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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loy v. Kenney | 301 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2022), reh'g denied (Dec. 2, 2022) | 85 Cal.App.5th 403 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2022) | This is a case brought by purchasers of puppies from breeders advertising on Craigslist, against the breeders who were selling fatally sick puppies to these buyers. The buyers allege that the sellers misrepresented the puppies as healthy, when the dogs were actually too young to be separated from their mothers and many of these puppies ended up dying from illnesses such as parvovirus. The buyers brought suit for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and for animal cruelty. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to stop the sellers from advertising and selling dogs while trial was pending. This appeal followed, with the sellers arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show that they were the sellers of these sick puppies. However, the court of appeals affirmed. The court found that the evidence from the humane officer’s search of the seller’s home led to sufficient evidence that they were selling the sick puppies, including the seizure of 32 puppies and dogs living in unhealthy and cruel conditions. The puppies were being separated from their mothers too soon, and some were encrusted with feces. During the search, one of the sellers also told the officer that they would not stop selling puppies. Sellers attempted to raise several evidentiary objections to the evidence offered by the humane society officers, but all were rejected. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed and awarded costs to the buyers who brought the action. | Case |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE KERALA PANCHAYAT RAJ (SLAUGHTER HOUSES AND MEAT STALLS) RULES, 1996 | 13 or 1994 | These Rules regulate the operation of slaughterhouses and meat stalls. Animals may be slaughtered only in public or licensed slaughter houses within a village panchayat area. Slaughter houses may not be established within 90 metres of any house. Butchers require licenses for slaughtering animals. Animals may not be admitted to slaughter houses unless they are examined and certified as being free from contagious diseases. | Statute | |
| Japan, Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment | TIAS 7990 | Per Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: This 1972 Convention is designed to provide for the protection of species of birds which are common to both countries, or which migrate between them by (1) enhancement of habitat, (2) exchange of research data, and (3) regulation of hunting. It was signed in Tokyo on March 4, 1974, with ratification advised by the Senate of March 27, 1973, and documents of ratification exchanged September 19, 1972. The Convention entered into force September 19, 1974. An agreement amending the annex to the Convention by adding the Maloy Bittern was effected by exchange of notes September 19, 1974, entering into force December 19, 1974 (25 UST 3373; TIAS 7990). This exchange also included a list of endangered birds as provided for in Article IV of the Convention. Implementing legislation for the United States was achieved by enactment of P.L. 93-300, June 1, 1975 (88 Stat. 190), amending the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (16 USC 703-711; 40 Stat. 755), as amended. By a 1988 exchange of diplomatic notes, Convention appendices were updated to correct common names of species, scientific names, and to both add and delete species on the list based upon the latest scientific knowledge. | Treaty | |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-1.1. Towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick, and Middletown and city of Woonsocket--Vicious dog ordinance | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1.1 | RI ST § 4-13-1.1 | This Rhode Island statute provides that the town councils of the towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick and Middletown may, by ordinance, provide that the owner or keeper of any dog that assaults any person shall be fined an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two hundred dollars. The investigation must prove that the dog was off the owner's property or that the assault was the result of owner negligence. It further provides that, in the city of Woonsocket, an owner shall not be declared negligent if an injury is sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort upon the owner's premises or was teasing, tormenting, provoking, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. | Statute |
| MT - Exotic wildlife - Part 7. Importation, Introduction, and Transplantation of Wildlife | MCA 87-5-701 to 87-5-725 | MT ST 87-5-701 to 87-5-725 | These Montana statutes control the importation, introduction, and transplantation of exotic wildlife into the state. The importation of any wildlife is prohibited unless the species poses no threat of harm to native wildlife and plants or to agricultural production and that the introduction has significant public benefits. Violations may result in a fine or imprisonment. | Statute |
| Ferguson v. Birchmount Boarding Kennels Ltd. | 2006 CarswellOnt 399 | 207 O.A.C. 98, 79 O.R. (3d) 681 |
In August 2002, plaintiffs’ dog escaped while being exercised at defendant-kennel’s boarding facility. Birchmount appeals from the judgment claiming the court applied the wrong standard of care, and that the court erred in law in awarding the plaintiffs damages for pain and suffering. The reviewing court found that the evidence would likely have led to the same conclusion regardless of whether a “bailment” standard was used. Further, this court was satisfied that the trial judge did not err in law or in fact in making findings and in awarding general damages where there was evidence that the plaintiffs experienced pain and suffering upon learning of the dog’s escape. |
Case |
| State v. Hartrampf | 847 P.2d 856 (Oregon 1993) | 118 Or.App. 237 (1993) |
Defendant appealed a conviction for attempted involvement in animal fighting, arguing that the statutes at issue were unconstitutionally vague. Since the defendant admitted he knowingly was among spectators at farm hosting a cockfighting event, the Court of Appeals held that a person of common intelligence could discern that defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward involvement in animal fighting. |
Case |
| Ley N° 371 de 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Ley 371, enacted in March 2023, is the law by which Panama promotes the conservation and protection of Sea Turtles and their habitat. Relying on Law 287, 2022 (which recognized Nature as a subject of Rights), this law recognizes sea turtles are subjects of rights in Panama. More specifically, Article 29, "Protection of the Rights of Turtles and their Habitat," establishes that sea turtles have "the right to live and have free passage in a healthy environment, free of pollution and other anthropocentric impacts that cause physical damage and damage to their health, such as climate change, contamination incidental capture, coastal development, and unregulated tourism, among others." | Statute |
| Houk v. State | 316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) | Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty). | Case |
| Keith v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture | 116 A.3d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 2214849 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2015) | This case focuses on the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's preliminary objection that Petitioners' had taxpayer standing to request injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that regulations promulgated by the Department were in conflict with the mandates set forth in the Pennsylvania Dog Law Act. Petitioners asserted that the Department was not authorized to exempt nursing mothers from the statutory ban on metal strand flooring and from the statutory requirement of unfettered access to exercise areas. Department argued that Petitioners had not pled sufficient facts to show that those directly and immediately affected by the regulations were beneficially affected. The court found Petitioners were at least as well inclined and situated as any other entities to challenge regulations that might be in conflict with those provisions. The court therefore overruled the Department's preliminary objections to Petitioners' standing. | Case |