Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R. v. Senior | [1899] 1 QB 283 |
Held: The word "wilfully", when used in the context of an offence prohibiting cruelty to children, "means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it" ( per Lord Russell of Killowen C.J.). Note: the word "wilfully" is occasionally an element of animal welfare offences, such as that of wilfully, without any reasonable cause or excuse, administering a poisonous drug or substance to an animal (Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(d)). |
Case | |
| People v. Schneider | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) |
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions. |
Case |
| LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, LLC | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3538951 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2019) | No. 1:18-CV-00384-BLW | Plaintiffs, Robert and Iva LaRosa filed this action in August of 2018, alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The Court dismissed the complaint and the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The Plaintiffs had applied to live at River Quarry Apartments in August of 2017. They requested a reasonable accommodation to keep their dog at the apartment without paying a fee. The Plaintiffs provided a copy of a note from a nurse practitioner stating that the companion dog helps manage Mr. LaRosa’s post-traumatic stress disorder. The Plaintiffs were approved for the apartment but told that their reasonable accommodation request was still being processed and received forms to fill out regarding the reasonable accommodation. River Quarry required Mr. LaRose’s doctor to fill out a form verifying the need for an assistance animal. Rather than completing the form, the plaintiffs provided a letter from Mr. LaRosa’s primary care physician which stated that in the doctor’s opinion, an emotional support animal would help mitigate the symptoms that Mr. LaRose was experiencing. River Quarry insisted on speaking with Mr. LaRose’s doctor directly to verify the information that the plaintiffs had given. After Kirk Cullimore, an attorney on behalf of River Quarry, spoke with the doctor, River Quarry wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs denying their request for a reasonable accommodation stating that the doctor declined to verify that Mr. LaRosa met the two prong test that one must be handicapped and there must be a nexus between the handicap and the need for the animal. Soon after this, Mr. LaRosa saw his primary care physician and had the actual form completed by his doctor and turned it in to River Quarry. Kirk Cullimore believed that the doctor’s signature on the form was forged and called Mr. LaRose’s doctor to speak with him again. The doctor’s secretary informed Cullimore that the signature was genuine. Mr. and Mrs. LaRosa argued that they were injured by the discrimination of the Defendants in violation of the FHA. The Court denied the Plaintiffs claim under the FHA because they did not sufficiently allege that the Defendants refused to make the requested accommodation. River Quarry allowed the dog to stay in the apartment while their request for an accommodation was reviewed. The Court stated that housing providers are granted a meaningful opportunity to investigate a request for an accommodation. Housing providers do not have to immediately approve a request for an accommodation right away. River Quarry ended up approving the request within 45 days after the initial request. The Court held that this was not an unreasonable delay considering that River Quarry did not have sufficient information to make a determination until after Mr. LaRosa’s doctor completed the verification form. Prior to that the doctor’s letter and the phone call between Cullimore and the doctor did not reveal enough information for River Quarry to make a determination on the accommodation. The Plaintiffs, however, succeeded on their interference claim. The LaRosas were engaged in a protected activity when they applied for a reasonable accommodation and they sufficiently alleged that they were subjected to adverse action and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. The Defendants misrepresented the contents of Mr. Cullimore and Mr. LaRosa’s doctor’s conversation. The Court ultimately denied in part and granted in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss claims against Kirk Cullimore and his law office. | Case |
| Companion Animal Issues | Policy | |||
| VA - Assistance animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6528, 6588; § 46.2-932.1 - 934; § 51.5-40.1 - 51.5-46; § 36-96.1:1 - 3.2 | VA ST § 3.2-6528, 6588; § 46.2-932.1 - 934; § 51.5-40.1 - 51.5-46; § 36-96.1:1 - 3.2 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| KY - Louisville/Jefferson County - Title IX: General Regulations (Chapter 91: Animals) | Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government Code of Ordinances § 91.098 MUTILATION OF ANIMALS |
In Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, no person shall crop a dog’s ears or tail, except a veterinarian. Additionally, no person shall mutilate any animal whether dead or alive; however, this provision does not apply to accepted livestock practices concerning humane slaughter at licensed stockyards, slaughterhouses and meat packing establishments or on the premises of agricultural uses. Penalties are also included for violating these provisions. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div. Continental Grain Co. | 447 N.W.2d 94 (1989) | 152 Wis.2d 78 (1989) |
Pig breeder sought damages from feed manufacturer after pigs got sick, died, or became sterile after eating feed. The Court of Appeals held that jury should have been instructed that basic measure of damages for dead and injured livestock was based on market value of affected animals and did not include separate award for unborn litters. Failure to give proper instruction was prejudicial error that required a new trial on the issue of damages. |
Case |
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| Scotland - Wildlife - Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 | 2004 asp 6 | This Act makes amendments to the protection of wildlife under the Countryside and Wildlife Act 1981, and the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, in respect of Scotland. Wild animal protection is extended to include reckless as well as intentional acts. The Act also makes it an offence to disturb or harass a dolphin, whale or basking shark, and amends the provisions for enforcement. | Statute | |
| WY - Invasive Species - Article 2. Aquatic Invasive Species | W. S. 1977 §§ 23-4-201 to 206 | WY ST §§ 23-4-201 to 206 | These Wyoming statutes prohibit introducing an aquatic invasive species into any waters of the state. No one may launch any conveyance without first complying with aquatic invasive species prevention requirements. A violation is a high misdemeanor. | Statute |