Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Humane Society v. Merriam | 2007 WL 333309 (D.Minn.) |
Minnesota allowed trapping and snaring activities. Plaintiffs sued the state, arguing that this policy was causing the death of some endangered Canada lynx, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs and defendants had the case dismissed after they agreed that Minnesota would seek a permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and that conservation measures would be taken for the protection of the lynx. |
Case | |
| MI - Constitutional Provisions - Protection of Natural Resources | M. C. L. A. Const. Art. 4, § 52 | MI CONST Art. 4, § 52 | This section declares the protection, conservation, and development of the state's natural resources to be of paramount public concern and the legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. | Statute |
| Kitchin ex rel. Kitchin v. Halifax County | 665 S.E.2d 760 (N.C.App.,2008) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant dog owners appealed from a decision of the County Board of Health that ruled their dog could not be returned home because of the dog's potential exposure to rabies as result of attacking a raccoon (the dog was scheduled for euthanization). After the Board denied the owners' appeal, they filed a complaint against county which contained motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent dog's quarantine and for class certification. The Court of Appeals held that the owners' appeal of Board's decision to quarantine dog was moot because dog had already been returned home. The action against the animal control officers was dismissed because the officers were shielded by governmental immunity. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lewis | 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9802 |
Defendant was convicted of a number of offenses related to his role in a wildlife smuggling operation. If trial did not begin within the requisite time period and defendant moved for dismissal prior to trial, the court had to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. The court held that the circumstances in the case, where it was clear that the delay in the trial caused the delay in the hearing, rather than the other way around, and where defendant repeatedly asked the court to set the case for trial and was otherwise ready to proceed to trial, plaintiff United States' pending pretrial motion could not serve as a basis for exclusion for a 117 day period. Because the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act, defendant's convictions had to be reversed, his sentences vacated, and his indictments dismissed. |
Case |
| State Holding Period Laws for Impounded Companion Animals |
Holding period laws are state requirements that determine how long an impounded animal must be “held” by a government entity (or contracted agent) before it can be released or euthanized. |
State map | ||
| MD - Liens - § 16-401. Lien for care or custody | Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 16-401 | MD Code, Commercial Law, § 16-401 | Under Maryland law, any person who owns or operates a livery stable or other establishment who gives care or custody to livestock will have a lien on the livestock for any reasonable charge relating to: board and custody, training, veterinarian and blacksmith service, and other maintenance expenses. If the lien is not paid within 30 days after payment is due, the owner of the livery stable is entitled to sell the livestock. | Statute |
| NE - Dangerous - ARTICLE 6. DOGS AND CATS. (B) DANGEROUS DOGS. | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-617 to 54-624 | NE ST § 54-617 to 54-624 | These Nebraska statutes outline the state's dangerous dog laws. Among the provisions include a requirement that the dog must be restrained when not in a secure enclosure on the owner's property. There is also a requirement that owners must post warning signs on the property notifying people that a dangerous dog is present. If a dangerous dog bites a person, the owner can be found guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor and the dog will be destroyed. | Statute |
| KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities | KRS § 65.877 | KY ST § 65.877 | This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion. | Statute |
| MN - Hospitals, nursing homes - § 144.573. Pets in certain institutions | M.S.A. § 144.573 | Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.573 (West) | This Minnesota statute describes the level of care required for pets who live in institutional facilities with their owners. | Statute |
| Schor v. N. Braddock Borough | 801 F. Supp. 2d 369 (W.D. Pa. 2011) | Sadie, a six (6) year old pit bull and family pet was shot and killed by the Defendant Officer Wittlinger. The Plaintiff, Sadie’s owner, filed a twelve count complaint alleging four § 1983 claims under federal law against all Defendants including the borough, police department, board of supervisors, police chief, and Officer Wittlinger. The remaining eight counts alleged claims solely against the officer. The Defendants' filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the dismissal of claims against the board, police chief, and officer in their official capacities. The court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s state negligence claims. However, the court did not dismiss claims brought against Police Chief Bazzone and Officer Wittlinger in their individual capacities. The court reasoned that the facts pled by the Plaintiff were sufficient to show that Chief Bazzone may have acted with deliberate indifference by not disciplining Officer Wittlinger after a prior dog shooting incident, and maintained a custom within the Police Department that it was proper to shoot a pet dog wandering the streets. The court also denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights claim. The court reasoned that the facts pled by the Plaintiff were sufficient to state a claim for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights because the plaintiff had a possessory interest in her dog Sadie as “property” and the officer used excessive force while seizing the Plaintiff’s property. | Case |