Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Breeder - Chapter ATCP 16. Dog Sellers and Dog Facility Operators. | WI ADC s ATCP 16.01 - 30 | Wis. Adm. Code s ATCP 16.1 to 30 | This set of administrative regulations from Wisconsin covers the conditions under which dogs must be kept by dog breeders (defined as any person who sells at least 25 dogs from more than 3 litters) and dog dealers. Dog sellers and dog facility operators are required to be licensed under the section. Per ATCP 16.18, a person licensed under this chapter may not transfer a dog to the buyer unless the dog is at least 7 weeks old, the dog is accompanied by its dam, or the department approves the transfer in writing. Minimum standards of care are outlined for licensees for dogs kept indoors or outdoors. | Administrative | |
| US - Wolf - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western | FR Doc. 04-5248 | RIN 1018-AT61 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) propose regulations for the nonessential experimental populations of the western distinct population segment (DPS) of the gray wolf (Canis lupus). In addition, we propose regulations so that States with wolf management plans approved by the Service can apply for additional authorities to manage wolves consistent with those approved plans. These proposed regulations would only have effect in States that have an approved State management plan for gray wolves. |
Administrative | |
| Gonzales v. Kissner | 24 So.3d 214 ((La.App. 1 Cir.,2009) | 2009 WL 3029621 (La.App. 1 Cir.), 2008-2154 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09) |
This Louisiana case concerns an action for personal injuries sustained by an animal control officer who was mauled about the head and neck by defendants' dog while investigating a complaint of an attack by the dog from the previous day. The dog's owners argued on appeal that the trial court failed to apply the Professional Rescuer's Doctrine, sometimes referred to as the “fireman's rule." Because under the facts here, where the dog had previously escaped after being confined in the house and the defendants failed to properly lock the house and/or restrain the dog, the court did not find that Ms. Gonzales' recovery for injuries was barred by the Professional Rescuer's Doctrine. The court held that based upon the record before this court, there was no error on the part of the trial court that warranted reversal of the plaintiff's motion for a partial summary judgment as to the liability of the dog's owners. |
Case | |
| ND - Initiatives - Prevention of Animal Cruelty Initiative, Measure 5 | Initiative, Measure 5 (2012) | This initiated statutory measure would create section 36-21.1-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. This measure would make it a class C felony for an individual to maliciously and intentionally harm a living dog, cat or horse and provide a court with certain sentencing options. The measure would not apply to production agriculture, or to lawful activities of hunters and trappers, licensed veterinarians, scientific researchers, or to individuals engaged in lawful defense of life or property. It failed at the polls in 2012 (34.6% yes). | Statute | ||
| DC - Animal Control - Subchapter III. Release of Animals. | DC CODE § 8-1831.01 | DC ST § 8-1831.01 | This D.C. law states that no animal shall be released from custody of animal protection except for the purposes of adoption, redemption by the owner of the animal, or other suitable placement in the best interest of the animal. No animals shall be knowingly released from any entity charged with animal protection for the purposes of research, experimentation, testing, or medical instruction or demonstration. Violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| US - Native American - RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) | 42 USC 2000bb-1 | RFRA provides that the government may not substantially burden an individual's free exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and it is done through the least restrictive means. | Statute | ||
| Hines v. Pardue | --- F.Supp.3d -------, 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) | 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D.Tex., 2023) | Plaintiff and veterinarian Ronald S. Hines brings this action to challenge a Texas law that mandates a veterinarian conduct a physical examination of an animal before practicing veterinary medicine on the grounds that the law violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiff, who was unable to maintain a veterinary practice in person due to medical issues, began providing veterinary advice to animal owners via a website without first examining their animals. Plaintiff was disciplined by the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners for doing this, and was fined $500 and sentenced to a year of probation. Plaintiff then sued the members of the Board on two separate occasions, with the second appeal being remanded by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to determine whether the requirement for a physical examination before issuing veterinary advice regulates speech incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, or is a regulation of non-expressive conduct. Here, the district court first examined multiple instances of plaintiff providing veterinary advice to animal owners via the internet. Next, the court asserts that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against the board. Lastly, the court examines plaintiff’s First Amendment argument. Plaintiff argues that his email exchanges with animal owners constitutes speech, and the court agrees that this is speech and that the Examination Requirement regulates this speech. However, the court finds that this regulation of plaintiff’s speech is content neutral, because the requirement for a physical examination of the animals before issuing advice applies neutrally to all forms of veterinary care and veterinary speech regardless of content. Therefore, the court held that defendants may enforce the Examination Requirement without violating plaintiff’s free speech rights. | Case | |
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | 33 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ass'n des Éleveurs de Cananards et D'oies du Quebec v. Bonta, 143 S. Ct. 2493, 216 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2023) | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. | Case | ||
| United States v. 144,774 Pounds Of Blue King Crab | 410 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. Wash., 2005) | 2005 WL 1355511 (9th Cir. Wash.) |
An importer of 144,774 pounds of cooked, frozen blue king crab was charged with violating the Lacey Act for taking the crab in violation of Russian fishing regulations. The crab is subject to forfeiture under the Lacey Act on a strict liability basis, but the importer asserted an "innocent owner" defense. The trial court denied the owner's defense and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning if the crab was illegally taken under Russian law then it is considered contraband for Lacey Act purposes regardless of its status under U.S. law. |
Case | |
| McBride v. Orr | 466 A.2d 952 (N.H., 1983) | 124 N.H. 66, 42 A.L.R.4th 835 (N.H. 1983) |
In this New Hampshire case, defendant animal control officer killed plaintiff’s dog believing that it was in pursuit of a deer. Defendant claimed immunity pursuant to a state statute. The Court reversed and remanded for a determination of damages for the plaintiff. The Court went on to state that the purpose of the statute was not to authorize defendant’s killing of plaintiff’s dog when the dog was no longer pursuing the deer. |
Case |