Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN CANADA AND EUROPE | 6 Animal L. 23 (2000) | The idea that animals are entities that deserve protection, irrespective of their utility to man, is firmly grounded in the Enlightenment. The principle that a creature's need for considerate treatment did not depend on the possession of a soul or the ability to reason, but on the capacity to feel pain was formulated and debated at that time. The debate continues today-Canada is in the midst of examining its own ethical, philosophical and legal beliefs about animal welfare and cruelty. This article examines the current state of animal welfare and cruelty laws and recent attempts through federal legislation to modernize the animal welfare provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. Comparisons are drawn with European animal welfare and cruelty laws, which tend to be more concerned with an animal's welfare than Canadian laws, which tend to be more concerned with the economic interests of humans. | Article | |
| Mogensen v. Welch | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8756708 (W.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2023) | 2023 WL 8756708 (W.D.Va., 2023) | Plaintiffs owned and operated a zoo containing about 95 animals. Following complaints about suspected abuse and neglect of these animals, defendant executed a search warrant of the zoo. The search led to the seizure of many of these animals, including a tiger in such poor health that it needed to be euthanized. Following the seizure of these animals, plaintiffs filed a motion to argue that their due process rights were violated because a civil forfeiture hearing must be held no more than ten business days after the state seized the animals, and plaintiffs argue that ten days is too little time to prepare for the hearing. To succeed on the claim, plaintiffs must show that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, which they were unable to do because plaintiffs still have the right to appeal if the hearing does not go in their favor. Therefore, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. | Case |
| AU - Cruelty - South Australia Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) | Animal Welfare Act 1985 |
The South Australian Animal Welfare Act’s primary purpose is for the promotion of animal welfare. The Act is enforced by RSPCA SA and is the primary piece of legislation that aims to protect animals from cruelty in South Australia. The Act generally governs domestic privately owned animals (pets). |
Statute | |
| GA - Avondale Estates - Chapter 1: General Provisions & Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl | Code of Ordinances, City of Avondale Estates, Georgia §§ 1-8,4-1, 4-5, 4-6, 4-14, 4-15 |
In Avondale Estates, Georgia, animal fighting is not only prohibited by ordinance, but an animal trained for fighting is also considered a public nuisance, and an abused and dangerous animal. This ordinance provides provisions for each of the respective categories, as well as penalties for the violations. Notably, the city will not respond to a citizen's compliant about a violation of this chapter if the citizen chooses to remain anonymous. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply | 848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004) | 2004 PA Super 141 |
Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute. |
Case |
| Bedford v. Jorden | 698 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1985) | 215 Mont. 508 (Mont. 1985) |
This action was brought by Dale C. Bedford, appellant, on an amended complaint on two counts seeking special damages in the amount of $750, unspecified general damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against E.E. Jorden, a Billings, Montana veterinarian and his partnership. The first count of complaint alleges that the defendant, Dr. Jorden, willfully or by gross negligence broke, or allowed to be broken a wing of a parrot belonging to the appellant, Bedford. The second count alleges that Dr. Jorden and his business willfully, wantonly or maliciously failed to provide adequate care for the parrot. The court found that the interrogatories and depositions of all witnesses, including the appellant, indicate that there was no evidence produced that would establish a prima facie case of negligence, let alone intentional cruelty or inhumanity to animals. |
Case |
| Giarrusso v. Giarrusso | --- A.3d ----, 2019 WL 1606351 (R.I. Apr. 16, 2019) | This Rhode Island Supreme Court case centers on a disagreement among former spouses concerning the ex-husband's visitation with their two dogs acquired during marriage. Before the Court is an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After review, the Court concluded that cause was not shown and affirmed the order of the Family Court. The couple entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) formalizing the terms of the dissolution of Diane and Paul Giarrusso's marriage and giving Diane all title and interest to the dogs and Paul twice a week visitation. The weekly visitation proceeded according to the agreement for over a year, when Diane ceased allowing Paul's visits. Paul then filed a motion for post-final judgment relief citing breach of the agreement and Diane counterclaimed. A justice of the Family Court held a hearing on the issue, where each party testified and submitted associated texts and emails. In one recounted incident, a dog was missing for some time at Paul's house. Ultimately, the dog was found to be accidentally locked in a closet. At the conclusion of the hearing, Diane argued that the justice should withdraw approval for the MSA because Paul failed to care for the dogs and showed bad faith, while Paul argued that Diane had breached the terms. The hearing justice affirmed the visitation schedule of the MSA, denied Diane's requested relief, and awarded attorney fees to Paul. On appeal here, Diane argues that the hearing justice was "clearly wrong and overlooked material evidence when she found that Paul had acted in good faith." In particular, Diane contends that the dogs are chattel and Paul failed to provide safe conditions and return them to her in an undamaged condition. The Supreme Court held, in noting that the MSA retains the characteristics of a contract, that it would not overturn the hearing justice's determination in absence of mutual mistake in the contract (the MSA). There was no mutual mistake in the MSA's visitation provision and no basis for the hearing justice to conclude that the MSA needs to be reformed. Further, this court found no evidence of bad faith on Paul's part and that the hearing justice's findings were support by the evidence. Thus, it was not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA as written. The order of the Family Court was affirmed and the matter returned to Family Court. | Case | |
| MA - Initiatives - Question 3, 2000 (dog racing) | Question 3 (2000) | This Massachusetts ballot question asked voters in 2000 whether they wanted to prohibit in Massachusetts any dog racing where any form of betting or wagering on the speed or ability of dogs occurs. Any person violating the proposed law could be required to pay a civil penalty of not less than $20,000 to the State Racing Commission. The question failed with 49% voting "yes" and 51% voting "no" on the question. | Statute | |
| WV - Humane Slaughter - Article 2E. Humane Slaughter of Livestock. | W. Va. Code, §§ 19-2E-1 to 7 | WV ST §§ 19-2E-1 to 7 | The West Virginia humane slaughter provisions apply to livestock, defined as cattle, swine, sheep or goats. Humane methods of slaughtering livestock include those where the animal is rendered insensible to pain by a single blow, gunshot or by electrical, chemical or other means, or by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries. The section provides a graduating scheme of penalties for violation; a first offense results in a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $100 - $500; a second offense results in a misdemeanor with a fine of $500 - 1,000 and suspension of the license to do business as a slaughtering establishment until the facility is in compliance. | Statute |
| Sentencia STC1926-2023 | Sentencia STC1926-2023 | Romeo and Salvador, two beloved family dogs that found themselves in the center of a heartbreaking divorce. The divorce resulted in the family judge ordering the foreclosure of the dogs in the divorce proceeding. The plaintiff filed a writ of protection or "Recurso de Tutela" before the Chamber of Civil Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice to protect her rights to family unity, free personality development, and health. Furthermore, she argued that the lower court decision had violated not just her rights but her children's rights, who had developed a filial bond with the dogs, as they are sentient beings and not just mere property. The Court denied the "tutela." It affirmed the lower court decision allowing foreclosure upon companion animals, holding that the "tutela" was not the appropriate legal mechanism to protect procedural guarantees. In his dissenting opinion, Magistrate Aroldo Wilson Quiróz stated that the court had missed a valuable opportunity to address the issue of the multispecies families in Colombia. This novel legal concept is supported under Art. 42 of the Constitution, and that it was the responsibility of the court, as the body of last instance, to delve into this subject, pointing out the fact that even though animals are considered property, they are also sentient beings in the eyes of the law with rights that limit the right to own them. Like in other family cases, the magistrate suggested that courts should address issues such as custody, visitation rights, and alimony payments when companion animals are involved. | Case |