Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Sandia | 188 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir 1999) |
This case was vacated by the Tenth Circuit in the Hardman order. Defendant in this case sold golden eagle skins to undercover agents in New Mexico. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court failed to consider the facts under a RFRA analysis. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that defendant never claimed that his sale of eagle parts was for religious purposes and that the sale of eagle parts negates a claim of religious infringement on appeal. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion. |
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| CA - Licenses - City dog license tags; compliance with division | West's Ann. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 30502 | CA FOOD & AG § 30502 | This California statute provides that any dog tag issued pursuant to ordinance by a city or county will be valid provided it complies with this division, provides for the wearing of the license tag upon the collar of the dog, and provides for the keeping of a record which shall establish the identity of the person that owns or harbors the dog. | Statute | ||||||
| EU - Farming - Egg regulation, Number 557 | (EC) Number 557/2007 |
In May 2007, the Commission passed an egg regulation, Number 557, building upon the prior one (Number 1028) and delineating detailed marketing standards for eggs. The Regulation sets out rules, applicable to virtually all hen eggs sold in the EU, for the quality and weight grading, packaging, marking, storage, transport and presentation for retail sale of eggs, to ensure that they are marketed on an evenhanded, competitive basis. Though the regulation’s focus is primarily on egg marketing rather than animal welfare, it includes certain provisions that bear upon animal welfare. For instance, the regulation sets out detailed requirements for hen living conditions that must be met before eggs can qualify as “free range,” including open-air runs of low hen density.
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| Murga v. Yarusso | 215 A.D.3d 979, 187 N.Y.S.3d 762 (2023) | No. 2021-00173, 605534/18, 187 N.Y.S.3d 762, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 02130, 2023 WL 3083108 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Apr. 26, 2023) | This New York case involved action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained after defendant's dog allegedly ran into street and pushed the plaintiff pedestrian to the ground. The plaintiff described the dog as acting like a "big puppy" and the dog did not bite the plaintiff. In contrast, the defendant testified that the dog was chasing a ball in the defendant's front yard and did not actually go in the street. Rather, defendant asserts that plaintiff tripped upon seeing the dog in the yard. The complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to keep the dog under control and to take protective measures knowing of the aggressive propensity of the dog. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County granted the defendant-owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal by the plaintiff, the plaintiff also suggested that defendant might be liable for throwing the ball which caused the dog to run in the street and knock the plaintiff down. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the plaintiff cannot recover under such a theory, as New York does not recognize a common-law negligence cause of action to recover damages for an owner's alleged negligence in the handling of a dog. The summary judgment was affirmed as the court found the owner was not liable to pedestrian for injuries sustained. | Case | ||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 7 Núm 4 |
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| Com. v. Erickson | 905 N.E.2d 127 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 172 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was found guilty of six counts of animal cruelty involving one dog and five cats after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the warrantless entry into her apartment and argued that the judge erred when he failed to grant her motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. The Court of Appeals found no error where the search was justified under the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The court found that the officer was justified to enter where the smell emanating from the apartment led him to believe that someone might be dead inside. The court was not persuaded by defendant's argument that, once the officer saw the dog feces covering the apartment that was the source of the smell, it was then objectively unreasonable for him to conclude the smell was caused by a dead body. "The argument ignores the reality that there were in fact dead bodies in the apartment, not merely dog feces, to say nothing of the additional odor caused by the blood, cat urine, and cat feces that were also found." |
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| Andrews v. City of West Branch Iowa | 454 F.3d 914 (8th Cir., 2006) |
Appellants filed a suit against defendant, City of West Branch, Iowa and former police chief Dan Knight, seeking damages and relief under Section 1983. The dog was killed by Knight in the owners' fenced backyard in view of one of the plaintiffs. The district court's grant of summary judgment for the officer was reversed and the case was remanded for a jury trial. |
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| AZ - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Statutes | A. R. S. § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | AZ ST § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | The Arizona section contains the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she intentionally, knowingly or recklessly subjects any animal under the person's custody or control to cruel neglect or abandonment, fails to provide medical attention necessary to prevent protracted suffering to any animal under the person's custody or control, inflicts unnecessary physical injury to any animal, or recklessly subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, among other things. Animal is defined as a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian. Exclusions include hunting and agricultural activities in accordance with those laws and regulations in Arizona. Intentionally attending a dogfight is a felony under this provision whereas attendance at a cockfight is a misdemeanor. | Statute | ||||||
| Maine Laws: Chapter 182 'Lands reserved for public uses.' | 1883 Me. Laws 182 | The act concerns the allocation of land for the public use within a township. | Statute | |||||||
| State v. Butler | 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191 (2022) | 2022 WL 4488304 (N.H. Sept. 28, 2022) | Defendant Kevin Butler was convicted of criminal negligence after he left his dog inside a parked vehicle for 45 minutes when the temperature was over 90 degrees outside. The charge came after a neighbor noticed a dog in the vehicle that was "scratching at the windows and the door" and appeared to be in distress. After calling the police, an animal control officer removed the animal from the unlocked car and transported the distressed dog to a local veterinary clinic. At trial, the defendant testified that he was out running errands on a "very hot" day, and asked his son to get the dog out of the car as Defendant's hands were full. An important phone call distracted him from following up on the dog's removal and only after the police knocked on his door did he realize the dog must still be in the car. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of criminal negligence for both charges. The State must prove that a defendant “fail[ed] to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct" and that this risk constitutes a gross deviation from conduct performed by a reasonable person. Here, the court found that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the dog would overheat in the car and that his failure to perceive this risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The temperature was high that day, the car was parked in direct sunlight with all the windows up, and the dog was left for around an hour. The fact that Defendant relied upon his 8-year-old son to remove the dog under these circumstances constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. This was not "mere inattention" as Defendant claimed. The conviction was affirmed. | Case |