Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ecuador - Animal rights - Civil Code | CÓDIGO CIVIL | Even though the constitution has indirectly granted animals rights as they are part of nature, they continue to be categorized as movable objects by the civil code. However, the most recent reform to the civil code is from 2005, meaning the current civil code still needs to be updated to comply with the 2008 constitution and subsequent constitutional court decisions. Article 585 defines movable objects as those that can be transported from one place to another, either by their force, like animals (which is why they are called “semovientes”), or by an external force, like inanimate things. Article 639 states that “domestic animals are subject to domain” (or complete ownership). It is important to note that the bill for animal welfare is currently in the hands of the National Assembly. Changing the categorization of animals in the civil code to “sentient beings” is one of the many topics regulated by this bill. | Statute | |
| WV - Lien - § 38-11-4. Lien of bailee of animals or vehicles | W. Va. Code, § 38-11-4 | WV ST § 38-11-4 | This West Virginia law (as it relates to animals) states the a person who keeps a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or one who boards, pastures, feeds or trains animals for hire, has a lien upon such animals for the sum due him for the care, boarding, pasturage, feeding, or training of such animals, or the care, keeping of such animals. This lien exists even though such animals are permitted to be taken out of the possession of the one claiming such lien even if the contract has not yet terminated for the lien. The purchaser of such an animal, while out of the possession of the person claiming the lien, can take the property free of the lien unless he or she had actual notice of the lien at the time of purchase. | Statute |
| EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU | Directive 2010/63/EU | Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. | Statute | |
| US - Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 - Chapter 68. Disaster Relief | 42 U.S.C.A. § 5196 - 5196d | The FEMA Administrator is directed to develop emergency preparedness plans that take into account the needs of individuals with pets and service animals prior to, during, and following a major disaster or emergency. The Administrator must also ensure that state and local emergency preparedness plans take into account the needs of such individuals. The Administrator may make financial contributions to the States and local authorities for animal emergency preparedness purposes to accommodate people with pets and service animals. | Statute | |
| AR - Ecoterrorism - Farm Animal and Research Facilities | A.C.A. § 5-62-201 - 204 | AR ST § 5-62-201 to 204 | This Arkansas subchapter concerns illegal acts committed against agricultural production and animal research facilities. Under the act, a person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility, with the intent to deprive the owner of the animal facility, animal, or property and disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Any person who violates any provision of this subchapter is deemed guilty of a Class D felony and will be ordered to pay replacement costs/restitution. | Statute |
| U.S. ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West | 594 F.3d 694 (C.A. 9 (Ariz.), 2010) | 2010 WL 376093 (C.A.9 (Ariz.)) |
The plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals and Patricia Haight brought suit against the defendants, Michael Berens, the principal research investigator of the study in question, and the Barrow Neurological Institute, St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center, Catholic Healthcare West Arizona, and Catholic Healthcare West, his employers, under the False Claims Act. In 1997, defendant Michael Berens, Ph.D., submitted a grant application to the NIH in which he sought federal funding for a project to develop a canine model to study glioma, a form of human brain cancer, and attempted to create a process for implanting gliomas in the brains of beagles. The plaintiffs brought suit against Dr. Berens under the False Claims Act asserting that he had lied in his grant application in order to obtain NIH funding. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the challenged grant application statements were objectively false. In response, the plaintiffs filed a notice to appeal 51 days later, relying on a circuit court precedent allowing plaintiffs 60 days to file a notice of appeal in these types of cases. However, an intervening Supreme Court decision declared that plaintiffs have only 30 days to file a notice to appeal in this type of case. This case was amended and superseded by US ex rel Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West , 602 F.3d 949 (9th Cir., 2010). |
Case |
| Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) |
Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe. Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| Template for Country topical intro | Template for country topical introductions. | Policy | ||
| Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher | 518 P.3d 131 (2022), review denied, 370 Or. 789, 524 P.3d 964 (2023) | 321 Or.App. 439 (Or.App., 2022) | The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. | Case |
| CA - Vehicle - § 23117. Transportation of animals; enclosure or restraint requirements | West's Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code § 23117 | CA VEHICLE § 23117 | This California law prohibits any person from transporting any animal in the open back of a vehicle on a highway unless the vehicle has sides that extend 46" vertically, or the animal is secured in a cage and cross-tethered to prevent it from jumping out of the vehicle. The law targets the transporting of dogs in the back of pickup trucks. Exclusions include the transportation of livestock and farm dogs. | Statute |