Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kasey v. Beshear | 626 S.W.3d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1324395 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2021) | Appellants, Teresa's Legacy Continues, Inc., a non-profit organization of concerned citizens and taxpayers in Kentucky sued the Governor and Commissioner of Agriculture alleging failure to monitor or enforce compliance with animal shelter statutes (KRS3 Chapter 258, Animal Control and Protection). The appellants contend that in 120 of Kentucky's counties, only 12% are in compliance with the statutes and over 50% are in violation of at least three statutes. In lieu of filing an answer, the appellants filed a motion to dismiss based largely on appellants' lack of standing. In response, the appellants claimed standing based on actual damage and argued that they have "a real and substantial interest in the outcome" because post-tax funds that are supposed to be for shelters will "unjustly enrich[]" the Commonwealth. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing in 2018 and this appeal followed. On appeal, this court held that the failure to enforce Kentucky laws is not the particularized injury contemplated under the Lujan test. In fact, the court declined to expand the doctrine of standing to include an injury based on the appellants voluntary expenditure of personal time and resources to care for abandoned animals when they were under no legal obligation to do so. As to the asserted taxpayer standing, the court found that appellants failed to allege in circuit court that funds were being illegally expended and thus, could not consider this argument for the first time on appeal. Further, the animal shelter statutes at issue require only that the Governor and Commission of Agriculture disburse the funds and had no control over the oversight of funding (that goes to the governing board of each county). Thus, the cause of appellants' injuries could not be traced to the appellees. Lastly, the court acknowledged that while appellants have attempted to show standing via citizen and taxpayer status, Kentucky law has not previously considered that avenue. Said the court, "[p]erhaps, given the right facts and circumstances, one could obtain such standing. However, for the reasons set forth above, we cannot say the Appellants have properly pled it here." Affirmed. | Case | |
| Silver v. State | 23 A.3d 867 (Md. App., 2011) | 2011 WL 2437286 (Md. App., 2011); 420 Md. 415 (2011) |
Defendants were sentenced by the District Court after pleading guilty to one count of animal cruelty. After defendants were convicted in the Circuit Court, they petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court could order that defendants pay restitution for the euthanasia cost for the deceased horse, but it was beyond the court’s authority to order defendants pay restitution for costs of caring for the two surviving horses because defendants had not been convicted in those cases. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike officer's testimony for prosecutor's failure to provide the officer's written report prior to trial. Finally, photos and testimony regarding the surviving horses were “crime scene” evidence and not inadmissible “other crimes” evidence because the neglect of the surviving horses was part of the same criminal episode. |
Case | |
| Hill v. Norton | 275 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2001) | 53 ERC 2038, 348 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,437 (2001) |
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000), extends protection to all birds covered by four migratory bird treaties, which, in relevant part, define migratory birds to include the family Anatidae (which includes the mute swan). Under the authority, delegated by Congress the Secretary of the Interior has published lists of protected migratory birds. The instant case arose when appellant Joyce Hill filed a law suit pro se in District Court claiming that the Secretary's regulation violated the MBTA in excluding mute swans from the List of Migratory Birds promulgated at 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2000). The District Court rejected Hill's claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. In reversing the the District Court's decision, the court found that the Secretary pointed to nothing in the statute, applicable treaties, or administrative record that justified the exclusion of mute swans from the List of Migratory Birds. It also ordered the Secretary's List of Migratory Birds, codified at 50 C.F.R. § 10.13, insofar as the list excludes mute swans, to be vacated. This case more or less set the stage for the revisions to the MBTA in 2004 by Congress's passing of the MBTRA. |
Case | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking and Importing Marine Mammals | 1998 WL 71373 (F.R.) |
This material from the Federal Register invites public comment on the proposed guidelines outlined by the NMFS for acceptable methods for deterring marine mammals. |
Administrative | ||
| CA - Service Animal - § 600. Horses or dogs used by peace officers or volunteers; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 600 | CA PENAL § 600 | This statute makes it an offense to willfully, maliciously and with no legal justification harm, injure, obstruct, or interfere with a horse or dog under the supervision of law enforcement in the discharge of official duties or a volunteer under the direct supervision of a peace officer. Violations are punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Punishment depends on the seriousness of the injury to the animal. Upon conviction, a defendant must also pay restitution for damages. | Statute | |
