Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Facility dog - 5/106B-10. Conditions for testimony by a victim who is a child or a moderately, | 725 I.L.C.S. 5/106B-10 | IL ST CH 725 § 5/106B-10 | This Illinois law allows a "facility dog" - a dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization that is a member of Assistance Dogs International - to be present during the testimony of a victim who is a child or a moderately, severely, or profoundly intellectually disabled person or a person affected by a developmental disability. This occurs in the prosecution of criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse. When deciding whether to permit the child or person to testify with the assistance of a facility dog, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child or person, the rights of the parties to the litigation, and any other relevant factor that would facilitate the testimony by the child or the person. | Statute | |
| VA - Property - § 3.2-6585. Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6585 | VA ST § 3.2-6585 | This Virginia statute provides that all dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. It further grants authority to animal control officers to seize a stolen dog or cat pending court action. | Statute | |
| MI - Melvindale - Breed - DIVISION 5. - PIT BULL TERRIERS | MELVINDALE, MI., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 4-136 - 4-148 (2006) |
In Melvindale, Michigan, there is a ban on owning or keeping pit bull dogs, with an exception for dogs licensed as of April 1990. Such dogs are allowed, as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as confinement or leash and muzzle, $100,000 liability insurance, and an ID number tattoo. A violation may result in a misdemeanor conviction punishable by a fine of up to $100 and imprisonment of up to 30 days. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Animal Law Index Volume 19, Part 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 19, Issue 1 (Fall 2012)INTRODUCTIONEMPATHY WITH ANIMALS: A LITMUS TEST FOR LEGAL PERSONHOOD? |
Policy | |||
| Carbasho v. Musulin | 618 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2005) |
Owner's dog was killed by a negligently driven car. The owner sued to recover damages for loss of companionship. The court held that dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable. |
Case | ||
| U.S. v. Hackman | 630 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 2011) | Defendants appealed sentences arising out of a Missouri-based dog-fighting conspiracy. Each man pleaded guilty to conspiring to engage in animal fighting ventures in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one Defendant additionally pleaded guilty to engaging in animal fighting ventures in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156. When sentencing each defendant, the district court applied an upward departure provision found in the application notes to United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or Guidelines). Each appellant argued that his relevant conduct was not sufficiently cruel to warrant the upward departure. The 8th Circuit found, however, that the district court had properly considered conduct that was legally relevant to Defendants' sentencing under the Guidelines. The court also found that Defendants' conduct amounted to more than just possessing fighting pit bulls. Defendants bred, raised, trained, sold, and fought them knowing that the dogs would be allowed, if not required, to fight until severely injured or dead. Thus, the ordinary cruelty inherent in dog fighting justifies base offense level, while the extraordinary cruelty of Defendants' crimes separately justified the upward departure. The district court's judgment was affirmed. | Case | ||
| SD - Hunting - 41-1-8. Interference with lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing prohibited--Violation as misdemeanor | S D C L § 41-1-8 to 10 | SD ST § 41-1-8 to 10 | This South Dakota law reflects the state's hunter harassment provision. The law prohibits a person from intentionally interfering with any person or group of persons lawfully engaged in the process of taking or attempting to take any game or fish. This includes actions specifically intended to harass and any activity intended to scare or disturb game with the specific intent of preventing their lawful taking. Violation is a Class 2 misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| US - Wolf - Regulation for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population Segment of the Gray Wolf; Fi | 2005 WL 20189 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 05-136 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) establish a rule for the nonessential experimental populations (NEPs) of the Western Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of the gray wolf (Canis lupus), so that in States and on Tribal reservations with Service-approved wolf management plans, we can better address the concerns of affected landowners and the impacts of a biologically recovered wolf population. In addition, States and Tribes with Service accepted wolf management plans can petition the Service for lead management authority for experimental wolves consistent with this rule. |
Administrative | |
| Thompson v. Hancock County | 539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995) |
In this case, the Supreme court of Iowa held that hog confinement buildings were agricultural buildings and thus exempt from county zoning ordinances. |
Case | ||
| Sanders v. Frank | 37 N.E.3d 1305 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2015) |
In this case, Heather Sanders filed suit against Joseph D. Frank after she suffered injuries as a result of rescuing Frank’s horses that were running at large. The lower court dismissed Sander’s complaint with prejudice and Sanders appealed. On appeal, Sanders asserted four main arguments: (1) the doctrine of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should not be applied when defendant negligently violates a statute; (2) the rescue doctrine should preclude the assumption of the risk doctrine even though Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses; (3) the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine; and (4) the trial court erred by preventing recovery of damages. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the complaint. The court found that all four of Sander’s arguments were without merit. The court held that although Frank had negligently violated a statute, allowing his horses to escape and run at large, Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses and was not responding to any immediate emergency or threat to human life. Also, the court pointed out that Sanders had “assumed the risk” based on the fact that she had helped rescue Frank’s horses in the past. As a result, the lower court did not err in dismissing Sander’s claim based on contributory negligence and the assumption of the risk doctrine. |
Case |