Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Chimpanzees - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for Chimpanzee and Pygmy Chimpanzee | 1990 WL 325467 (F.R.) | 50 CFR Part 17 RIN 1018-AB23 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) reclassifies wild populations of the chimpanzee and all populations of the pygmy chimpanzee from threatened to endangered status. Both species have declined through such problems as massive habitat destruction, excessive hunting and capture by people, and lack of effective national and international controls. This rule will enhance the protection of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, for these species. Captive populations of the chimpanzee will continue to be classified as threatened, and individuals of that species in the United States will continue to be covered by a special regulation allowing activities otherwise prohibited. |
Administrative | |
| Roalstad v. City of Lafayette | 363 P.3d 790 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | --- P.3d ---- 2015 WL 5895396 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed. | Case | |
| Mejia v. State | 681 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App. 1984). |
Rooster fighting case. Testimony from the defendant's witness, a sociologist that argued cockfighting is not generally thought of as an illegal activity, was irrelevant in cruelty to animals conviction. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. |
Case | ||
| SC - Leash - § 51-3-145. Certain acts unlawful at state parks. | Code 1976 § 51-3-145 | SC ST § 51-3-145 | This South Carolina law contains a dog leash provision that states that it is unlawful for any person to bring a dog or any other animal into the park or facility unless it is crated, caged, or upon a leash not longer than six feet or otherwise under physically restrictive control at all times (see section P). This provision concerns any park or facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism. | Statute | |
| Kovnat v. Xanterra Parks and Resorts | 770 F.3d 949 (10th Cir. 2014) |
In this case, Corrine Kovnat filed suit against Xanterra Parks and Resorts (Xanterra) alleging that it was negligent in connection with the injuries she sustained while horseback riding in Yellowstone National Park. Kovnat argued that Xanterra was negligent because the cinch on the saddle was too loose and her stirrups were uneven. The district court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, Xanterra. The court held that under Wyoming’s Recreational Safety Act, Xanterra owed no duty of care to protect Kovnat from the injuries she sustained. Kovnat appealed the district court’s ruling and the court of appeals affirmed in part and denied in part the district court’s ruling. Ultimately, the court of appeals found that summary judgment was only proper for Kovnat’s claim regarding the loose cinch but was not proper for the issue of the uneven stirrups. The court of appeals came to this conclusion after examining the Recreational Safety Act and finding that Xanterra cannot be held liable for any risks that are “inherent to the sport of horseback riding.” The court determined that the loose cinch was a reasonable risk that was inherent to the sport of horseback riding while the uneven stirrups were not. For this reason, the court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings with regard to the issue of the uneven stirrups. |
Case | ||
| Map of State Dog Tethering Laws | As of 2023, about twenty-three (23) states have laws that limit or otherwise control how owners can tether their dogs. Tethering or chaining a dog under most state laws means that a person ties a dog with a rope or line to a stationary object. While the laws themselves vary from state to state, they do have several consistent features. Some laws that address tethering allow a dog to be tethered for a reasonable period of time. Other states include tethering as part of their anti-cruelty chapters. Indiana defines “neglect” as restraining an animal for more than a brief period in a manner that endangers the animal's life or health by the use of a rope, chain, or tether. Some states specify the manner in which a dog must be tethered or chained (i.e., that a tether must be at least 6 feet long or at least 3 times the length of the dog as measured from the tip of its nose to the base of its tail). This map gives links to these laws. | State map | |||
| In re Kulka's Estate | 18 P.2d 1036 (1933) | 142 Or. 104 |
This action relates to a court order in an estate case. The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals." The executor refused to pay the legacy. This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands. The court affirmed the payment of the legacy. |
Case | |
| OK - Horse - § 6-192. Horse meat | 2 Okl. St. Ann. § 6-192, § 6-207 | (former repealed, 63 Okl.St.Ann. § 1-1135 - 1139) | It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer or exhibit for sale, or have in his or her possession with intent to sell, any quantity of horsemeat for human consumption in Oklahoma. | Statute | |
| QUATTROCCHIO WANDA S/ MALTRATO ANIMAL | QUATTROCCHIO WANDA S/ MALTRATO ANIMAL (Expte. Nº PEX 292565/21) | This is an animal cruelty case in which Wanda Quattrochio witnessed the defendant whipping the neighbor's dogs. Wanda recorded the events and filed a complaint about animal cruelty. The defendant was in charge of caring for the dogs while their owner was away. When the authorities arrived at the house to seize the dogs, they found six dogs in small dirty kennels, with unclean water and without food. After considering the testimony of witnesses and other evidence, the judge concluded that the defendant had violated articles 1-3 of the anti-cruelty law (Ley 14.346) and was found guilty of animal cruelty. In her analysis of the case, the judge stated that animals were not things or resources but rather living beings with the potential to be "subjects of life." | Case | ||
| JACQUELINE CONRAD, PlaintiffAppellant, v. SUSAN CATAPANO and JIM CATAPANO, DefendantsRespondents | Not Reported in A.3d 2013 WL 673463 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2013) |
Plaintiff was injured by defendants' dog after being knocked to the ground. The plaintiff had her dog over to defendants' house for a "doggie play date" and the dogs were running off-leash in the fenced yard.The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of negligence and absolute liability, finding that the defendants had not prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to run into people. The Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to defendants' prior knowledge of the dog's proclivities to become "hyper" in the presence of other dogs. Thus, the decision to grant summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for trial. Notably, the Court did state that it shared "the motion judge's observation that plaintiff may well be comparatively at fault here for choosing to stand in the backyard while the three unleashed dogs ran around." |
Case |