Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation-MDL No.1993 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. | 720 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) | 2013 WL 2991027 (D.C. Cir. 2013) |
Hunters and hunting organizations sued the Secretary of Interior, the Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Service itself after the Service listed the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and barred the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). On appeal, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants' motion of summary judgment. |
Case | |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 6 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2021), aff'd, 598 U.S. 356, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 215 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2023) | This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim. | Case | ||
| Queensland - Food Production - Agricultural Regulations | This Regulation implements the Agricultural Standards Act 1994 by providing specifications on the composition and labeling of fertilizers, the labeling and prohibited materials in seeds, labeling and other requirements for stock food,and on general labeling requirements in agriculture. | Statute | |||
| MI - Enforcement - Chapters 760 to 777 Code of Criminal Procedure. | M. C. L. A. 764.16 | MI ST 764.16 | This law authorizes private citizens to make arrests. | Statute | |
| HI - Disaster; Accomodations for Pets - Chapter 128. Civil Defense and Emergency Act. | HRS § 127A-1, § 127A-2, and § 127A-19 (Formerly cited as HRS § 128-1 et seq.) | These sections replace former HRS § 128-1. In terms of animal-related provisions, the definition for "evacuation" includes mention of animals. In the section on sheltering, the law states that "[c]ounty emergency management agencies shall be responsible for identifying and operating locations and facilities suitable for sheltering" both the public and pet animals. "Pet animal” has the same meaning as defined in section 711-1100. | Statute | ||
| Luper v. City of Wasilla | 215 P.3d 342 (Alaska,2009) | 2009 WL 2902504 (Alaska) |
Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Wasilla, Alaska's enforcement action over zoning ordinances. The facts stem from the City's denial of plaintiff's application for a use permit in 2005 to run an eighteen-dog kennel. Plaintiff argued on appeal that Wasilla's former three-dog limit infringed on her property rights in both her land and her dog. This court agreed with the lower court that the provision here bore a "fair and substantial relationship" the government purposes of controlling dog noise, reducing dog odor and pollution, and preventing loose dogs. Further, the court found that it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the city clerk's statement that she only needed a kennel license to operate a hobby kennel. |
Case | |
| State v. DeFrancesco | 668 A.2d 348 (Conn. 1995) | 235 Conn. 426(1995) |
After the USDA went to the defendant’s house to perform a prelicense inspection for an Animal Welfare Act permit for a rabbit, the USDA discovered the defendant also kept a Bengal cat, a Jungle cat and a Bobcat on the premises; the USDA then notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) about the three cats. After the defendant’s attempt to sell the three cats, the DEP confiscated them and placed them in the care of an expert; the DEP also charged the defendant with three misdemeanor violations of General Statutes section 26-40a. After trial and appellate court determinations, the Connecticut Supreme Court found the three cats to be included on the list of prohibited felidae in General Statutes section 26-40a and found General Statutes section 26-40a did not violate Due Process. |
Case | |
| OK - Breeders - Commercial Pet Breeder Operations Guidelines | OK ADC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | OAC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | These regulations describe standards for pet breeders including sufficient food and water, regular exercise, veterinary care, adequate grooming, natural or artificial light during daylight hours, adequate space in living quarters, protection from the elements and extreme temperatures, and adequate resting time between breeding cycles, that ensures the general health and well-being of all pets the commercial pet breeder owns.“Commercial pet breeder” means any person that possesses or has possessed at any time in the last twelve months eleven or more adult intact female animals for use in breeding or dealing in animals for direct or indirect sale or for exchange in return for consideration. Household pets kept by breeders which the breeder has registered with the Board as not being used in breeding or dealing shall not be counted under this definition. Mandated record-keeping is outlined in Subchapter 7, which includes a required pet health history provided to purchasers. | Administrative | |
| AL - Facility dog - § 12-21-148. Use of certified facility dog in certain legal proceedings. | Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-147 -148 | This Alabama law from 2017 covers use of both registered therapy dogs and registered facility dogs in certain legal proceedings. A "registered therapy dog" is defined as "[a] trained emotional support dog that has been tested and registered by a nonprofit therapy dog organization that sets standards and requirements for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for therapy dogs and their handlers . . ." A "certified facility dog" is defined as "[a] trained working dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization, a nonprofit organization that sets standards of training for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for assistance dogs and their handlers . . ." Both must meet minimum standards including minimum months/years of training, documentation showing graduation from an assistance dog organization, a current health certificate, and proof of at least $500,000 in liability insurance. During trial proceedings, all precautions should be taken to obscure the presence of the dog from the jury. | Statute | ||
| GA - Initiatives - Georgia Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | 2006 Georgia Amendment 2 | This Georgia constitutional amendment was presented to voters on the 2006 ballot. The measure preserves the state's tradition of hunting and fishing for the public good. Amendment 2 passed by a margin of 81% to 19%. | Statute |