Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| Ecuador - Farm animals - Organic Code of agricultural health | Ley Organica de Sanidad Agropecuaria de Ecuador | The organic code of agricultural health of 2017 has as its primary objective to 1) prevent the entry, dissemination, and establishment of pests and diseases; promote animal welfare; and 2) control and eradicate pests and diseases that affect plants and animals and that could represent a phytosanitary and animal health risk. This law creates the Regulatory agency for Phytosanitary and Zoosanitary Control. This agency is responsible for regulating and controlling animal health and welfare, plant health, and food to maintain and improve the adequate conditions of agricultural production. | Statute | |
| WY - Hunting - Article 4. Miscellaneous Acts Prohibited (hunter harassment) | W. S. 1977 §§ 23-3-401 to 407 | WY ST §§ 23-3-401 to 407 | This section of Wyoming laws relates to miscellaneous prohibited hunting acts. Included is the state's hunter harassment law, which provides that no person shall with the intent to prevent or hinder the lawful taking of any wildlife. Violation is a "low misdemeanor." Article 4 also includes a 2009 law that prohibits remote hunting that allows a person not physically present to remotely control a weapon to kill wildlife. | Statute |
| ME - Lien, care - § 3352. Pasturage, food and shelter | 10 M.R.S.A. § 3352 | ME ST T. 10 § 3352 | This Maine law provides that a person who pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by contract or consent of the owner has a lien for the amount due. The lien may be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession. | Statute |
| SC - Wildlife - § 50-1-270. Liability for gross destruction or injury to wildlife, | Code 1976 § 50-1-270 | SC ST § 50-1-270 | This South Carolina statute provides that any person or public or private entity is liable to the State for the unlawful gross destruction of or injury to wildlife, aquatic life, endangered or threatened species, or the lands or waters owned by the State. For a deliberate or grossly negligent act, the State must be awarded damages of three times the value of the resource affected, plus costs, including attorney's fees. This section does not apply to ordinary agricultural practices. | Statute |
| Altman v. City of High Point | 330 F.3d 194 C.A.4 (N.C. 2003) |
This case arises out of several shooting incidents in the City of High Point, North Carolina. In each incident, a High Point animal control officer shot and killed one or more dogs that were running at large in the city. Plaintiffs, the owners of the animals, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dogs at issue in this case do qualify as property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the officers seized that property. However, because in each instance the seizure involved was reasonable, it concluded that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. |
Case | |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) | 2011 S.D. 43; 2011 WL 3207821 (S.D.) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
Case |
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case | |
| IN - Transport of Animals - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS ON FOOT) RULES, 2001 | The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, regulate the transport of animals on foot. The rules apply to the transport of animals on foot is five kilometres or more from the boundary of the town/city/village of origin. New born animals whose navels have not completely healed, and those animals that are diseased, blind, emaciated, fatigues or have given birth in the past three days or that are likely to give birth during transport shall not be transported on foot. Animals may only be transported in their farm social groups. The owner of the animals must ensure that the animals have access to veterinary first aid equipment through their journey and that they have access to adequate water and fodder. | Statute | ||
| Viilo v. City of Milwaukee | 552 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Wis. 2008) | The court in this case denied summary judgement for the defendant after two police officers shot plaintiff’s dog four times which ultimately resulted in the dog’s death. The court denied summary judgment because it believed that there was a question as to a material fact of the case. The material fact in this case was whether or not the officers reasonably feared for their lives when the dog was shot the third and fourth time. After the dog was injured from the first two shots, there was inconsistent testimony as to whether the dog was still acting in an aggressive manner, which may have warranted the third and fourth shots. Due to the inconsistent testimony, the court held that a ruling of summary judgment was not appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted as to all claims except the claim that the third and fourth shots constituted an illegal seizure. | Case |