Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Property - § 1717. Dog as personal property | 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1717 | OK ST T. 21 § 1717 | Dogs are considered personal property in Oklahoma. | Statute | |
| Spray v. Ammerman | 66 Ill. 309 (1872) | 1872 WL 8566 (Ill.) |
This was an action brought by appellant, before a justice of the peace, against appellee, to recover damages for killing a dog owned by appellant. The court here reversed the judgment, and remanded the case to determine recovery of damages based on the qualities, traits, consequential losses, and the market price of the animal at issue. |
Case | |
| ND - Wildlife, possession/rehabilitation - Article 48.1-09. Nontraditional Livestock. | N.D. Admin. Code § 48.1-09-01-01 - 48.1-09-06-01 | NDAC 48.1-09-01-01 - 48.1-09-06-01 | This section of North Dakota regulations concerns non-traditional livestock: any nondomestic species held in confinement or which is physically altered to limit movement and facilitate capture. The regulations describe three categories of animals: category 1 - those species generally considered domestic, or not inherently dangerous (such as turkeys, geese, ranch mink, and ducks); category 2 - certain protected species or those species that may pose health risks to humans or animals or may be environmentally hazardous (such as all deer, zebras, and nondomestic cats not listed in category 3); and category 3 - those species determined by the board to pose special concerns, including species which are inherently dangerous or environmentally hazardous (such as nondomestic swine, big cats, bears, wolves, venomous reptiles, primates, and non-domestic sheep and goats). Additionally, a person may not keep a skunk or raccoon in captivity. There are specific licensing requirements for category 2 and 3 species. The owner shall obtain a license from the board before acquiring animals classified as nontraditional livestock category 2 and category 3 species. A license or permit may not be granted by the board until it is satisfied that the provisions for housing and caring for such nontraditional livestock and for protecting the public are proper and adequate and in accordance with the standards prescribed by the board. | Administrative | |
| Lacy v. U.S. | 278 F. App'x 616 (6th Cir. 2008) | 2008 WL 2178099 (6th Cir.) |
The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration. Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known. While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness. |
Case | |
| Argentina - Endangered species - Ley 25.463, 2001 | Ley 25.463 | This law declared the Panthera onca, also known as yaguareté, Jaguar, overo tiger or painted onca, a natural monument. Ley 25.463/01 instructs the National Park Administration and the Directorate of Wildlife and Flora of the Nation to work together on the management plan for the species in the areas of its jurisdiction, making sure it is in accordance to the national faunal policy. The Enforcement Authority will guarantee the planning and execution of preventive measures in cases in which a specimen becomes circumstantially harmful to humans or their productive activities. | Statute | ||
| Murrell v. Hooter | 892 So.2d 680 (5th Cir., 2004) | 892 So.2d 680 |
A champion jumping horse was struck and killed by a van after escaping through an open gate. The horse owner sued the property owners for negligence and the trial court granted defendants' summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding the defendants were not entitled to immunity under the Equine Immunity Statute. |
Case | |
| TN - Pet Damages - § 44-17-403. Liability for death of pet; damages; exemptions | T. C. A. § 44-17-403 | TN ST § 44-17-403 | This Tennessee statute provides that a pet owner may seek non-economic damages up to $5,000 for the death of his or her pet against the person who is liable for causing the death or injuries that led to the animal's death. The person causing the pet's death must have done so intentionally or, if negligently, the incident must have occurred either on the owner or pet caretaker's property or while in the control and supervision of the caretaker. These damages are not for the intentional infliction of emotional distress of the owner or other civil claim, but rather for the direct loss of "reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection of the pet." | Statute | |
| NH - Impound - Chapter 436. Diseases of Domestic Animals. Rabies Control. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 436:107 | NH ST 436:107 | This New Hampshire statute provides that the local rabies control authority shall establish and maintain a pound. Any dog found off the owner's premises and not wearing a valid vaccination tag shall be impounded and maintained at the pound for a minimum of 7 days unless reclaimed earlier by the owner. Notice of impoundment of all dogs, including any significant marks of identification, shall be posted at the pound as public notification of impoundment. If the dog is unclaimed at the end of 7 days, the rabies control authority may dispose of the dog in accordance with applicable laws or rules. | Statute | |
| Augillard v. Madura | 257 S.W.3d 494 (Tex.App.-Austin,2008) | 2008 WL 2468689 |
This appeal arises from a suit for conversion filed by Shalanda Augillard alleging that Tiffany Madura and Richard Toro wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Augillard's black cocker spaniel, Jazz, who was recovered from New Orleans in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina. The central issue at trial and the only disputed issue on appeal is whether Augillard's dog, Jazz, and the dog that Madura adopted from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Hope, are in fact the same dog. Augillard asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in disregarding conclusive evidence, including forensic DNA analysis, establishing that Hope and Jazz are the same dog. |
Case | |
| United States v. Wallen | 874 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2017) | 85 ERC 1461, 17 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,343, 2017 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,241 (9th Cir. 2017) | Defendant appeals his conviction for unlawfully killing three grizzly bears in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The killing of the bears occurred on May 27, 2014 at defendant's residence in Ferndale, Montana ("bear country" as the court described). In the morning, defendant discovered bears had killed over half of his chickens maintained in a coop. Later that evening, the bears returned, heading toward the coop. Defendant's children, who were playing outside at the time, headed inside and defendant proceeded to scare the bears away with his truck. Later that night, the bears returned and were shot by defendant. According to testimony by enforcement officers, defendant gave two different accounts of what happened that night. Ultimately, defendant was charged for killing the bears in violation of the ESA and convicted by a magistrate judge after raising an unsuccessful self-defense argument. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) he should have been tried by a jury; (2) the magistrate judge did not correctly identify the elements of his offense, and that error was not harmless; and (3) the case should be remanded for a trial by jury in the interest of justice. With regard to (1), that he was entitled to a jury trial because the offense was serious, rather than petty, the appellate court rejected the argument. The possibility of a five-year probation term and $15,000 restitution did not transform the crime, which had a maximum 6-month imprisonment, into a serious offense. On the second and third arguments, the court agreed that magistrate erroneously relied on a self-defense provision from a federal assault case that required the "good faith belief" to be objectively reasonable. The court held that the "good faith" requirement for § 1540(b)(3) should be based on a defendant's subjective state of mind. Then, the ultimate question becomes whether that subjective good faith belief was reasonably held in good faith. Said the Court, "[u]nder the Endangered Species Act, the reasonableness of a belief that an endangered animal posed a threat is likewise strong evidence of whether the defendant actually held that belief in good faith." As a result, the appellate court found the error by the magistrate in rejecting defendant's self-defense claim was not harmless. As to whether defendant is entitled to a jury trial on remand, the court found that the outcome of the prior proceedings conducted by a magistrate do not constitute a showing of bias or partiality. Thus, he is not entitled to trial by jury. The conviction was vacated and proceedings remanded. | Case |