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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia, Decreto 2113, 2017 | DECRETO 2113 DE 2017 | This decreto adds a chapter to Title 3, Part 14 of Book 2 of Decreto 1071, 2015 “Decreto Único Reglamentario del Sector Administrativo Agropecuario, Pesquero y de Desarrollo Rural.” This Decreto establishes the dispositions and requirements for the welfare of species for agricultural production. | Statute | |
| MS - Ecoterrorism - Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act | Miss. Code Ann. § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | MS ST § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | This section comprises Mississippi's Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act. The act prohibits a person, without the effective consent of the owner, to acquire or otherwise exercise control over an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. A person is also prohibited from entering and remaining concealed at a facility with the intent to damage or disrupt the facility. Violation for damaging a facility is a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Violation for illegal entry with an intent to damage or disrupt the facility results in a fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to 1 year. | Statute |
| IL - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | 510 ILCS 70/2.01c, 2.01d, 4.03, 4.04, 7.15; 720 ILCS 5/48-8; 730 I.L.C.S. 5/3-12-16; 740 I.L.C.S. 13/1, 13/5, 13/10; 775 I.L.C.S. 30/1 - 6; 510 ILCS 5/15.1; 105 I.L.C.S. 5/14-6.02; 210 ILCS 125/32; 625 ILCS 60/5, 60/15; 775 ILCS 5/3-104.1 | 310 I.L.C.S. 120/1 - 120/120 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| State v. Fessenden | 310 P.3d 1163 (Or.App., 2013), review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) and aff'd, 355 Or. 759 (2014) | 2013 WL 5352270 (Or.App., 2013); 258 Or. App. 639, review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) and aff'd, 355 Or. 759 (2014) |
This Oregon case considers, as an issue of first impression, whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to animals in need of immediate assistance. Defendant appealed her conviction for second-degree animal neglect (ORS 167.325) based on the condition of her horse. The court found that the emergency aid exception extends to nonhuman animals when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals which are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or cruel death. Here, the deputy sheriff found that the horse was more emaciated than any other horse he had ever seen and there were signs of possible organ failure. |
Case |
| IN - Domestic Violence - 34-26-5-9 Ex parte orders; authority and jurisdiction of court; relief available | I.C. 34-26-5-9 | IN ST 34-26-5-9 | This Indiana law allows a court to grant ex parte orders for protection in cases of domestic or family violence. Effective July 1, 2017, a court may grant a petitioner the exclusive possession, care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or cared for by the petitioner, respondent, minor child of either the petitioner or respondent, or any other family or household member. Additionally, the court may prohibit a respondent from removing, transferring, injuring, concealing, harming, attacking, mistreating, threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of an animal described in subdivision (c)(5). | Statute |
| People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture | 194 F. Supp. 3d 404 (E.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep't of Agric., 861 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 2017) | 2016 WL 3902745 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2016) | In this case, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, In.c (PETA) filed a complaint against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). PETA argued that the USDA had violated the APA because the USDA has a “policy, pattern, and practice or rubber stamping” exhibitor license renewals to noncompliant animal exhibitors. Under the APA, any agency action that is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” must be held unlawful by the courts. The court in this case reviewed the facts of the case in accordance with the Chevron decision. According to the court in Chevron, a court must give deference to an agency if: (1) "the statutory language is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question posed," or (2) "the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” The statutory language that the court considered in this case was the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) that regulate the transportation, handling, and treatment of animals. Ultimately, the court determined that the AWA was silent with regard to exhibitor renewals and therefore moved to the second step of the Chevron decision. The court found that the AWA does not prohibit the USDA’s administrative renewal process for animal exhibitor licenses. The court held that the USDA did not act arbitrarily or abuse its description when it chose to renew certain exhibitor licenses. As a result, the court rejected PETA’s claim against the USDA. | Case |
| ME - Pet Trusts - Chapter 4. Creation, Validity, Modification and Termination of Trust. | 18-B M. R. S. A. § 408 | ME ST T. 18-B § 408 | This statute represents Maine's pet trust law. The provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. The comment following the text of the statute clarifies what types of animal-related activities qualify as non-charitable versus charitable trusts. | Statute |
| FL - Hunting - 379.302. Private game preserves and farms; regulations; penalties | West's F. S. A. § 379.302 | FL ST § 379.302 (372.16. Renumbered as 379.302 and amended by Laws 2008, c. 2008-247, § 105, eff. July 1, 2008) | This Florida statute provides that any person owning land in this state may establish, maintain, and operate within the boundaries thereof, a private preserve and farm, not exceeding an area of 640 acres, for the protection, preservation, propagation, rearing, and production of game birds and animals for private and commercial purposes. All private game preserves or farms established under the provisions of this section shall be fenced in such manner that domestic game thereon may not escape and wild game on surrounding lands may not enter. Violation of this section results in a misdemeanor and forfeiture of the violator's license to operate for one year. | Statute |
| Martinez v. Robledo | 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.) | 210 Cal.App.4th 384; 2012 WL 5208537 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.) |
These two consolidated California appeals address the measure of damages for the wrongful injury to a companion animal. Both respondents filed motions in limine concerning the issue of damages in the cases and, in both case, the trial court limited the measure of damages to the market value of the dogs. On appeal, the appellants argued that the measure of damages should go beyond market value to cover the reasonable costs of the pets' treatment. The appellate court found the recent case of Kimes v. Grosser (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1556 (decided after these appeals were filed) persuasive (where the court held that a plaintiff can recover reasonable and necessary costs where a pet is wrongfully injured). The court reasoned that otherwise, the injured animal's owner would bear the burden of all the costs of treatment, regardless of the wrongdoer's conduct. Moreover, this ruling reflects a basic principle of tort law - to make a plaintiff whole again - and accords with the different way animals, as property, are treated in the criminal arena. Thus, the court agreed with Kimes that allowing a pet owner to recover reasonable and necessary costs related to the treatment of an animal wrongfully injured is an appropriate measure of damages. |
Case |
| Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador | Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T | Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía. | Case |