Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Pet Trusts - Chapter 4. Creation, Validity, Modification and Termination of Trust. | 18-B M. R. S. A. § 408 | ME ST T. 18-B § 408 | This statute represents Maine's pet trust law. The provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. The comment following the text of the statute clarifies what types of animal-related activities qualify as non-charitable versus charitable trusts. | Statute | |
| FL - Hunting - 379.302. Private game preserves and farms; regulations; penalties | West's F. S. A. § 379.302 | FL ST § 379.302 (372.16. Renumbered as 379.302 and amended by Laws 2008, c. 2008-247, § 105, eff. July 1, 2008) | This Florida statute provides that any person owning land in this state may establish, maintain, and operate within the boundaries thereof, a private preserve and farm, not exceeding an area of 640 acres, for the protection, preservation, propagation, rearing, and production of game birds and animals for private and commercial purposes. All private game preserves or farms established under the provisions of this section shall be fenced in such manner that domestic game thereon may not escape and wild game on surrounding lands may not enter. Violation of this section results in a misdemeanor and forfeiture of the violator's license to operate for one year. | Statute | |
| Smegal v. Gettys | 48 So.3d 431 (La.App. 1 Cir., 2010) | 2010 WL 4272594 (La.App. 1 Cir.) |
Plaintiff Steven Smegal appeals a judgment that found him 50% at fault in a dog bite case. The incident occurred after the dog owned by Smegal's neighbor (Gettys) ran into the street and was hit by a school bus. Smegal approached the injured dog too closely and was bitten on his ankle. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding. The court held that Smegal's actions did not constitute provocation where the dog's owners were also approaching the injured dog in an "equally provocative" manner. As to allocation of fault, the court found that while it was Gettys' failure to restrain the dog that was the ultimate cause of the accident, Smegal chose to approach the injured dog despite his training and knowledge as a police officer. Thus, this set of facts supported the trial court's allocation of comparative fault. |
Case | |
| Tennant v. Tabor | 89 A.D.3d 1461 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.., 2011) | 2011 WL 5433831 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.); 932 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2011) |
Motorist collided with a horse and sued horse owners for damages. The Supreme Court held that, even if horse owners violated statute requiring them to provide shelter to horse, this did not constitute common-law negligence, which was required for damages. In addition, horse owners were not liable because there was no evidence that horse exhibited propensity to interfere with traffic prior to incident involving motorist. |
Case | |
| US - AWA - Subpart D. Specifications/Standards for Nonhuman Primates | 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 to .92 | This portion of the AWA regulations contains the humane care provisions for non-human primates. Included are requirements for housing facilities, primary enclosures, provisions for psychological well-being, feeding, watering, sanitization, employee requirements, and transportation standards. | Administrative | ||
| IN RE: ERVIN STEBANE | 47 Agric. Dec. 1264 (1988) | 1988 WL 242938 (U.S.D.A.) | Licensed dealer who engaged in recurring pattern of trivial noncompliance with housekeeping requirements, failed to provide records on two occasions and failed to permit inspection on one occasion, is properly sanctioned with 20-day license suspension, $1500 civil penalty, and cease and desist order. | Case | |
| Sickel v. State | 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7873714 (Alaska Ct. App., 2015) | Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a) after one of her horses was found starving, without shelter, and frozen to the ground (it later had to be euthanized). On appeal, defendant claims that she did not act with the requisite "criminal negligence" under the statute unless she had a duty of care to prevent the specified harm. The court noted that while the statute does not specify the exact nature of this duty to care for particular animals, common law fills the gap. In looking to similar laws and cases from other states, the court found that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) applies only to people who have assumed responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise. The jury instructions taken as a whole and the prosecutor's argument and rebuttal demonstrated that Sickel assumed the duty of care with regard to the horses and was the person tending the horses in the last three days before the now-deceased horse collapsed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| IN - Health - Article 17. Animal Health and Animal Products. Chapter 18. Crimes and Infractions | I.C. 15-17-18-1 - 13 | IN ST 15-17-18-1 - 13 | This set of Indiana laws covers diseased livestock and the sale of domestic animals. It also provides that a person responsible for livestock or poultry who knowingly or intentionally permits the livestock or poultry to run at large commits a Class B misdemeanor. Another provision states that a person may not import to or export from Indiana for the purpose of sale any dog under the age of eight (8) weeks unless the dog is transported with its dam. | Statute | |
| Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce | 839 F.2d 795 (1988) | 268 U.S. App. D.C. 116 (1988) |
The Secretary of Commerce issued a regulation authorizing appellant salmon federation to take a fixed number of porpoise in connection to commercial fishing for salmon. Appellee commercial fishermen opposed the permit. The federation sought review of a judgment which preliminarily enjoined the Secretary from issuing the permit. |
Case | |
| CO - Domestic Violence - Animals and Domestic Violence; Definition. | C. R. S. A. § 18-6-800.3; C.R.S.A. § 13-14-101, 103 | CO ST § 18-6-800.3; CO ST § 13-14-101, 103 | This statute includes within the definition of "domestic violence" any other crime against a person, or against property, including an animal, or any municipal ordinance violation against a person, or against property, including an animal, when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship. Under Article 14 on Civil Protection Orders, the phrase "protection order” means any order that prohibits the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, touching, stalking, or sexually assaulting or abusing any protected person or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises, or from taking, transferring, concealing, harming, disposing of or threatening harm to an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by a protected person, or any other provision to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health. | Statute |