Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Wolf - Regulation for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population Segment of the Gray Wolf; Fi | 2005 WL 20189 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 05-136 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) establish a rule for the nonessential experimental populations (NEPs) of the Western Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of the gray wolf (Canis lupus), so that in States and on Tribal reservations with Service-approved wolf management plans, we can better address the concerns of affected landowners and the impacts of a biologically recovered wolf population. In addition, States and Tribes with Service accepted wolf management plans can petition the Service for lead management authority for experimental wolves consistent with this rule. |
Administrative | |
| MN - Wildlife, possession - Chapter 97A. Game and Fish. Possession and Transportation of Wild Animals. | M. S. A. § 97A.501 - 56 | MN ST § 97A.501 - 56 | These Minnesota statutes restrict possession and transportation of wild animals. No one may transport wild animals taken, bought, or sold in violation of the game and fish laws. In general, a person may not take, import, transport, or sell an endangered species of wild animal, but there are exceptions. | Statute | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Dyer | 2009 WL 484438 (D.Idaho) |
The plaintiff, Western Watersheds Project (WWP), is an environmental group that brought this lawsuit to ban livestock grazing in certain areas of the Jarbidge Field Office (1.4 million acres of public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Idaho and northern Nevada). WWP alleges that continued grazing destroys what little habitat remains for imperiled species like the sage grouse, pygmy rabbit, and slickspot peppergrass (deemed “sensitive species” by the BLM). After ten days of evidentiary hearings, the court found that three sensitive species in the JFO are in serious decline and that livestock grazing is an important factor in that decline. However, the court found that a ban on grazing was not required by law at this point since the Court was "confident" in the BLM's ability to modify the 2009 season in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the existing RMP. |
Case | ||
| Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser | (1991) 1 VR 51 | (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-027 |
Animal Liberation were injuncted from publishing words claiming animal cruelty in a circus or demonstrating against that circus. They were also found guilty of nuisance resulting from their demonstration outside that circus. On appeal, the injunctions were overturned although the finding of nuisance was upheld. |
Case | |
| US - Marine Mammals, Endangered - Establishment of Species of Concern List, Addition of Species to Species of Concern List, Desc | 2004 WL 791908 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-8593 |
NMFS establishes a species of concern list, places 45 species on this list, describes the factors it will consider when identifying species of concern, and revises the candidate species list. NMFS also solicits information and comments concerning the status of, research and stewardship opportunities for, and the factors for identifying species of concern. |
Administrative | |
| Beckett v. Warren | 921 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio, 2010) | 2010 WL 46003 (Ohio), 124 Ohio St.3d 256 (2010) |
On a certified conflict from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided here whether a plaintiff pursuing a claim for bodily injuries caused by a dog must elect either a statutory remedy under R.C. 955.28 or a remedy at common law for negligence. The Supreme Court found that the defense's conflict case, Rodenberger v. Wadsworth, 1983 WL 7005, did not turn on the issue of whether both claims could be pursued simultaneously, but rather whether the statutory cause of action abrogated the common law cause of action (which it held did not). In looking at the plain language of R.C. 955.28, the Court found that the statute itself does not preclude a simultaneous common law action for damages for bodily injuries caused by a dog. Under both theories of recovery, compensatory damages remain the same so there is no issue of double recovery. Thus, a plaintiff may, in the same case, pursue a claim for a dog bite injury under both R.C. 955.28 and common law negligence. |
Case | |
| People v. Miller | 159 A.D.3d 1608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | 72 N.Y.S.3d 750, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 02109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | In this New York case, defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal contempt in the first degree. The incident occurred when defendant went back over to his girlfriend's house after he called her to ask permission to visit the dogs. The complainant declined, saying she had plans for an outing with the dogs that day. Witnesses later observed defendant banging on the complainant's door and subsequently opening a window and climbing in her residence. After forcing entry, defendant took the dogs and complainant called 911. Subsequently, defendant led police on a high speed chase, and, after being arrested, defendant claimed the dogs were licensed to him. The appellate court viewed all the evidence of the elements for each crime and rejected defendant's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. Notably, two judges dissented on this appeal, finding that defendant "had at least a good faith basis for claiming an ownership interest the dogs." The dissent found the dogs may have been jointly owned and that, prior to his arrest, "defendant simply intended to take the dogs for a walk and then return them." | Case | |
| Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept | 152 A.D.3d 113, 55 N.Y.S.3d 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) | 2017 WL 2429221 (N.Y. App. Div. June 6, 2017) | Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus. | Case | |
| NJ - Veterinary - Chapter 16. Veterinary Medicine, Surgery and Dentistry. | NJSA 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 | NJ ST 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass'n | 387 F.3d 850 (9th Cir., 2004) | 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20, 119 (2004) |
Activist sued a state-created agricultural association under 42 USC § 1983 to challenge a rule that limited demonstrations to “free expression zones” outside a state-owned performance facility. The Court of Appeals held that the association was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It held that the parking lots and walkways were public fora, and thus time, place and manner restrictions on speech had to be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest. The Court held that the state did not have a significant interest in restricting protestors to these zones. The rule was not narrowly tailored enough to promote the association's interest in preventing traffic congestion, and restricted more speech than was necessary. Therefore, the rule unduly infringed free speech on its face. |
Case |