Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NE - Initiatives - Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | Amendment 2 (2012) | A constitutional amendment to establish the right to hunt, to fish, and to harvest wildlife and to state that public hunting, fishing, and harvesting of wildlife shall be a preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. It passed with 76.7% of the vote. | Statute | |
| GA - Assistance Animal - Georgia's Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 30-4-2 to 4; Ga. Code Ann., § 40-6-94; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-12-120; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107.1 | GA ST § 30-4-2 to 4; GA ST § 40-6-94; GA ST § 16-12-120; GA ST § 16-11-107.1 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| CA - Hunting - Chapter 3. Nongame Mammals and Depredators | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | CA FISH & G § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | These sections regulate the taking and killing of nongame mammals and depredatory animals. Nongame and fur-bearing mammals that are injuring crops or other property may be taken at any time or in any manner in accordance with this code. In some cases, a permit is required. It is unlawful to use snares, hooks, or barbed wire to remove from the den, or fire to kill in the den, any immature predatory mammal. Predators that are relocated by the department must be tagged. | Statute |
| Williams v. Reynolds | 263 S.E.2d 853 (N.C.App., 1980) | 45 N.C.App. 655 (N.C.App., 1980) | This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of a horse against a veterinarian that performed the castration surgery that led to the death of the horse. The trial court refused to allow a veterinarian with experience practicing in the same area and with a similar background to testify about whether he was familiar the accepted standards or to answer questions to elicit his opinion about whether defendant's treatment of the horse was unacceptable for practicing veterinarians in the area. The trial court then granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and this appeal followed. The court held that the judge erred in excluding the testimony, and reversed and remanded the case. | Case |
| U.S. v. Clucas | 50 F.Supp. 609 (D.C. Va. 1943) |
Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law. The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person. The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks. The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Zak | 486 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass., 2007) | 2007 WL 1427442 (D.Mass.) |
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts under the MBTA after agents determined that he killed 250 great blue herons; he then went to trial on the remaining counts under the MBTA and BGEPA related to his killing of a juvenile bald eagle on his commercial fish growing operation. On appeal, defendant contended that he cannot be found guilty under the MBTA unless the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the bird he was shooting was protected and intentionally shot it with that knowledge (defendant stated that he shot a "big brown hawk'). The court disagreed, finding the overwhelming authority requires no such specific scienter on the part of the actor. With regard to defendant's contention that the government failed to prove the "knowingly" prong of the BGEPA, the court was equally unpersuaded. The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly shot the eagle as it sat perched on the dead pine tree on the edge of his property, regardless of whether he knew the juvenile bird was an eagle or, as he said, “a big brown hawk.” |
Case |
| People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery | 2014 WL 6802767 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014) | 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08531 | This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings." | Case |
| Marine Mammals Issues | Policy | |||
| DC - Animal Control - Subchapter III. Release of Animals. | DC CODE § 8-1831.01 | DC ST § 8-1831.01 | This D.C. law states that no animal shall be released from custody of animal protection except for the purposes of adoption, redemption by the owner of the animal, or other suitable placement in the best interest of the animal. No animals shall be knowingly released from any entity charged with animal protection for the purposes of research, experimentation, testing, or medical instruction or demonstration. Violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| US - Native American - RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) | 42 USC 2000bb-1 | RFRA provides that the government may not substantially burden an individual's free exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and it is done through the least restrictive means. | Statute |