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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Carter v. Metro North Associates | 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998) | 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998) |
In this New York case, a tenant sued his landlords for injuries after he was bitten on face by pit bull owned by another tenant. The lower court denied the landlords' motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment for tenant on issue of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of vicious nature of breed of pit bulls as a whole. In fact, the court found that the IAS court "erred in circumventing the requirement for evidence concerning the particular animal by purporting to take judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." Thus, the landlords were not strictly liable for the tenant's injuries where there was no evidence indicating that the dog had ever attacked any other person or previously displayed any vicious behavior. |
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| US - Service animals - Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities | 2008 WL 2413721 (F.R.) | CRT Docket No. 106; AG Order No. 2968-2008 |
The Department of Justice (Department) is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in order to: Adopt enforceable accessibility standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) that are "consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board" (Access Board); and perform periodic reviews of any rule judged to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a regulatory assessment of the costs and benefits of any significant regulatory action as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).
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| Ecuador - Animal rights - Civil Code | CÓDIGO CIVIL | Even though the constitution has indirectly granted animals rights as they are part of nature, they continue to be categorized as movable objects by the civil code. However, the most recent reform to the civil code is from 2005, meaning the current civil code still needs to be updated to comply with the 2008 constitution and subsequent constitutional court decisions. Article 585 defines movable objects as those that can be transported from one place to another, either by their force, like animals (which is why they are called “semovientes”), or by an external force, like inanimate things. Article 639 states that “domestic animals are subject to domain” (or complete ownership). It is important to note that the bill for animal welfare is currently in the hands of the National Assembly. Changing the categorization of animals in the civil code to “sentient beings” is one of the many topics regulated by this bill. | Statute | ||
| NE - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Neb. Rev. St. § 49-801; Neb. Rev. St. § 20-126 - 131.04; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1313 - 1314; Neb. Rev. St. § 54-603; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1009.01 | NE ST § 49-801; Neb. Rev. St. § 20-126 - 131.04; Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1313 - 1314; NE St. § 54-603; NE St. § 28-1009.01 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant service animal, assistance animal, and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| KY - Dog Laws (also includes cats & ferrets) - Kentucky Consolidated Dog Laws (License, Impound, Bite, etc.) | KRS § 39F.040; KRS § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 | KY ST § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 | These Kentucky statutes comprise the state's Dog Laws, which were amended significantly in 2005. Included are all vaccination, licensing, animal control provisions, and the relevant dog bite statutes. Under Section 258.235, any person may kill or seize any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing or wounding any livestock, or wounding or killing poultry, or attacking human beings, whether or not such dog bears the license tag required by the provisions of this chapter. There shall be no liability on such person in damages or otherwise for killing, injuring from an attempt to kill, or for seizing the dog. That same section also comprises the state's new strict liability law for dog bites. Under Sec. 235(4), any owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage. | Statute | |
| WV - Lien - § 38-11-4. Lien of bailee of animals or vehicles | W. Va. Code, § 38-11-4 | WV ST § 38-11-4 | This West Virginia law (as it relates to animals) states the a person who keeps a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or one who boards, pastures, feeds or trains animals for hire, has a lien upon such animals for the sum due him for the care, boarding, pasturage, feeding, or training of such animals, or the care, keeping of such animals. This lien exists even though such animals are permitted to be taken out of the possession of the one claiming such lien even if the contract has not yet terminated for the lien. The purchaser of such an animal, while out of the possession of the person claiming the lien, can take the property free of the lien unless he or she had actual notice of the lien at the time of purchase. | Statute | |
| EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU | Directive 2010/63/EU | Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. | Statute | ||
| Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Robeson County | 164 N.C. App. 366, 595 S.E.2d 773 (2004) | 2004 WL 1091902 (N.C. 2004) |
Non-profit and advocate challenged the improper treatment/euthanasia of animals and complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's qualified as "aggrieved persons" within the statute, but that all administrative remedies were not sought. Affirmed. |
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| Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher | 518 P.3d 131 (2022), review denied, 370 Or. 789, 524 P.3d 964 (2023) | 321 Or.App. 439 (Or.App., 2022) | The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. | Case |