Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) | 2011 WL 2982992 (Minn.App.,2011) |
The city council ordered the destruction of a dog after finding it to be a dangerous animal and the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that procedural due process required that the owner should have been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the declaration of the dog as a “potentially dangerous animal” before it was declared a “dangerous animal” under the city ordinance. |
Case |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink | 620 F.3d 1187 (C.A.9 (Idaho). 2010) | 2010 WL 3420012 (C.A.9 (Idaho)) |
Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands, arguing that the revisions violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals held that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed changes, and violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. Opinion Amended and Superseded on Denial of Rehearing en banc by: Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir., 2010). |
Case |
| PA - Fur - Dog and Cat Product Act | 73 P.S. § 210-1 to 7 | This set of laws represents the Dog and Cat Product Act. The act provides that no person shall sell or offer for sale, wholesale or retail, the fur, skin or hair of a dog or cat or any product or part of a product containing the fur, skin or hair of a dog or cat. Violation of the act commits a misdemeanor of the third degree. Subsequent offenses committed within five years of a prior conviction for the same offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. | Statute | |
| MD - Prince George's County - Breed - § 3-185.01 Pit Bull Terriers. | PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., §§ 3-101, 3-116.01, 3-185.01 (1997) |
Prince George's County, Maryland prohibits owning or keeping a Pit Bull Terrier with exceptions. If the person owned the dog prior to November 1, 1996, then s/he may continue to keep it if s/he complies with certain conditions, such as registering it with the Administrator of Animal Control and keeping an ID tag on the dog and keeping the dog inside or on a secure leash. Show dogs are allowed into the county on a temporary basis. Dogs that have been trained for security, search and rescue, or for police or fire services are exempt. A violation of this ordinance may result in a fine of up to $1,000 or be sentenced to up to 6 months in prison. In addition, if a Pit Bull injures or kills a person or a domestic animal without provocation, then it will be destroyed. |
Local Ordinance | |
| State v. Spade | 695 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va., 2010) | 2010 WL 2243519 (W.Va.), 225 W.Va. 649 (2010) |
In 2006, appellant was charged with one count of animal cruelty after 149 dogs were seized from her rescue shelter. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, since the appellant (1) entered into a valid plea agreement which "specifically and unequivocally reserved a restitution hearing" and (2) "attempted on numerous occasions to challenge the amounts she was required by the magistrate court to post in separate bonds," that the final order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County should be reversed. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a restitution hearing to determine the actual reasonable costs incurred in providing care, medical treatment, and provisions to the animals seized. |
Case |
| India |
Introduction to the Indian Judicial System |
Topical Introduction | ||
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Dalton | 97 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (2000) |
Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant government official from lifting the embargo against tuna from Mexico's vessels in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Plaintiffs alleged irreparable injury if three stocks of dolphins became extinct. The court found plaintiffs failed to produce evidence showing irreparable injury. |
Case | |
| Giarrusso v. Giarrusso | --- A.3d ----, 2019 WL 1606351 (R.I. Apr. 16, 2019) | This Rhode Island Supreme Court case centers on a disagreement among former spouses concerning the ex-husband's visitation with their two dogs acquired during marriage. Before the Court is an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After review, the Court concluded that cause was not shown and affirmed the order of the Family Court. The couple entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) formalizing the terms of the dissolution of Diane and Paul Giarrusso's marriage and giving Diane all title and interest to the dogs and Paul twice a week visitation. The weekly visitation proceeded according to the agreement for over a year, when Diane ceased allowing Paul's visits. Paul then filed a motion for post-final judgment relief citing breach of the agreement and Diane counterclaimed. A justice of the Family Court held a hearing on the issue, where each party testified and submitted associated texts and emails. In one recounted incident, a dog was missing for some time at Paul's house. Ultimately, the dog was found to be accidentally locked in a closet. At the conclusion of the hearing, Diane argued that the justice should withdraw approval for the MSA because Paul failed to care for the dogs and showed bad faith, while Paul argued that Diane had breached the terms. The hearing justice affirmed the visitation schedule of the MSA, denied Diane's requested relief, and awarded attorney fees to Paul. On appeal here, Diane argues that the hearing justice was "clearly wrong and overlooked material evidence when she found that Paul had acted in good faith." In particular, Diane contends that the dogs are chattel and Paul failed to provide safe conditions and return them to her in an undamaged condition. The Supreme Court held, in noting that the MSA retains the characteristics of a contract, that it would not overturn the hearing justice's determination in absence of mutual mistake in the contract (the MSA). There was no mutual mistake in the MSA's visitation provision and no basis for the hearing justice to conclude that the MSA needs to be reformed. Further, this court found no evidence of bad faith on Paul's part and that the hearing justice's findings were support by the evidence. Thus, it was not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA as written. The order of the Family Court was affirmed and the matter returned to Family Court. | Case | |
| U.S. v. Lewis | 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9802 |
Defendant was convicted of a number of offenses related to his role in a wildlife smuggling operation. If trial did not begin within the requisite time period and defendant moved for dismissal prior to trial, the court had to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. The court held that the circumstances in the case, where it was clear that the delay in the trial caused the delay in the hearing, rather than the other way around, and where defendant repeatedly asked the court to set the case for trial and was otherwise ready to proceed to trial, plaintiff United States' pending pretrial motion could not serve as a basis for exclusion for a 117 day period. Because the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act, defendant's convictions had to be reversed, his sentences vacated, and his indictments dismissed. |
Case |
| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) | 2012 WL 4470240 (Ct. App. Ind.) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Case |
