Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gurtek v. Chisago County | 1988 WL 81554 (Minn.App., 1988) (unpublished) |
Appellants sought review of a denial of a special-use permit to build a large campground adjacent to a bald eagle nesting site. They contended that the denial by the county board was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the denial was reasonable where the county proffered two legally valid reasons for denying the permit: the danger to the sensitive nesting eagle population and the detrimental effect the increased human activity would have on the unspoiled nature of the property. |
Case | ||||||||||
| Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo | 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) | 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) |
To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo. Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying. The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. |
Case | |||||||||
| Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc v. Bengal | 2011 WL 4867541 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2011) |
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue rescued three dogs from North Carolina and had them delivered to Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement seized them and turned them over to Appellants PSPCA. The District Court ordered Appellants to return the dogs to Sixth Angel based on a state law conversion claim. The motion was affirmed because PSPCA deprived Sixth Angel of its unique property. Returning the dogs to their owner served the public interest by settling property rights and allowing Sixth Angel to fulfill its mission of finding homes for the dogs. |
Case | ||||||||||
| In re: Jennifer Caudill | 2013 WL 604009 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 1, 2013) | Although the Complaint alleged that Caudill made false or fraudulent statements and/or provided false or fraudulent records to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the emphasis in the Complaint suggested that primary reliance was being placed upon the more general determination of unfitness. The Complaint alleged that Respondents (collectively, including Caudill) engaged in activities designed to circumvent an order of the Secretary of Agriculture in revoking the Animal Welfare Act exhibitor's license previously held by Lancelot Kollman Ramos, and have acted as surrogates for Ramos. Caudill and Kalmanson were alleged to continue to act as Ramos's surrogates, and to facilitate the circumvention of his license revocation order. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found factual support for termination on the grounds of false statements and providing false documents to be lacking. The AJL also found little support for the conclusion that Caudill in any way was operating as a surrogate for Ramos. The ALJ did find that although Caudill had initiated discussions with Ramos concerning the purchase of his animals prior to the effective date of his license revocation, her subsequent consummation of the transaction after his license had been revoked constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.132. In the end, however, the evidence was insufficient to find that Respondent Caudill was unfit to hold an AWA license or that maintenance of a license by her would in any way be contrary to the purposes of the Act | Case | ||||||||||
| IL - Service Animal - Chapter 740. Civil Liabilities. | 740 I.L.C.S. 13/1 - 10 | IL ST CH 740 § 13/1 - 10 | Under this Illinois statute, a physically impaired person may bring an action for both economic and noneconomic damages against a person who steals, injures, or attacks his or her assistance animal with hazardous chemicals (provided he or she reasonably knew the guide dog was present and the chemical was hazardous). The economic damages recoverable include veterinary medical expenses, replacement costs, and temporary replacement assistance (provided by person or animal). No cause of action lies where the physically impaired person was committing a civil or criminal trespass at the time of the attack or theft. | Statute | |||||||||
| MA - Exotic pets - 9.01: Exemption List | 321 MA ADC 9.01 | 321 CMR 9.01 | This section exempts some animals from Massachusetts' exotic pet ban. The animals that have been added to this license-exemption list include boas and pythons, skinks, parrots, hedgehogs, chinchillas, and flying squirrels, among others. | Administrative | |||||||||
| CO - Wildlife, nongame - Wildlife; Illegal Possession | C. R. S. A. § 33-6-109 | CO ST § 33-6-109 | Colorado law prohibits the taking, hunting, or possession of animals deemed property of the state or wildlife taken in violation of state, federal, or non-U.S. law (including bald and golden eagles), resulting in a misdemeanor with up to one year in jail and fines. Further, there is an additional penalty for the taking of "big game" species. It is also illegal to have in one's possession any nonnative or exotic species. | Statute | |||||||||
| Australia - Anti Cruelty - New South Wales Regulations |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 2006 are authorative in the state of New South Wales. |
Administrative | |||||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 3 |
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Policy | |||||||||||
| New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case |