Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Williams v. Hill | 658 So.2d 381 (Ala.,1995) |
In this Alabama case, a motorcyclist and passenger were injured when they collided with defendant's dog while traveling on public roadway and brought an action for damages. The Circuit Court, Elmore County granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the motorcyclist and passenger appealed. The Court held that there is no recover at common law, as no negligence was shown. The Court would not accept the proposal that all owners should be charged with the knowledge that dogs will chase cars. “We hold that the owner of a dog may not be charged with the general knowledge that all dogs chase motor vehicles, and therefore that the law will not impute such general knowledge to dog owners in actions for injuries incurred. We, therefore, affirm the defendant's summary judgment.” |
Case | ||
| IN - Law enforcement - Chapter 42.5. Burial with Law Enforcement Animals or Service Animals | IC 23-14-42.5-1 - 7 | This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration. | Statute | ||
| Haggblom v. City of Dillingham | 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008) | This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order. | Case | ||
| Roos v. Loeser | 183 P. 204 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) | 41 Cal.App. 782 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) |
This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the killing of her dog, of the variety known as Pomeranian, by an Airedale belonging to the defendant. In 1919, a California court determined damages to be limited to the veterinary expenses connected with the injury to the animal. In the opinion, the court lovingly discusses the value of the animal. Notwithstanding these words of praise for the small animal, the court decided that the value was limited to the fair market value and related expenses. |
Case | |
| VA - Disaster - § 44-146.18. Department of Emergency Services continued as Department of Emergency Management; | VA Code Ann. § 44-146.18 | VA ST § 44-146.18 | In Virginia, the State Department of Emergency Management must develop an emergency response plan to address the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals in the event of a disaster (subsection (B)(18)). | Statute | |
| OK - Licenses - § 22-115. Animals running at large--Regulation and taxation | 11 Okl. St. Ann. § 22-115 to 115.1 | OK ST T. 11 § 22-115 to 115.1 | This Oklahoma statute provides that the municipal governing body may regulate or prohibit animals from running at large. The governing body may also regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and authorize the killing of dogs which are found at large in violation of any ordinance regulating the same. | Statute | |
| National Meat Ass'n v. Harris | 32 S.Ct. 965 (2012) | 2012 WL 171119 (U.S.) |
Trade association representing packers and processors of swine livestock and pork products sued the State of California for declaratory and injunctive relief barring a ban on slaughter and inhumane handling of nonambulatory animals on federally regulated swine slaughterhouses. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the California Penal Code provision prohibiting the sale of meat or meat product of “nonambulatory” animals for human consumption and requiring immediate euthanization of nonambulatory animals. |
Case | |
| Argentina - Slaughter - Ley 18.819, 1970 | LEY N° 18.819 | This law contains the provisions for the procedures for the slaughter of animals. More specifically the slaughter of animals of the bovine, equine, ovine, porcine and caprine species. However, Article 2 establishes that executive power may extend these provisions to the slaughter of birds, rabbits, and other minor species. Slaughterhouses and meat packing plants in Argentina must comply with the desensitization requirements and procedures established by the executive power. This law prohibits the use of the clubs in slaughtering. The veterinary inspection services of the national and of the provincial or municipal administrations are the control entities for the compliance of this law. The Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock is the entity that imposes sanctions to establishments subject to national veterinary inspection and those that violate these provisions. | Statute | ||
| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
Case | ||
| MA - Exotic pets - 9.01: Exemption List | 321 MA ADC 9.01 | 321 CMR 9.01 | This section exempts some animals from Massachusetts' exotic pet ban. The animals that have been added to this license-exemption list include boas and pythons, skinks, parrots, hedgehogs, chinchillas, and flying squirrels, among others. | Administrative |