Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case | |
| Anderson v. State (Unpublished) | 877 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. App. 2007) |
After shooting a pet dog to prevent harm to Defendant's own dog, Defendant challenges his animal cruelty conviction. Defendant argues that since he was attempting to kill the dog, he did not intend to torture or mutilate the dog within the meaning of the statute. The court affirms his conviction, reasoning that the evidentiary record below supported his conviction. |
Case | |
| CT - Transport, poultry - § 53-249. Cruelty to poultry | C. G. S. A. § 53-249 | CT ST § 53-249 | This statute makes it illegal to transport poultry in any manner that is not sanitary, warm, and ventilated. Poultry must receive "reasonable care" to "prevent unnecessary suffering." Violation of this provision is a class D misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry | 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007) |
The issue on appeal was whether Texas' prohibition of horsemeat for human consumption was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that the statute was not preempted or in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. |
Case | |
| North American Meat Institute v. Becerra | 825 F. App'x 518 (9th Cir. 2020) | 825 Fed.Appx. 518 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2020) | The North American Meat Institute (NAMI) brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 (which forbids the sale of pork meat and eggs in California from producers that do not comply with its animal housing standards). NAMI alleged that Proposition 12 violated the dormant commerce clause by improperly regulating economic activity outside of California’s boundaries and substantially burdening interstate commerce. Plaintiffs acknowledged that Proposition 12 was not facially discriminatory, and that Proposition 12 did not have a discriminatory purpose, because there was a lack of evidence that the state had protectionist intent when enacting Proposition 12. The district court dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. | Case |
| United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney | 940 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (D. Neb. 2013). | This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA." | Case | |
| Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC | 90 So.3d 915 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 WL 2327814 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff. |
Case |
| CA - Mountain Lions - Chapter 10. Mountain Lions | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4800 - 4810 | CA FISH & G § 4800 - 4810 | California statutes make mountain lions specially protected mammals. These sections make it unlawful to take, injure, possess, transport, import, or sell any mountain lion or any part or product thereof. Specific exceptions to these prohibitions include instances where a mountain lion is perceived to be an imminent threat to public health or safety or when it is perceived by to be an imminent threat to the survival of any threatened, endangered, candidate, or fully protected sheep species. | Statute |
| Wilkins v. Daniels | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 6644465 (S.D.Ohio, 2012) |
Various owners of exotic and wild animals filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction against the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director, David Daniels. The owners of the exotic and wild animals argued the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, which the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director were trying to enforce, was unconstitutional. The district court denied the owners’ motion for obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction reasoning that the exceptions to the Act’s ban on owning wild and exotic animals does not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, that the legislature had a legitimate purpose so as to not violate procedural due process with regards to micro-chipping wild and exotic animals, and that the Act did not constitute an unconstitutional takings. Significantly, the court recognized that owners of wild and exotic animals have a limited or qualified property interest in said animals. |
Case | |
| CO - Transportation - Ley 2138 | Ley 2138 | This law establishes the parameters for the substitution of vehicles of animal traction in Colombia, and standards that promote the welfare of horses and cattle that are used for this purpose. It also offers the necessary guarantees to those who derive their livelihood from this type of vehicles so they can access social transformation programs. Vehicles of animal traction are to be substituted by motor vehicles that are ready to circulate, are in new condition, are approved for carrier transportation, and are suitable for the topography and distances of the corresponding municipality. District, municipal and departmental authorities are in charge of carrying out the substitution programs for animal-drawn vehicles, except in cases where they are intended for rural transport in municipalities whose geographical condition does not allow other means for tourist, agricultural, livestock, forestry, and sports activities. Replacement programs are to be financed with departmental, municipal, and district funding. This law gives local governments 10 months from its promulgation to complete a census with 100% of the data on animal-drawn vehicles and their owners. | Statute |