| EU - Transport - Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 of 25 June 1997 concerning Community criteria for staging points | Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 |
The European Union lays down common criteria applicable to control posts (or "staging points") at which animals must be unloaded during long journeys. These rules are designed to ensure the health and welfare of the animals during such stops. |
Statute | ||
| Montana - Health - 32.3.213. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DOGS AND CATS | MT ADC 32.3.213 | Mont.Admin.R. 32.3.213 | This Montana regulation states that dogs and cats may enter the state of Montana provided they are accompanied by an official health certificate of the state of origin issued by an accredited veterinarian and officially vaccinated by a licensed veterinarian against rabies in accordance with procedures recommended in the latest version of the U.S. Public Health Compendium for rabies vaccine. Rabies vaccination requirements do not apply to puppies and kittens under three months of age. | Administrative | |
| Baughman v. City of Elkhart, TX | Slip copy, 2018 WL 1510678 (E.D. Tex., 2018) | Plaintiff Tammy Baughman filed a complaint on May 31, 2017 seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of her Fourteenth amendment rights; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that she was discriminated against; the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), alleging a failure to make reasonable accommodations; and 42 U.S.C. § 3613. Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled due to a failed back surgery. She also has fibromyalgia, depression, and other health issues. Plaintiff has a seven pound ring tail lemur that she claims is an emotional support animal that improves her quality of life. Plaintiff's lemur bit a mail carrier on December 5, 2012 which left lacerations on the carrier's hand and wrist. Plaintiff then moved to Elkhart, Texas in December 2014 where her lemur bit another person on June 25, 2015. In both instances the lemur was quarantined for 30 days and then returned to Plaintiff. The City of Elkhart enacted an ordinance on October 5, 2015 that bans all non-human primates from the city. Plaintiff claims she requested an accommodation form the City to keep her lemur as an emotional support animal, but her request was denied. The defendants, which include the mayor and city council members, claim the plaintiff never requested an accommodation. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants "showed deliberate indifference in refusing to give [her] a hearing and defend her lemur,' which violates the FHAA and ADA. On February 15, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims. Defendants claim that Plaintiff's lemur was involved in two documented attacks in Houston County, Texas and a third in Elkhart. Defendants assert that Plaintiff runs a retail resale shop out of her home and that in the third attack on June 25, 2015, the lemur jumped on a customer in plaintiff's store. Defendants assert that the ordinance was enacted as a legitimate exercise of the City's legislative power and police power. The District court concluded that the defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their conduct because the act of voting in favor of an ordinance is an undeniable legislative action. As for Plaintiff's 1983 claim, the District Court concluded that she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether her due process rights were violated nor does she have a basis for a procedural due process claim. The ordinance is rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in the safety and welfare of its citizens. The ordinance does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As for Plaintiff's ADA claim, the District Court concluded that the Plaintiff had not shown that the reasonable accommodation that she requested - an exemption from the animal control ordinance - did not place an undue burden on the City of Elkhart. No facts were provided by the Plaintiff that would show that her interest in keeping her lemur outweighs the interest of the City in protecting its citizens. As for Plaintiff's ADA claim, in order to succeed on an ADA claim, there must be some evidence that set the animal apart from an ordinary pet. The Plaintiff failed to show any evidence that her lemur is specifically trained to perform tasks that help her in her daily life. The District Court held that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. | Case | ||
| UT - Agriculture - Title 4 Utah Agriculture Code | U.C.A. 1953 § 4-2-301 - 305; § 4-2-401 - 402; § 4-2-501 to 504; § 4-31-1 to 4-31-119 | UT ST § 4-2-301 - 305; § 4-2-401 - 402; § 4-2-501 to 504; § 4-31-1 to 4-31-119 | The following statutes detail penalities for violating of the agricultural code. They also contain animal disease control provisions and detail the organization of the Department of Agriculture and Food. | Statute | |
| Reed v. Vickery | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 3276648 (S.D.Ohio) |
A veterinarian performed a pre-purchase examination on a horse and indicated to the prospective buyers that the horse was in good health. The vet facility failed to disclose that a different vet at the same facility had injected the horse to mask lameness. The purchasers had a cause of action for negligence where the statements made by the facility constituted misrepresentations or concealment. The measure of damages was the difference between the horse’s fair market value before and after the loss. |
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