Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NJ - Pet Trusts - Trusts for care of domesticated animals | N.J.S.A. 3B:31-24 | NJ ST 3B:31-24 | A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Note: this section replaces the original law (3B:11-38) enacted in 2001 and repealed in 2016. | Statute | |
| City of Houston v. Levingston | 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tx.App.-Hous.(1 Dist.) 2006) |
This opinion substitutes City of Houston v. Levingston, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)), which is withdrawn. |
Case | ||
| DeRobertis by DeRobertis v. Randazzo | 462 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1983) | 94 N.J. 144 (1983) |
The principal issue in this New Jersey case is the liability of a dog owner to an infant plaintiff bitten by the owner's dog. At trial the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the Appellate Division, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. A factual issue existed at the trial, however, as to whether the infant plaintiff was lawfully on the property of the owner, but the trial court did not submit that question to the jury. The omission is important because the "dog-bite" statute, N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, imposes absolute liability on an owner whose dog bites someone who is "lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog." If the plaintiff was a trespasser, he was not lawfully on the property, and liability should not be determined under the statute but according to common-law principles. It was necessary to find that the invitation to infant plaintiff to be on defendant's property extended to the area where the dog was chained. |
Case | |
| Colombia - Whaling - Ley 1348, 2009 | Ley 1348, 2009 | This law adopts the "International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling" signed in Washington D.C. on December 2, 1946 and the Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed in Washington D.C. on November 19, 1956. Colombia is one of the 89 countries that are part of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This Commission is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to implement measures aiming for the conservation of whales and the regulation of whaling. Colombia joined this commission in 2011. | Statute | ||
| OR - Licenses - 609.060. Notice by publication of election result; dogs running at large prohibited; violations | O. R. S. § 609.060 | OR ST § 609.060 | This Oregon statute provides that if a governing body of a county by ordinance, or a measure approved by the electors in an election prohibits dogs from running at large, the county shall give notice, by publication in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county. If after 60 days from the notice, a keeper violates the running at large ordinance, he or she commits a Class B violation. | Statute | |
| MO - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 578. Miscellaneous Offenses. Animal Research and Production Facilities | V. A. M. S. 578.405 - 578.412 | MO ST 578.405 - 578.412 | This chapter comprises "The Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act." The act prohibits anyone from releasing, stealing, or otherwise intentionally causing the death, injury, or loss of any animal at or from an animal facility. It also prohibits any person from damaging, vandalizing, or stealing any property in or on an animal facility, or obtaining access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing acts not authorized by the facility. Generally, violation is a misdemeanor if the loss is less than $300 and a felony if it exceeds that amount. Any person who has been damaged by a violation of section 578.407 may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing such damage. | Statute | |
| Toledo v. Tellings | 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio, 2007) | 114 Ohio St.3d 278; 2007 -Ohio- 3724 |
In this Ohio case, the defendant, who owned three pit bull type dogs, was convicted in the Municipal Court, Lucas County, of violating the Toledo city ordinance that limited ownership to only one pit bull per household. On appeal by the City, the Supreme Court found the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls. The evidence presented in the trial court supports the conclusion that pit bulls pose a serious danger to the safety of citizens. The statutes and the city ordinance are rationally related to serve the legitimate interests of protecting Ohio and Toledo citizens. |
Case | |
| Thurston v. Carter | 92 A. 295 (Maine, 1914) | L.R.A. 1915C,359, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, Am.Ann.Cas. 1917A,389 | This action of trespass is brought for the recovery of damages for the killing of the fox hound of plaintiff by defendant. Defendant claimed that he shot and killed the plaintiff's dog while it was chasing and worrying a cat belonging to and upon the land of the defendant. After the introduction of all the evidence, the court ordered a verdict for defendant. To this direction, plaintiff filed his bill of exceptions in which it is stipulated that if a cat is a domestic animal, the ruling below is to stand, otherwise judgment is to be entered for plaintiff in the sum of $50. | Case | |
| NV - Exotic Wildlife - NAC 504.471 Restrictions on shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife | NV ADC 504.471 | NAC 504.471 | This administrative provision restricts the shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife subject to limited exceptions. | Administrative | |
| Commonwealth v. Szewczyk | 53 N.E.3d 1286 (Mass.App.Ct.,2016) | 89 Mass.App.Ct. 711 (2016) | In this Massachusetts case, defendant was charged with animal cruelty after he shot a dog that had wandered onto his property with a pellet gun. The pellet was lodged in the dog’s leg and caused significant pain and discomfort to the dog. Following conviction, defendant appealed the District Court’s ruling arguing that the judge erred in denying three of his eleven requests for rulings of law.Specifically, defendant's principal argument was that he had a lawful purpose in shooting (to scare the dog off his property), his intent was justified (to insure his wife's safety on the property), and the pain inflicted by defendant shooting the dog does not fit the statutory meaning of "cruel." At the close of evidence, defendant submitted a written request for ruling under Mass. R.Crim. P.26 setting out these issues. The court held that the District Court judge correctly denied the three requests because they were clearly outside the scope of rule 26 because they called upon the judge as a fact finder to weigh the evidence presented at trial. Next, the court reviewed the facts of the case to determine whether or not a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the court held that a rational trier of fact would have been able to find that defendant did commit animal cruelty by shooting the dog. The court focused on the fact that the defendant could have used other means to ensure that the dog did not enter the property again without causing pain and suffering to the dog by shooting the dog in the leg. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |