Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Veterinarian Issues - Professional Conduct | OK ADC 775:10-5-30 | Okla. Admin. Code 775:10-5-30 | The following acts and/or omissions shall be considered unprofessional conduct and shall constitute grounds for disciplinary action by the Oklahoma Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners. | Administrative | |
| CT - Exotic Pets - § 26-40a. Possession of potentially dangerous animal; Chapter 490. Fisheries and Game | C. G. S. A. § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | CT ST § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | These Connecticut states reflect the state's laws on the keeping of wild animals. Under § 26-40a, no person shall possess a potentially dangerous animal, which includes wildlife such as the lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi cat, puma, lynx, bobcat, wolf, coyote, all species of bears, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan. The Department of Environmental Protection shall issue a bill to the owner or person in illegal possession of such potentially dangerous animal for all costs of seizure, care, maintenance, relocation or disposal of such animal. Additionally, any person who violates any provision of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $2000, and is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Under § 26-55, no person shall import or introduce into the state, possess or let loose, any live fish, wild bird, wild mammal, reptile, amphibian or invertebrate unless such person has obtained a permit. Again, a violator is responsible for expenses from the seizure, maintenance, and relocation of the illegally imported animal. The penalty includes a civil fine up to $1000 and results in a class C misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc. | 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964) |
Respondent was a corporation engaged in the garbage collection business. One of its employees maliciously hurled an empty garbage can at plaintiff's pet pedigreed dog, who was tethered at the time, killing it. The issue before the court was the reconsideration not of the issue of liability, but for determination only of compensatory and punitive damages. The court stated that it was obvious from the facts that the act performed by the representative of the respondent was malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the petitioner. Having this view, there was no prohibition of punitive damages relative to awarding compensation for mental pain, as would be the case if there had been physical injury resulting only from simple negligence. The court went on to say that the restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal because of its special training. |
Case | ||
| Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar | 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012) | 2012 WL 3538236 (D.C. Cir. 2012) |
In 1985, after scientists had found only 10 living squirrels, the Virginia northern flying squirrel was listed as endangered under the ESA. In 2006, after scientists had captured 1,063 squirrels, the FWS went through the procedure to delist the squirrel. Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint against the Secretary of Interior in district court, challenging the Secretary's rule to delist the squirrel. Subsequently, the Secretary of Interior appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The D.C. circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Secretary's determination the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel was no longer endangered was neither arbitrary and capricious nor in violation of the Act. |
Case | |
| NV - Eggs - Chapter 583. Eggs. Cage-Free Eggs | N.R.S. 583.211 - 251 | Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 583.211 - 251 (West) | This collection of laws are Nevada's cage-free egg provisions. Under these laws, Nevada egg producers must adopt cage-free housing systems for egg-laying hens. These housing systems must allow the hens a certain amount of usable space and the ability to do certain natural behaviors. Producers that do not comply with these provisions are subject to a civil penalty. | Statute | |
| Town of Bethlehem v. Acker | 102 A.3d 107 (Conn. App. 2014) | 153 Conn.App. 449 (2014) | Plaintiffs seized approximately 65 dogs from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut pursuant to a search and seizure warrant that had been issued on facts showing that the dogs, which were being kept in an uninsulated barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit, were neglected, in violation of General Statutes § 22–329a. The trial court found that the smaller breed dogs were neglected, but found that larger breed dogs were not. On an appeal by plaintiffs and a cross appeal by defendants, the appeals court found: (1) the trial court applied the correct legal standards and properly determined that the smaller breed dogs were neglected and that the larger breed dogs were not neglected, even though all dogs were kept in a barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) § 22–329a was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would know that keeping smaller breed dogs in an uninsulated space with an interior temperature of approximately 30 degrees Fahrenheit would constitute neglect; (3) the trial court did not err in declining to admit the rebuttal testimony offered by the defendants; and (4) the trial court did not err in granting the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and properly transferred ownership of the smaller breed dogs to the town. The appellate court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court only with respect to its dispositional order, which directed the parties to determine among themselves which dogs were smaller breed dogs and which dogs were larger breed dogs, and remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion. | Case | |
