administrative | ||
| MN - Veterinary - Chapter 156. Veterinarians. Board of Veterinary Medicine. | M.S.A. § 156.001 - 20 | MN ST § 156.001 - 20 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall | 565 F.Supp.2d 1160 (D.Mont., 2008) | 2008 WL 2780917 (D.Mont.) |
The case concerns the delisting of the wolf from the Endangered Species list that occurred in March of 2008. Plaintiffs-Defenders of Wildlife moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to reinstate ESA protections for the wolf. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that even though the Fish & Wildlife Service’s (“Service”) original environmental impact statement (EIS) on wolf reintroduction conditioned the delisting on a finding of genetic exchange between populations, and there is no evidence that such exchange has occurred. Further, the Service approved Wyoming's 2007 wolf management plan even though the Wyoming plan still contains provisions that the Service previously found inadequate. On the whole, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and granted plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As a result, the Endangered Species Act protections were reinstated for the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf pending final resolution of this matter on the merits. |
Case | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 4 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 4 (1998)
INTRODUCTIONTHE CONFLICT BETWEEN SPECIES IN AN EVER MORE CROWDED WORLD |
Policy | |||
| The Equine Identification (England) Regulations 2018 | The Equine Identification (England) Regulations 2018 | Owners have two years to ensure all equines born before 30th June 2009 are chipped. Some wild and semi-wild equids are exempt. Non-compliant owners risk being fined. | Statute |