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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sentencia C-889, 2012 | Sentencia C-889/12 | Decision C-889 grants constitutional value to animal protection. It establishes the parameters for tradition and social roots. It limits the scope of bullfighting in the national territory. On this opportunity, the court decided on the constitutionality of Arts. 14 and 15 of the statute of Bullfighting Statute. It establishes the criteria that must be met in order for bullfighting to be legal: (1) Bullfighting has to meet the legal conditions established for public shows in general; (2) Bullfighting must meet the legal conditions established in the statute that regulates the taurine activity, Ley 916 of 2014; and (3) Bullfighting must comply with the constitutional conditions, restrictions, and limitations established in decision C-666 of 2010 to satisfy the mandate of animal welfare, animal protection, and to avoid suffering and pain. It must also satisfy social ingrain, location, opportunity, the condition of no financial funds, and exceptionality. | Case | ||
| WI - Dog, licenses - Chapter 174. Dogs. 174.06. Listing | W. S. A. 174.06 | WI ST 174.06 | This Wisconsin statute provides that every town, village and city shall annually, by September 1, ascertain by diligent inquiry the dogs owned or kept within the assessment district. The listing official shall enter in the records for personal property assessments, or in a separate record, all dogs in the district subject to tax, to whom they are assessed, the name, number, sex, spayed or unspayed, neutered or unneutered, breed and color of each dog. | Statute | |
| In re: JULIAN J. TONEY AND ANITA L. TONEY | 54 Agric. Dec. 923 (1995) | 923, 1995 WL 785952 (U.S.D.A.) | Civil penalty of $200,000.00 (largest civil penalty ever imposed under Act) was appropriate, where degree of willfulness and flagrancy of respondents' violations was astonishing, and even after hearing was pending on initial complaint, respondents continued to violate Act. | Case | |
| PA - Rabies - Chapter 7A. Rabies Prevention and Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act | 3 P.S. § 455.1 - 15 | PA ST 3 P.S. § 455.1 - 15 | This chapter is known as the Rabies Prevention and Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act. Every person living in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who owns or keeps a dog or cat over three months of age, must have that dog or cat to be vaccinated against rabies. A person who violates any provision of this act commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $300 for each violation. Each day of violation constitutes a separate offense. | Statute | |
| Southeastern Community College v. Davis | 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979) |
Applicant to nursing program brought suit against the college alleging discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for denying her acceptance to the program based on her physical disability of being deaf. The college alleged that the applicant was not "otherwise qualified" under the statute because, even if provided accommodations for her hearing disability, she would be unable to safely participate in the clinical training program. The court held that "otherwise qualified" under the statute means that a person is qualified for the program "in spite of" the handicap, and that the applicant here was not otherwise qualified for the program. The court also held that a program authority is not required to ignore the disability of the applicant when determining eligibility for the program. Rather, the statute only requires that the disabled person not be denied the benefits of the program solely because of the disability. |
Case | ||
| Dart v Singer | [2010] QCA 75 |
The applicants pleaded guilty to a number of charges under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) following the seizure of 113 live dogs, one cat, 488 rats, 73 mice, 12 guinea pigs and 11 birds from their premises due to unsanitary and inappropriate living conditions. The applicants claimed that RSPCA officers were acting ultra vires and that a stay preventing the RSCPA from parting with the animals should be effected. The applicants' argument failed. |
Case | ||
| State v. Hearl | 190 A.3d 42 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | 182 Conn. App. 237 , 2018 WL 2381893 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | Defendant Hearl was convicted of nineteen counts of animal cruelty by jury. The convictions stem from the care of his goat herd used for his goat cheese manufacturing business in Connecticut in 2014. Defendant and his business partner moved a herd from Massachusetts to Cornall, CT in May of 2014, where they rented an open air barn space (mainly used for dairy cows), but did not negotiate any boarding or care of the goats. Another farmer (Betti) rented the other half of the barn space for his dairy cows. Betti became concerned about defendant's goat herd in Fall 2014. As the condition of the goats deteriorated (to the point of death for some of the goats), Betti informed the state Dept. of Agriculture and this spurred the investigation which culminated in the seizure of defendant's remaining living goats in January 2015. On appeal of his conviction, defendant raises four main arguments: (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the trial court did not provide the jury with a proper instruction on the required mental state; (3) § 53–247 (a) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct; and (4) his conviction and sentencing on nineteen separate counts of animal cruelty violates the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. As to defendant's first insufficiency of the evidence claim, defendant's argument centered on whether he had charge or custody of the goats necessary to impute responsibility to him. The court found that there was ample evidence before the jury to support the finding that the defendant confined, or had charge or custody of, the goats. Not only did the defendant play an active role in the management of the goats according to testimony, but.in converstations with officers, defendant “took the lead on telling me what was being done with the management of the goats” and that he “predominated the conversation” about the mortality rates in the herd. In fact, the court found compelling evidence of defendant's custody role where since he had authority to order the euthanization of the animals. Defendant's attempts to characterize his role as mere "ownership," with no role in the particulars of confinement, were unpersuasive. Ownership itself "can still be probative evidence that the defendant bore the responsibility of caring for the goats and authorizing their confinement." Equally unpersuasive was defendant's claim that his business partner was the was who alone confined the 20 plus goats in the open air barn. However, the court noted that there is "no authority limits liability under the statute to a single actor when the facts demonstrate that more than one person may have confined the goats or had charge or custody of them." The jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant, having confined, or having charge or custody of, the goats, failed to give the goats proper care or food, water, and shelter. On defendant's second claim, the court concluded that the mens rea required for a conviction under the relevant portion of § 53–247 (a) is general intent and that the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on criminal negligence. Defendant's third argument - that § 53–247 (a), was unconstitutionally vague - was also dispensed by the court. Even if the terms "charge" or "custody" are susceptible to some degree of interpretation, the record here shows that defendant had definite notice that his conduct violated the law. Further, the evidence at trial showed that he had notice from the state on things like heat lamps and shelter from the wind and failed to protect the animals by acting on those instructions. Finally, the court considered defendant's final double jeopardy argument and whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple convictions for cruelty for each goat or one conviction for the cruel treatment of the nineteen goats under § 53–247 (a). In looking at previous versions of the anti-cruelty law and other laws within the chapter, the court found that defendant's separate abuse and maltreatment of each goat supports the nineteen separate counts filed by the prosecutor. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - AWA - Subpart B. Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, etc. of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | 9 C.F.R. § 3.25 - 3.41 | These regulations provide the specifications for the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | Administrative | ||
| UT - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | U.C.A. 1953 § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | UT ST § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | These Utah statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include municipal pound pet sterilization provisions, rabies control laws, hunting laws that impact dogs, and laws concerning injuries caused by dogs. | Statute | |
| NY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 331 - 382; McKinney's Penal Law § 130.20 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 331 - 382; NY PENAL § 130.20 | These New York statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. "Animal" includes every living creature except a human being. A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both. Exclusions include properly conducted scientific tests, experiments or investigations, involving the use of living animals approved by the state commissioner of health. | Statute |