| CA - Mammals - § 4700. Taking or possession prohibited; scientific research; legal imports; | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4700 | CA FISH & G § 4700 | This statute enumerates the fully protected mammals in the state of California. These animals may not be taken or possessed at any time. The statute also specifically states that permits or licenses to take these animals will not be issued, with a possible exception in the case of necessary scientific research. | Statute | |
| IN RE: CECIL BROWNING, DELORES BROWNING AND DARREN BROWNING, d/b/a ALLIGATORLAND SAFARI ZOO, INC. | 52 Agric. Dec. 129 (1993) | 1993 WL 18997 (U.S.D.A.) |
This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. s 2131 et seq.), and the regulations and standards issued thereunder (9 C.F.R. s 1.1 et seq.). On November 20, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Edwin S. Bernstein (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing a civil penalty of $2,000, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, and thereafter until they are in full compliance with the Act, regulations and standards, because Respondents failed to keep their primary enclosures sanitary and in suitable condition, failed to maintain complete records, failed to keep food and watering receptacles clean, failed to handle wastes properly, failed to provide adequate veterinarian care, and failed to utilize sufficient personnel to maintain proper husbandry practices. (Respondents were licensed exhibitors of captive wildlife, including deer, non-human primates, and bears, among other animals.) The court also found the sanctions were not too severe, considering the willfullness of the violations. |
Case | |
| Humane Society-Western Region v. Snohomish County | 2007 WL 2404619 (W.D. Wash) |
Plaintiff Humane Society Western Region (d/b/a "Happy Paws Farm") filed this lawsuit against Snohomish County alleging provisions of the county code regulating barking are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and that the SCC provision governing the temporary housing of animals in shelters violates its federal constitutional right to substantive due process. Plaintiff argued that the noise ordinances invite subjective evaluation resulting in arbitrary enforcement because the code contains no reference to identifiable levels of noise, only to noises that are repetitive. The absence of identifiable levels of noise, or decibel levels, does not render the noise ordinances unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this method is not easily understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence or that it fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement. This opinion was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by Humane Society Western Region v. Snohomish County, 357 Fed.Appx. 144 (9th Cir., 2009). |
Case | ||
| Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Nat'l Institutes of Health | Slip Copy, No. 21-CV-00121-LKG, 2022 WL 17619232 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2022) | Plaintiff animal welfare advocates sued the National Institute of Health (NIH) for failing to transfer all chimpanzees housed at the Alamogordo Primate Facility to a retirement sanctuary known as “Chimp Haven." According to plaintiffs, transfer is required under the federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection Act (“CHIMP Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 283m, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In 2015, NIH officially announced that it would cease biomedical research on chimpanzees and establish a working group to transfer all 288 surplus chimpanzees owned by NIH to Chimp Haven. In 2019, the NIH announced that not all chimpanzees would be transferred to Chimp Haven because 44 of those individuals were too frail for transfer due to medical conditions. After cross-motions for summary judgment, this court considers whether transfer is legally required. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the CHIMP Act requires the transfer of all chimps and the court owes no deference to agency interpretation. In contrast, the Government argues that the decision is consistent with the CHIMP Act because the plain language of the act only requires that surplus chimpanzees offered by NIH be "accepted" into CHIMP Haven. The court found that the plain and unambiguous language, and use of the word "shall," in the CHIMP Act requires the NIH to transfer ALL chimpanzees to the federal sanctuary system. In addition, the legislative history of the CHIMP Act reinforces that reading of the statute. While the court recognized NIH's concern toward the frailest chimpanzees, the proper avenue is within the legislative branch. Notably, the court was unsure as to the proper remedy in this particular matter (e.g., whether a remand or vacatur is more appropriate). As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was granted and the Government's cross motion was denied as was the motion to dismiss. The court directed the parties to file a joint status report report with views on the relief Plaintiff seeks and how the matter should proceed in light of the instant opinion. | Case |