Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Lien, care - § 3352. Pasturage, food and shelter | 10 M.R.S.A. § 3352 | ME ST T. 10 § 3352 | This Maine law provides that a person who pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by contract or consent of the owner has a lien for the amount due. The lien may be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession. | Statute | |
| The South African Predator Breeders Association v. The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism | South African Predator Breeders Association and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (1900/2007) [2009] ZAFSHC 68 (11 June 2009) | This application is about the validity of regulations designed to regulate the hunting of lions that were bred in captivity. | Case | ||
| US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reopening of Comment Period | 1995 WL 121178 (F.R.) |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) is reopening the comment period on the bald eagle reclassification proposal for thirty days. On July 12, 1994, the Service proposed reclassifying the bald eagles of the lower 48 States as threatened, except those already listed as threatened and those of the Southwestern Recovery Region and Mexico. The bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region were proposed to remain listed as endangered. The Service also proposed classifying bald eagles in Mexico as endangered; they are not currently listed as endangered or threatened. Specific public comment was solicited on the status of bald eagles in the Southwest and Mexico and the distinctness of those eagles as a separate population. New information indicates that the Southwestern and Mexican bald eagles may not warrant a classification as endangered. The Service is making available for public review and comment information recently received about bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region. |
Administrative | ||
| UK - Circus - Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 | 1925 CHAPTER 38 |
The Performing Animals Act 1925 requires any person who exhibits or trains any performing (vertebrate) animal to be registered with a local authority. This information is kept in the local register. The law also gives power to local authorities to prohibit animal training or exhibition where it is accompanied by cruelty. Any officer of a local authority duly authorised in that behalf by the local authority and any constable may inspect performance premises during reasonable hours. Failure to become properly registered or concealing an animal to avoid inspection makes a person guilty of an offence. |
Statute | ||
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case | ||
| City and County of Denver, a Home Rule municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; and John W. Hickenlooper, as Mayor of the | In 2004, the Colorado General Assembly passed changes to the state's dangerous dog laws; part of the law prohibited municipalities from adopting any breed-specific dog laws. Denver previously enacted an ordinance that regulated dogs by breed (Section 8-55). In this current action, the City instituted an action seeking declaratory judgment that Section 8-55 preempts the state law under the Home Rule Amendment. The court found that the regulation of dogs by breed on an intra-city basis was purely a matter of local concern, and thus fell under Home Rule authority. The state was permanently enjoined from taking any action against Denver based on the language of the amended state law. The state then filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently withdrew it. | Pleading | |||
| IN - Transport of Animals - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS ON FOOT) RULES, 2001 | The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, regulate the transport of animals on foot. The rules apply to the transport of animals on foot is five kilometres or more from the boundary of the town/city/village of origin. New born animals whose navels have not completely healed, and those animals that are diseased, blind, emaciated, fatigues or have given birth in the past three days or that are likely to give birth during transport shall not be transported on foot. Animals may only be transported in their farm social groups. The owner of the animals must ensure that the animals have access to veterinary first aid equipment through their journey and that they have access to adequate water and fodder. | Statute | |||
| Viilo v. City of Milwaukee | 552 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Wis. 2008) | The court in this case denied summary judgement for the defendant after two police officers shot plaintiff’s dog four times which ultimately resulted in the dog’s death. The court denied summary judgment because it believed that there was a question as to a material fact of the case. The material fact in this case was whether or not the officers reasonably feared for their lives when the dog was shot the third and fourth time. After the dog was injured from the first two shots, there was inconsistent testimony as to whether the dog was still acting in an aggressive manner, which may have warranted the third and fourth shots. Due to the inconsistent testimony, the court held that a ruling of summary judgment was not appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted as to all claims except the claim that the third and fourth shots constituted an illegal seizure. | Case | ||
| AU - Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 (WA) | Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 |
An Act to make better provision for the use, protection and management of certain public lands and waters and the flora and fauna thereof, to establish authorities to be responsible therefor, and for incidental or connected purposes. |
Statute | ||
| RI - Importation, pets - 40-05-1.8. Importation of Dogs and Cats for the Purpose of Rescue, Shelter, Foster Care, | 250 RI ADC 40-05-1.8 | This Rhode Island regulation provides that any entities that import a dog or cat for rescue, adoption, foster care, brokering, and/or remote sales must register with the Department via the submittal of an application form provided by the Department. | Administrative |