Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cotton v. Ben Hill County | 208 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2016) | 2016 WL 5387627 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2016) | In this case, Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County after Cotton’s cattle was seized for alleged animal cruelty and roaming at large. Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department arguing that he had been deprived of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Hill County and the Sheriff's Department. The court granted summary judgment because Cotton was unable to establish that his rights were violated under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotton was unable to establish that his Due Process rights were violated because he was unable to provide any evidence that the allegations against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department were “the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the county or that the County acted with deliberate indifference to these rights.” Also, the court found that there was not a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause because under state law, Georgia provided for a “post deprivation remedy for the loss.” Lastly, the court found that Cotton’s claims against the Sheriff's Department failed as a matter of law because Cotton was unable to establish that anyone from the Sheriff’s Department actually participated in the seizure and impoundment of the cattle. For those reasons, the court held in favor of Ben Hill County and granted summary judgment. | Case | |
| ME - Breeder - Chapter 701. Rules Governing Animal Welfare | Code Me. R. 01-001 Ch. 701, § I - VII | ME ADC 01-001 Ch. 701, § I - VII | The following Maine regulations reveal the state's requirements for the proper care/housing of animals at pet stores, kennels, and animal shelters. These regulations also establish civil penalties for pet stores, kennels, or animal shelters who violate either the following regulations or Chapter 719 of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated. | Administrative | |
| NE - Veterinary - Article 33. Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act | Neb.Rev.St. § 38-3301 to 38- 3335 | NE ST § 38-3301 to 38- 3335 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| LA - Dog Bite - Art. 2321. Damage caused by animals. | LA C.C. Art. 2321 | This Louisiana civil code statute provides that an owner of any animal is liable for damages caused by that animal only upon a showing that he or she knew or should have known that his or her animal's behavior would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he or she failed to exercise such reasonable care. However, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for injuries to persons or property caused by the dog and which the owner could have prevented and which did not result from the injured person's provocation of the dog. | Statute | ||
| Com. v. Hackenberger | 836 A.2d 2 (Pa.2003) | 575 Pa. 197 (2003) |
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 6 months to 2 years jail following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of cruelty to animals resulting from his shooting of a loose dog more than five times. On appeal, appellant contends that the use of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement provision does not apply to a conviction for cruelty to animals since the purpose is to punish only those offenses where the defendant has used a deadly weapon against
persons.
The Commonwealth countered that the purpose behind the provision is immaterial because the plain language applies to any offense where the defendant has used a deadly weapon to
commit the crime, save for those listed crimes where possession is an element of the offense. This Court agreed with the Commonwealth and held that the trial court was not prohibited from applying the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement to defendant's conviction for cruelty to animals.
|
Case | |
| State of Ohio v. Jane Smith | 83 N.E.3d 302 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017) | 2017 WL 422315 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017) |
Jane Smith was charged with 47 counts of animal cruelty after 47 dogs and other animals were seized from her property where she operated a private dog rescue. Smith was ultimately sentenced to jail time and required to compensate the Humane Society for the money that was spent to care for the 47 dogs that were seized from Smith’s property. Smith appealed her sentence, arguing that the lower court had made five errors in coming to its decision. The Court of Appeals only addressed four of the five arguments made by Smith. First, the Smith argued that the court erred in not suppressing evidence on the basis that her 4th Amendment rights had been violated. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument, holding that Smith’s 4th Amendment rights had not been violated because the information that led to the seizure of Smith’s dogs was provided by a private citizen and therefore not applicable to the 4th Amendment protections. Secondly, Smith argued that the court violated her due process rights when it made multiple, erroneous evidentiary rulings that deprived her of her ability to meaningfully defend herself at trial. The Court of Appeals found that Smith had not provided enough evidence to establish that her due process rights had been violated, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the argument. Thirdly, Smith made a number of arguments related to constitutional violations but the Court of Appeals found that there was not evidence to support these arguments and dismissed the claim. Lastly, Smith argued that she had made a pre-indictment, non-prosecution agreement that was not followed by the court. The Court of Appeals also dismissed this argument for a lack of evidence. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision and sentencing. |
Case | |
| KY - Liens - § 257.105. Sale of unclaimed animals held by veterinarian | KRS § 257.105 | Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 257.105 | This statute deals with the sale of unclaimed animals after an animal is left with a licensed veterinarian after providing care to the animal. Under the statute, the veterinarian is able to sell the animal for reasonable value if the animal is left unclaimed for ten days or more. Once the veterinarian determines that he or she will be selling the animal, he or she must provide notice to the owner prior to the sale. | Statute | |
| Wyoming Farm Burearu v. Babbitt | 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) | 49 ERC 1985, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,289, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 434 (2000) |
The State Farm Bureaus (a national farm organization)), researchers, and environmental groups appealed from decision of United States and federal agencies to introduce experimental population of gray wolves in a national park and central Idaho. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming struck down the Department of Interior's final wolf introduction rules and ordered reintroduced wolves removed. In reversing the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit held that the possibility that individual wolves from existing wolf populations could enter experimental population areas did not violate provision of Endangered Species Act requiring that such populations remain "geographically separate." Further, the fact that the promulgated rules treated all wolves, including naturally occurring wolves, found within designated experimental population areas as nonessential experimental animals did not violate ESA. |
Case | |
| Carroll v. Cnty. of Monroe | 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013) | The Plaintiff-Appellant appeals a decision/order by the lower court to deny her motion to set aside the jury verdict or grant a new trial. At the original trial, a jury found plaintiff failed to prove her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the shooting of her dog during the execution of a search warrant was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff's dog was shot during a "no-knock" search warrant at plaintiff's residence, but the warrant team was aware that a dog would be present during the search. On appeal, this court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial because she failed to provide any “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to show that the jury would find in her favor. The court believed that it was unlikely that a jury would find in her favor because of the fact that the dog was killed during a “no-knock” search of the home and the dog “quickly and aggressively” ran towards the police officer after he entered the home. Although the court agreed that the officers should have advised a plan to deal with the dog in a non-lethal way, it maintained that a jury would unlikely find that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable given the circumstances of this case. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| MN - Ordinances - 366.01.Chapter 366. Town Board; Board of Audit. Town Board. | M. S. A. § 366.01 | MN ST § 366.01 | This Minnesota statute provides that the supervisors of each town constituting a town board are empowered to license and regulate the presence or keeping of dogs or domestic animal pets when deemed to be in the public interest. | Statute |