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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
AR - Endangered Species - 002.00.1-05.27. Endangered Species Protected AR ADC 002.00.1-05.27 Ark. Admin. Code 002.00.1-05.27 This Arkansas regulation states that it is illegal to import, transport, sell, purchase, take or possess any endangered species of wildlife or parts thereof except as provided. Administrative
US - Exotic Pets - Injurious Wildlife Species; Listing the Boa Constrictor, Four Python Species 2010 WL 836553 (F.R.)

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) proposes to amend its regulations to add Indian python (Python molurus, including Burmese python Python molurus bivittatus), reticulated python (Broghammerus reticulatus or Python reticulatus), Northern African python (Python sebae), Southern African python (Python natalensis), boa constrictor (Boa constrictor), yellow anaconda (Eunectes notaeus), DeSchauensee's anaconda (Eunectes deschauenseei), green anaconda (Eunectes murinus), and Beni anaconda (Eunectes beniensis) to the list of injurious reptiles. This listing would prohibit the importation of any live animal, gamete, viable egg, or hybrid of these nine constrictor snakes into the United States, except as specifically authorized.

Administrative
State of Ohio v. Jane Smith 83 N.E.3d 302 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017) 2017 WL 422315 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017)

Jane Smith was charged with 47 counts of animal cruelty after 47 dogs and other animals were seized from her property where she operated a private dog rescue. Smith was ultimately sentenced to jail time and required to compensate the Humane Society for the money that was spent to care for the 47 dogs that were seized from Smith’s property. Smith appealed her sentence, arguing that the lower court had made five errors in coming to its decision. The Court of Appeals only addressed four of the five arguments made by Smith. First, the Smith argued that the court erred in not suppressing evidence on the basis that her 4th Amendment rights had been violated. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument, holding that Smith’s 4th Amendment rights had not been violated because the information that led to the seizure of Smith’s dogs was provided by a private citizen and therefore not applicable to the 4th Amendment protections. Secondly, Smith argued that the court violated her due process rights when it made multiple, erroneous evidentiary rulings that deprived her of her ability to meaningfully defend herself at trial. The Court of Appeals found that Smith had not provided enough evidence to establish that her due process rights had been violated, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the argument. Thirdly, Smith made a number of arguments related to constitutional violations but the Court of Appeals found that there was not evidence to support these arguments and dismissed the claim. Lastly, Smith argued that she had made a pre-indictment, non-prosecution agreement that was not followed by the court. The Court of Appeals also dismissed this argument for a lack of evidence. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision and sentencing. 

Case
KY - Liens - § 257.105. Sale of unclaimed animals held by veterinarian KRS § 257.105 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 257.105 This statute deals with the sale of unclaimed animals after an animal is left with a licensed veterinarian after providing care to the animal. Under the statute, the veterinarian is able to sell the animal for reasonable value if the animal is left unclaimed for ten days or more. Once the veterinarian determines that he or she will be selling the animal, he or she must provide notice to the owner prior to the sale. Statute
NE - Hunting - Chapter 37. Game and Parks. Neb. Rev. St. § 37-564 to 37-570 NE ST § 37-564 to 37-570 This set of laws represents Nebraska's hunter harassment provisions. The section provides that no person shall knowingly and intentionally interfere or attempt to interfere with another person who is not trespassing and who is lawfully hunting, trapping, or fishing or engaged in activity associated with hunting, trapping, or fishing. A court may enjoin conduct described under the section. The section states that it is an affirmative defense where the alleged violator was not trespassing at the time of the interference and was engaged in lawful activity in conflict with the hunting, trapping, or fishing activity. Any person violating section 37-564 shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor. Statute
KY - Veterinary - Chapter 321. Veterinarians. KRS § 321.010 - 990 KY ST § 321.010 - 990 These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. Statute
Harris v. Barefoot 704 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. App. 2010) 2010 WL 3001399 (N.C.App.) , 206 N.C.App. 308 (2010)

A mail carrier was attacked by two dogs, and sued the dogs’ owners for negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a dog owner is not liable unless there is evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity and that the owner knew or should have known that the dog was dangerous.

Case
Tran v. Bancroft 648 So.2d 314 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1995) Fla. L. Weekly D191

In this Florida case, a tenant's next-door neighbor, who was bitten by tenant's dog when it leaped over fence and then attacked the neighbor on property not owned by landlord, brought a personal injury suit against the landlord.  The appellate court upheld a motion of summary judgment in favor of the defendant non-owner.   The court found that t he existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question to be decided as a matter of law.  Although the so-called "dog bite" statute, section 767.04, Florida Statutes (1993) controls actions against a dog's owner, actions against a non-owner must be brought upon a theory of common law liability.  Essentially, a landlord has no duty to prevent injuries to third parties caused by a tenant's dog away from leased premises.

Case
Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes 842 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 2016 WL 7187301

Plaintiff, Big Cats of Serenity Springs is a Colorado-based non-profit that provides housing, food, and veterinary care for exotic animals. The facility is regulated by the Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Three APHIS inspectors accompanied by sheriff's deputies broke into the Big Cats facility to perform an unannounced inspection of two tiger cubs. But at the time the inspectors entered the facility, the cubs were at a veterinarian's office receiving treatment. Big Cats sued the APHIS inspectors for the unauthorized entry and asserted that the entry was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and sought declaratory judgment and compensatory and punitive damages. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado,  granted APHIS's motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. APHIS appealed. The Court of Appeals, held that: (1) Big Cats could assert a Bivens claim; (2) Big Cats adequately alleged that the inspectors violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; and (3) Big Cats had clearly-established the constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches or seizures, thus weighing against the inspectors' claim of qualified immunity; but (4) the inspectors did not act under the color of state law, as required for § 1983 liability. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Big Cats' complaint stated a claim for relief under Bivens because No APHIS inspector would reasonably have believed unauthorized forcible entry of the Big Cats facility was permissible. Also, the Court reasoned that when the agents cut the locks to conduct a non-emergency inspection without a warrant, the federal officials did not act under color of state law, and the district court erred in denying the government's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order denying the government's motion to dismiss the Bivens claim and reversed the trial court's order denying the government's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim.

Case
Fair Housing of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Property Management, Inc. 78 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.N.D. 2011) 42 NDLR P 280, 66 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 687 Plaintiffs bring this action against Goldmark Property Management alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The alleged discriminatory policy is a mandatory application fee, non-refundable deposit, and monthly charge that Goldmark imposes on tenants with disabilities who reside with a non-specially trained assistance animal (i.e. a companion pet). These same fees are waived for tenants with disabilities who reside with a trained assistance animal (i.e. a seeing eye dog). The FHA encompasses all types of assistance animals regardless of training; therefore, Goldmark's policy implicates the FHA. Further, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing a prima face case of discrimination and have presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues for trial on the questions of the necessity and reasonableness of the requested accommodation and whether Goldmark's alleged objective for the policy is permissible under the FHA and not pretextual. Therefore, Goldmark's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim of disparate treatment because no proof was offered of a discriminatory intent. It is denied as to Plaintiffs' claims of disparate impact and failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Case

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