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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MA - Captive Wildlife - 2.12: Artificial Propagation of Birds, Mammals, Reptiles, and Amphibians | 321 MA ADC 2.12 | 321 CMR 2.12 | Massachusetts law prohibits possession of wild animals without a license. Licenses are only given out for limited reasons, none of which include the keeping of animals as pets. The classes for which licenses may be granted are propagator's licenses, public stocking licenses, dealer's licenses, possessor's licenses, and dog training licenses. | Administrative | |
| State v. Woods | 2001 WL 224519 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.) | Defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of kidnapping in an incident following a dogfight. Following a jury trial, d efendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case | ||
| Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | This is a draft of a withdrawn "Amparo" decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting's legality. In this case, plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company specializing in organizing bullfighting events, filed a legal action against various governmental entities and individuals in the state of Coahuila, in Mexico. The plaintiff challenged the 2015 amendment to Coahuila's animal protection law, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, on the grounds that it violated their rights to work, property, and cultural expression. The lower court dismissed the case regarding Article 20, Section XV of the animal protection law due to a lack of legal interest and because these provisions were not applicable to the case. The court also rejected the Amparo concerning Article 20, Section XIV of the same law. The case was appealed and eventually transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, after hearing the case de novo, upheld the constitutionality of Article 20, Section XIV of Coahuila's animal protection law. The judge emphasized that the right to a healthy environment includes the protection of animals as an element of the environment, moving away from viewing animals purely as property. The court highlighted the presence of various laws recognizing the need for humane treatment of animals and prohibiting cruelty, even though Mexico lacks a national anti-cruelty law. This legal framework justified the ban on bullfighting and supported the broader legislative objective of protecting and treating animals with dignity. The court argued that allowing bullfighting caused suffering and death for the sake of entertainment, which was detrimental to the societal interest of protecting the environment and species conservation, as established in Article 4 of the Constitution. It also stressed the importance of governments adopting gradual measures to protect animals, and regressing on these measures would be undesirable. | Case | ||
| Rotunda v. Haynes | 33 Misc.3d 68 (App. Term 2011) | 933 N.Y.S.2d 803, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 808, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21360 | The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| ID - Dog, property - Chapter 28. Dogs. | I.C. § 25-2807 | ID ST § 25-2807 | This Idaho statute states that dogs are considered property. It further provides that no entity of state or local government may by ordinance or regulation prevent the owner of any dog from protecting it from loss by the use of an electronic locating collar. | Statute | |
| People of the State of New York v. Mary Dawn Sitors | This action is an appeal from dismissal of criminal charges against a woman accused of acts of cruelty on her horses. The Town Court dismissed the criminal charges, finding that since the Catskill Animal Sanctuary's petition seeking the posting of security to care for the horses was dismissed (which had a lower standard of proof than in a criminal action), this necessarily meant it would be impossible to obtain a criminal conviction under the higher standard. Essentially, the Town Court's decision reflected a determination that one cannot violate New York's state cruelty law unless the animal dies due to lack of sustenance or care. The County Court found this reasoning erroneous; a violation under the law occurs when one fails to provide necessary sustenance, not only those acts or omissions that result in an animal's death. The criminal actions were thus, reinstated against defendant. | Pleading | |||
| City of Houston v. Levingston | 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tx.App.-Hous.(1 Dist.) 2006) |
This opinion substitutes City of Houston v. Levingston, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)), which is withdrawn. |
Case | ||
| Ecuador - Rights of nature - Civil Code | CÓDIGO CIVIL | Even though the constitution has indirectly granted animals rights as they are part of nature, they continue to be categorized as movable objects by the civil code. However, the most recent reform to the civil code is from 2005, meaning the current civil code still needs to be updated to comply with the 2008 constitution and subsequent constitutional court decisions. Article 585 defines movable objects as those that can be transported from one place to another, either by their force, like animals (which is why they are called “semovientes”), or by an external force, like inanimate things. Article 639 states that “domestic animals are subject to domain” (or complete ownership). It is important to note that the bill for animal welfare is currently in the hands of the National Assembly. Changing the categorization of animals in the civil code to “sentient beings” is one of the many topics regulated by this bill. | Statute | ||
| WV - Lien - § 38-11-4. Lien of bailee of animals or vehicles | W. Va. Code, § 38-11-4 | WV ST § 38-11-4 | This West Virginia law (as it relates to animals) states the a person who keeps a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or one who boards, pastures, feeds or trains animals for hire, has a lien upon such animals for the sum due him for the care, boarding, pasturage, feeding, or training of such animals, or the care, keeping of such animals. This lien exists even though such animals are permitted to be taken out of the possession of the one claiming such lien even if the contract has not yet terminated for the lien. The purchaser of such an animal, while out of the possession of the person claiming the lien, can take the property free of the lien unless he or she had actual notice of the lien at the time of purchase. | Statute | |
| EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU | Directive 2010/63/EU | Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. | Statute |