Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Divorce - § 2605. Care and ownership of pet animal | West's Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 2605 | CA FAM § 2605 | This California law, effective January of 2019, allows to court to enter an order, at the request of a party, for a party to care for the pet animal prior to the entry of a final order. The existence of an order providing for the care of a pet animal during the course of proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties shall not have any impact on the court's final determination of ownership of the pet animal. | Statute |
| Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 13 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of Law Journal of Animal & Natural Resource LawVol. |
Policy | ||
| DC - Restaurant - Subchapter VII. Dining with Dogs. | DC CODE § 8-1865.01, .02 | These laws from 2018 allow food establishments in D.C. to permit dogs in outdoor dining areas of food establishments or unenclosed sidewalk cafés. These establishments must post signage outside that states dogs are permitted along with any restrictions on dogs based on size or temperament. They must also provide an entrance that does not require dogs to enter an indoor dining area or an area in which food is being stored or prepared to access the outdoor dining area and provide patrons with waste bags and a means of proper disposal. Patrons must keep their dog in a carrier or on a leash at all times and never leave the dogs unattended. | Statute | |
| OR - Domestic Violence - 107.718. Court order when petitioner in imminent danger of abuse (allows pets) | O.R.S. § 107.718 | OR ST § 107.718 | Under this Oregon law, if requested by a petitioner who has been the victim of domestic abuse, the court may enter an order to protect a companion or therapy animal. This includes an order to "[p]revent the neglect and protect the safety of any service or therapy animal or any animal kept for personal protection or companionship, but not an animal kept for any business, commercial, agricultural or economic purpose." | Statute |
| MO - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | V.A.M.S. 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | MO ST 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | These Missouri statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws for impounding loose dogs, licensing, rabies control, and the Animal Care Facilities Act, which regulates commercial breeders/pet shops. | Statute |
| McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hospital | 644 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct.Cl., 1994) | 67 Ohio Misc.2d 40 (1994) |
After defendant filed a stipulation admitting liability for a botched surgery on defendant's show dog that ultimately led to euthanization, a trial was held as to the issue of damages. Evidence adduced at trial showed that "Nemo" had been trained by plaintiff as a Schutzhund or "sport dog" in Schutzhund schooling. The court noted that while dogs are considered personal property in Ohio and market value is the standard award for such personal property, market value in this case was merely a "guideline." In addition to the loss of the specially trained dog, the court also found significant the loss of stud fees for the dog and potential future gains in sustaining the trial court's award of $5,000 in damages. |
Case |
| Hendricks v. Barlow | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) |
Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property. The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law. However, on appeal, this Court found that federal (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances. The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption by state and federal law should not have been found. Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted. |
Case |
| IN RE: ROSIA LEE ENNES | 45 Agric. Dec. 540 (1986) | 1986 WL 74679 (U.S.D.A.) | Civil penalty of $1,000 against unlicensed dealer was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b), and greater penalty could have been requested where although moderate size of kennel suggested modest penalty, selling hundreds of dogs without license over 40-month period was grave violation of Animal Welfare Act, violations were not committed in good faith since dogs were knowingly and intentionally sold without license after receiving 4 warnings, and even though dealer thought mistakenly that Department would not prosecute her for such violations and there was no history of previous violations, the hundreds of violations proven were sufficient to warrant severe sanction. | Case |
| IN - Hunting - 15-17-14.7-13 Types of weapons allowed during hunt; computer assisted remote hunting; sedation; restricted areas | I.C. 15-17-14.7-13 | IN ST 15-17-14.7-13 | This Indiana law states that a hunting preserve may not allow computer assisted hunting. | Statute |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds | 297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | 2018 WL 1151000 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property. | Case |