Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute | |
| State v. Fackrell | 277 S.W.3d 859 (Mo.App. S.D.,2009) |
In this Missouri case, defendant appealed her conviction for animal abuse. The facts underlying defendant's conviction involve her care of her dog from July 2004 to December 2004. When defendant's estranged husband stopped by her house to drop off their children for visitation in December, he noticed that the dog was very sick and offered to take the dog to the vet after defendant stated she could not afford a vet bill. Because it was the worst case the vet had seen in twenty-seven years of practice, he contacted law enforcement. On appeal, defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence presented that she “knowingly” failed to provide adequate care for Annie. The court disagreed. Under MO ST 578.012.1(3), a person is guilty of animal abuse when he or she fails to provide adequate care including "health care as necessary to maintain good health." Evidence showed that defendant was aware of the fact the dog was sick over the course of several months and even thought the dog had cancer. |
Case | ||
| WA - Vehicle - 46.61.660. Carrying persons or animals on outside part of vehicle | West's RCWA 46.61.660 | WA ST 46.61.660 | This Washington law states that it is illegal to transport any living animal on the running board, fenders, hood, or other outside part of any vehicle unless suitable harness, cage or enclosure is provided that protects the animal from being thrown. | Statute | |
| CA - Fighting - § 598.1. Dogfighting; forfeiture proceedings | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598.1 | CA PENAL § 598.1 | This California law allows the prosecuting attorney to file a petition for forfeiture in animal fighting cases under Section 597.5 or subdivision (b) of Section 597b. Any property interest, whether tangible or intangible, that was acquired through the commission of any of the crimes listed in subdivision (a) of Section 597.5 or subdivision (b) of Section 597b shall be subject to forfeiture, including both personal and real property, profits, proceeds, and the instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by cockfighting or dogfighting participants, organizers, transporters of animals and equipment, breeders and trainers of fighting birds or fighting dogs, and persons who steal or illegally obtain dogs or other animals for fighting, including bait and sparring animals. | Statute | |
| In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon | This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order." | Pleading | |||
| AU - Wildlife - Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1977 (NT) | Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1977 |
An Act to make provision for and in relation to the establishment of Territory Parks and other Parks and Reserves and the study, protection, conservation and sustainable utilisation of wildlife. |
Statute | ||
| US - Chimpanzees - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding on a Petition To List All Chimpanzees (Pan trog | 2011 WL 3840975 (F.R.) | Docket No. FWS-R9-ES-2010-0086; MO 92210-1111F113 B6 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, announce a 90-day finding on a petition to list all chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as endangered under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act). Based on our review, we find that the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that listing all chimpanzees as endangered may be warranted. Therefore, with the publication of this notice, we are initiating a review of the status of the species to determine if listing the entire species as endangered is warranted. To ensure that this status review is comprehensive, we are requesting scientific and commercial data and other information regarding this species. Based on the status review, we will issue a 12-month finding on the petition, which will address whether the petitioned action is warranted, as provided in section 4(b)(3)(B) of the Act. |
Administrative | |
| People v. Arroyo | 777 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. 2004) | 3 Misc.3d 668, 2004 N.Y.Slip Op. 24067 |
This case presents the court with a novel question: Does a pet owner commit an act of cruelty, for which he or she could be prosecuted criminally, by not providing an ill pet (in this case, terminally ill) with medical care? Defendant charged with violation of New York's anticruelty statute and moved for dismissal. In engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court held that: (1) provision prohibiting the deprivation of "necessary sustenance" was vague when applied to defendant, and (2) that the provision prohibiting "unjustifiably" causing pain to an animal was also vague when applied to defendant. Motion granted. |
Case | |
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case | |
| AK - Zoo - § 09.65.180. Civil liability of zoos | AS § 09.65.180 | AK ST § 09.65.180 | The Alaska law provides that, except as provided in (b), a person who owns or operates a zoo is strictly liable for injury to a person or property if the injury is caused by an animal owned by or in the custody of the zoo. | Statute |