Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zageris v. Whitehall | 594 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.,1991) | 72 Ohio App.3d 178 |
The single-family residence property owner and owner of dogs kept on property filed suit for declaratory judgment, petition for habeas corpus, and civil rights claims against city based on city's enforcement of ordinance prohibiting number of dogs on property. He then appealed the ruling in favor for the city. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the local ordinance limiting number of dogs on single family property was a nuisance and not zoning measure and consequently a valid exercise of city's police power. |
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| Tighe v. North Shore Animal League | 142 A.D.3d 607, 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 | In May 2012, Tighe adopted a dog from the North Shore Animal League after having been warned that the dog was possessive regarding food. After taking the dog home, Tighe noticed that the dog exhibited aggressive behavior, such as jumping at the backyard fence and growling at her when she attempted to feed the dog. In July of 2012, the dog bit Tighe’s hand when she tried to pick up a cookie off of the floor. As a result, Tighe spent three days in the hospital due to severe blood loss and swelling. Additionally, in September of 2012, the dog bit Tighe in the face causing severe injuries. After the incident in September, Tighe filed suit against the North Shore Animal League to recover damages for negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the claim of emotional distress but granted summary judgment in favor of Tighe with regard to the other claims of negligence. The North Shore Animal League appealed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New York overturned the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the North Shore Animal League on all claims. The court found that the North Shore Animal League was not a proximate cause to Tighe’s injuries for failing to adequately warn her about the dog’s aggreesive behavior because Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior three months prior to the incident that caused Tighe’s injuries. According to the court, once Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive tendencies, she was in the best position to take “precautionary measures to prevent harm to herself.” So, even if the North Shore Animal League had failed to warn Tighe of the dog’s aggressive tendencies prior to the adoption, Tighe “independently” learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior prior to the incident which eliminated the North Shore Animal League as being a proximate cause of her injuries. | Case |
| MD - Veterinary - State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners. | MD Code, Agriculture, § 2-301 - 316 | MD AGRIC § 2-301 - 316 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Long v. The State of Texas | 823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) |
Appellant, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, raised 35 points of error in a direct appeal in which he challenged the trial court's voir dire rulings and its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the admission into evidence of photographs was within the discretion of the lower court, which properly determined that the photographs served a proper purpose in enlightening the jury. |
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| Dempsey v. Rosenthal | 121 Misc.2d 612 (N.Y. 1983) | 468 N.Y.S.2d 441, 37 UCC Rep.Serv. 1091 |
A buyer of a poodle brought an action against a kennel, seeking to recover purchase price on ground that poodle was "defective" due to an undescended testicle. The buyer argued that the kennel had breached implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The Civil Court of the City of New York held that since the contract of sale did not exclude or modify implied warranty of merchantability, it carried with it such a warranty. In light of this, the poodle was not a merchantable good because a poodle with an undescended testicle would not pass without objection in the trade. Further, the kennel breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose since the kennel was aware that the buyer wanted a dog for breeding purposes. This case is also significant because the court also held that a buyer's opportunity to examine the dog when purchasing it does not defeat a warranty claim. Indeed, the type of examination would not be undertaken by a casual buyer of a male puppy. The court allowed buyer to revoke her acceptance of the dog and receive her purchase price. |
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| Night monkey poking out of a soiled hideout | Slideshow Images | |||
| Hayes v. State | 518 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App. 2017) | 2017 WL 1193845 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2017) | Defendant appeals an order with the Henderson County Sheriff's Office to destroy his dogs under Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. More specifically, defendant claims reversible error after he was denied a jury trial. Defendant's three dogs were seized after they attacked an individual riding a bicycle in front of defendant's residence. After a hearing, the dogs were found to be dangerous pursuant to Section 822.041 related to dogs causing serious bodily injury to a person. The judge then ordered the dogs to be humanely destroyed. Hayes appealed the order and requested a jury trial, which was objected to by the Henderson County Attorney's Office and sustained by the court. The dogs were found to be dangerous at a bench trial and ordered humanely euthanized, while defendant was ordered to pay $2,780 to the county. On appeal, defendant argues the county court erred in removing his case from the jury trial docket. The court now considers two questions: "(1) whether the owner of a dog ordered to be humanely destroyed by a justice, county, or municipal court judge, pursuant to Chapter 822, subchapter A, of the Texas Health and Safety Code, has the right to appeal such order; and (2) if an appeal is allowed, whether a jury can be requested to hear the de novo appeal." The court here declined to adopt the state's interpretation that the statute's silence as to a right of appeal indicates that the legislature eliminated that right. In fact, the court observed Subchapter A of Chapter 822 dealing with less serious "dangerous dogs," allows a party to appeal a dangerous dog finding. The court found it would be inconsistent that the more severe Subchapter D denies an appeal of right where the less severe subchapter grants it, especially where a forfeiture of property occurs (i.e., dogs). As to the right to jury trial, the court found Chapter 822 silent on that issue. However, the court found the order for seizure and destruction of defendant's "special personal property" guaranteed him a trial by jury under Article I of the Texas Constitution. The trial court's Final Order was reversed and the case was remanded to county court. | Case |
| IE - Cruelty - Protection of Animals, 1911 | Protection of Animals Act, 1911 | This Ireland law makes it illegal for a person to cause any animal “unnecessary suffering.” The act outlines all of the ways a person can be guilty of causing an animal harm including: beating, kicking, over-loading, torturing, and poisoning. If a person is found guilty under the act, the court has the power to take ownership of the animal and order the guilty party to pay any damages that resulted from the harm. | Statute | |
| IL - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | 510 ILCS 70/2.01c, 2.01d, 4.03, 4.04, 7.15; 720 ILCS 5/48-8; 730 I.L.C.S. 5/3-12-16; 740 I.L.C.S. 13/1, 13/5, 13/10; 775 I.L.C.S. 30/1 - 6; 510 ILCS 5/15.1; 105 I.L.C.S. 5/14-6.02; 210 ILCS 125/32; 625 ILCS 60/5, 60/15; 775 ILCS 5/3-104.1 | 310 I.L.C.S. 120/1 - 120/120 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| State v. Fessenden | 310 P.3d 1163 (Or.App., 2013), review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) and aff'd, 355 Or. 759 (2014) | 2013 WL 5352270 (Or.App., 2013); 258 Or. App. 639, review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) and aff'd, 355 Or. 759 (2014) |
This Oregon case considers, as an issue of first impression, whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to animals in need of immediate assistance. Defendant appealed her conviction for second-degree animal neglect (ORS 167.325) based on the condition of her horse. The court found that the emergency aid exception extends to nonhuman animals when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals which are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or cruel death. Here, the deputy sheriff found that the horse was more emaciated than any other horse he had ever seen and there were signs of possible organ failure. |
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