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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 This is a draft of a withdrawn "Amparo" decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting's legality. In this case, plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company specializing in organizing bullfighting events, filed a legal action against various governmental entities and individuals in the state of Coahuila, in Mexico. The plaintiff challenged the 2015 amendment to Coahuila's animal protection law, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, on the grounds that it violated their rights to work, property, and cultural expression. The lower court dismissed the case regarding Article 20, Section XV of the animal protection law due to a lack of legal interest and because these provisions were not applicable to the case. The court also rejected the Amparo concerning Article 20, Section XIV of the same law. The case was appealed and eventually transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, after hearing the case de novo, upheld the constitutionality of Article 20, Section XIV of Coahuila's animal protection law. The judge emphasized that the right to a healthy environment includes the protection of animals as an element of the environment, moving away from viewing animals purely as property. The court highlighted the presence of various laws recognizing the need for humane treatment of animals and prohibiting cruelty, even though Mexico lacks a national anti-cruelty law. This legal framework justified the ban on bullfighting and supported the broader legislative objective of protecting and treating animals with dignity. The court argued that allowing bullfighting caused suffering and death for the sake of entertainment, which was detrimental to the societal interest of protecting the environment and species conservation, as established in Article 4 of the Constitution. It also stressed the importance of governments adopting gradual measures to protect animals, and regressing on these measures would be undesirable. Case
Rotunda v. Haynes 33 Misc.3d 68 (App. Term 2011) 933 N.Y.S.2d 803, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 808, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21360 The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed. Case
ID - Dog, property - Chapter 28. Dogs. I.C. § 25-2807 ID ST § 25-2807 This Idaho statute states that dogs are considered property. It further provides that no entity of state or local government may by ordinance or regulation prevent the owner of any dog from protecting it from loss by the use of an electronic locating collar. Statute
Commonwealth v. Craven 817 A.2d 451 (Pa. 2003)

The issue before the Court in this consolidated appeal was whether the trial court properly determined that 18 Pa.C.S. § 5511(h.1)(6), which criminalizes an individual's attendance at an animal fight "as a spectator," is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  Specifically, appellees contended that the statute criminalized "mere presence" at a dog fight.  The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the evidence showed appellees were active spectators at the fight (as seen in the videotape evidence).  The court concluded that the statute is constitutionally sound, thereby reversing the lower court's decision that the statute imposed strict liability on mere presence.

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CA - Horse slaughter - § 598d. Sale of horsemeat for human consumption West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598d CA PENAL § 598d This statute prohibits the sale of horsemeat for human consumption. No restaurant, cafe, or other public eating place may offer horsemeat for sale for human consumption. A first time violation is a misdemeanor. Statute
Ecuador - Animal rights - Civil Code CÓDIGO CIVIL Even though the constitution has indirectly granted animals rights as they are part of nature, they continue to be categorized as movable objects by the civil code. However, the most recent reform to the civil code is from 2005, meaning the current civil code still needs to be updated to comply with the 2008 constitution and subsequent constitutional court decisions. Article 585 defines movable objects as those that can be transported from one place to another, either by their force, like animals (which is why they are called “semovientes”), or by an external force, like inanimate things. Article 639 states that “domestic animals are subject to domain” (or complete ownership). It is important to note that the bill for animal welfare is currently in the hands of the National Assembly. Changing the categorization of animals in the civil code to “sentient beings” is one of the many topics regulated by this bill. Statute
WV - Lien - § 38-11-4. Lien of bailee of animals or vehicles W. Va. Code, § 38-11-4 WV ST § 38-11-4 This West Virginia law (as it relates to animals) states the a person who keeps a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or one who boards, pastures, feeds or trains animals for hire, has a lien upon such animals for the sum due him for the care, boarding, pasturage, feeding, or training of such animals, or the care, keeping of such animals. This lien exists even though such animals are permitted to be taken out of the possession of the one claiming such lien even if the contract has not yet terminated for the lien. The purchaser of such an animal, while out of the possession of the person claiming the lien, can take the property free of the lien unless he or she had actual notice of the lien at the time of purchase. Statute
EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU Directive 2010/63/EU Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. Statute
US - Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 - Chapter 68. Disaster Relief 42 U.S.C.A. § 5196 - 5196d The FEMA Administrator is directed to develop emergency preparedness plans that take into account the needs of individuals with pets and service animals prior to, during, and following a major disaster or emergency. The Administrator must also ensure that state and local emergency preparedness plans take into account the needs of such individuals. The Administrator may make financial contributions to the States and local authorities for animal emergency preparedness purposes to accommodate people with pets and service animals. Statute
Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd t/as Horsepower [2006] NSWSC 512

The plaintiffs claimed that they purchased horse feed from the first respondent and that the feed was contaminated with monensin. The second respondent manufactured the feed. They claimed that as a result, one of their horses died and five others were permanently injured so that they could not be used for the desired purpose. After addressing several factual issues, the trial judge found for the plaintiffs in regards to the issue of negligence by the second respondent and proceeded to assess damages with regard to the economic value of the horses to the plaintiffs, the cost of replacement, loss of profits and maintenance.

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