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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Weekly | 65 N.E.2d 856 (1946) | 146 Ohio St. 277 |
The court affirmed a conviction for stealing a dog by holding that it was a "thing of value" despite the traditional common law rule to the contrary and even though it was not taxable property. |
Case | |
| Taub v. State of Maryland | 296 Md. 439 (Md.,1983) | 463 A.2d 819 (Md.,1983) |
Maryland Court of Appeals held that animal-cruelty statute did not apply to researchers because there are certain normal human activities to which the infliction of pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable. |
Case | |
| NH - Exotic Pets - Chapter Fis 800. The Importation, Possession and Use of All Wildlife. | NH ADC FIS 802.01 - .05 | N.H. Code Admin. R. Fis 802.01 - .05 | These New Hampshire regulations state the different permitee categories under Chapter 800 of the New Hampshire Code of Administrative Regulations. These regulations also indicate the penalties for making false statements, when annual permits expire, and who is exempt from the requirements of this chapter. | Administrative | |
| HI - Facility dog - [§ 621-30]. Use of a facility dog | H R S § 621-30 | HI ST § 621-30 | This Hawaii law enacted in 2016 states that a court may permit the use of a facility dog in a judicial proceeding involving the testimony of a vulnerable witness (as defined) if the court determines that there is a compelling necessity for the use of a facility dog to facilitate the testimony of the vulnerable witness. Prior to use, the moving party must establish that the dog is credentialed; the dog is adequately insured; and that there is a relationship between the witness and the facility dog. | Statute | |
| Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Jewell | 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3165630 (9th Cir. June 7, 2016) | In this case, various environmental groups filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department of the Interior, arguing that the BLM should not have granted right-of-way on federal lands to a proposed energy project because the project would violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The plaintiffs also argued that the BLM’s environmental impact statement (EIS) for the project was not sufficient according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Ultimately, the court held in favor of the defendants and found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA and that by granting the right-of-way, BLM was not violation the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The court found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA because it included all the necessary information and was broad enough as to not force the BLM into automatically accepting the proposal. Additionally, the court held that the BLM was not in violation of the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act because the BLM was acting in a “purely regulatory capacity” and the BLM’s action could directly or proximately cause a violation under the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. | Case | |
| NM - Hunting - Chapter 17. Game and Fish and Outdoor Recreation. | NMSA 1978, § 17-2-7.1 | NM ST § 17-2-7.1 | This law represents New Mexico's hunter harassment provision. It is unlawful for a person to commit interference with another person who is lawfully hunting, trapping or fishing in an area where hunting, trapping or fishing is permitted by a custodian of public property or an owner or lessee of private property. A first offense is a petty misdemeanor; a second or subsequent offense is a misdemeanor. This section does not apply to a farmer or rancher in pursuit of his or her normal farm or ranch operation or law enforcement officer in pursuit of his or her official duties. | Statute | |
| MD - Ecoterrorism - Title 6. Crimes Against Property. | MD Code, Criminal Law, § 6-208 | MD CRIM LAW § 6-208 | This law reflects Maryland's "ecoterrorism"/animal research interference law. A person may not break and enter a research facility without the permission of the research facility with the intent to: obtain unauthorized control over research property; alter or eradicate research property; damage or deface research property; move research property in a manner intended to cause harm to it; destroy or remove research property; or engage in conduct that results in the removal of research property. Violation of the law is a felony with imprisonment of up to 5 years or a fine of up to $5,000, or both. | Statute | |
| Collier v. Zambito | 1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004) |
Infant child attacked and bit by dog when he was a guest in the owner's home. After defenses motion for summary judgment was denied, the Appellate Court reversed, and this court affirms. |
Case | ||
| Klobnak v. Wildwood Hills, Inc. | 688 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2004) | 2004 WL 2534344 (Iowa 2004) |
Plaintiffs brought suit against a ranch after their car struck two of the ranch's horses on the highway. The trial court dismissed holding no duty of care was breached by the ranch because Iowa no longer had a statute prohibiting animals from roaming. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed reasoning that a duty of ordinary care still exists. |
Case | |
| Toney v. Glickman | 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir., 1996) | Plaintiffs were in the business of selling animals to research facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they had committed hundreds of violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. The ALH then imposed what was, to that point, the harshest sanction, $200,000, in the history of the Act. The Judicial Officer affirmed the ALJ's findings and denied the Plaintiffs' request to reopen the hearing for consideration of new evidence. While the 8th Circuit affirmed most of these findings, it held that the evidence did not support all of them. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Department for redetermination of the sanction. The court also affirmed the Judicial Officer's refusal to reopen the hearing and denied the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence. The Plaintiffs were free, however, to seek leave to offer this additional evidence on remand to the extent it was relevant to the sanction. | Case |