Results
Displaying 21 - 30 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI - Vehicle - § 31-22-28. Transporting animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 31-22-28 | RI ST § 31-22-28 | This Rhode Island law makes it unlawful for any person to transport any animal, whether for business or pleasure, in an open air motor vehicle unless certain requirements are met: (1) the animal is kept in an enclosed area of the vehicle; (2) the animal is under physical control of a person; or (3) the animal is safely restrained and harnessed by means other than a neck restraint. Violation results in a fine of $50 to $100, with an increase of up to $200 for each subsequent offense. | Statute |
| MN - Lien, veterinay - Chapter 514. Liens Against Property. Agricultural Liens. | M. S. A. § 514.965 - 966 | MN ST § 514.965 - 966 | These Minnesota statutes relate to agricultural liens on livestock. Under these sections, an “agricultural lien” includes a veterinarian's lien, breeder's lien, livestock production input lien, temporary livestock production input lien, and feeder's lien. In section 514.966 entitled, "Agricultural lien on livestock," a licensed veterinarian performing emergency veterinary services in the ordinary course of business that cost more than $25 for animals at the request of the owner or a person in possession of the animals has a lien on the animals for the value of the services. Additionally, a veterinarian's lien, breeder's lien, livestock production input lien, temporary livestock production lien, or feeder's lien attaches to the livestock serviced by the agricultural lienholder, and products and proceeds thereof to the extent of the price or value of the service provided. To perfect the lien, a financing statement must be filed within the time periods established in the law. | Statute |
| MT - Hunting - Chapter 4. Commercial Activities. | MCA 87-4-401 to 87-4-433 | MT ST 87-4-401 to 87-4-433 | In Montana, a person may not operate an alternative livestock ranch without a license. Such ranches are defined as enclosed land upon which animals such as privately owned caribou, white-tailed deer, etc, are kept for purposes of obtaining, rearing in captivity, keeping, or selling. The rancher has reporting requirements. Failure to comply with provisions of the act may result in revocation of the license. | Statute |
| Qaddura v. State | 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1493 | 2007 WL 614087 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth) | The court held that the owner of livestock who placed them in the care of his tenant while he was on vacation for a month, but failed to provide his tenant with enough food for the livestock could be found guilty under the animal cruelty statute. | Case |
| IL - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 510 ILCS 5/1 - 35; 510 ILCS 92/1 - 999; 510 ILCS 72/1 - 180; 55 I.L.C.S. 5/5-1071 - 1071.1; 60 I.L.C.S. 1/30-110; 520 I.L.C.S. 20/15 and 20/19; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.34; 65 I.L.C.S. 5/11-20-9 | 520 I.L.C.S. 5/1.2y; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/1.2z; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/3.26 | These statutes comprise Illinois' dog laws. Among the provisions include the Animal Control Act, which regulates the licensing and control of dogs, the Diseased Animal Act, and the Humane Euthanasia in Animal Shelters Act. | Statute |
| Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel | 840 F.2d 45 (C.A.D.C.,1988) | 268 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,636 (C.A.D.C.,1988) |
In this appeal, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) challenged a series of actions by the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow hunting on some of America's national wildlife refuges. The District Court held that HSUS failed to satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements for associational standing because the 'recreational' interest of Society members was not germane to the group's self-described mission of insuring the humane treatment of animals and other wildlife. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding that the Humane Society had no standing to challenge the hunt openings, and remanded the action to allow HSUS to pursue its challenge to the introduction of hunting. This Court did affirm the district court's finding on the merits that the Wildlife Service complied with NEPA when it permitted hunting at the Chincoteague preserve. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Case |
| OR - Equine Liability Act - Chapter 30. Actions and Suits in Particular Cases. Actions Arising Out of Equine Activities. | O. R. S. § 30.687 - 697 | OR ST § 30.687 - 697 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or an equine professional is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, arising out of riding, training, driving, grooming or riding as a passenger upon an equine. However, there are exceptions to this rule: an equine sponsor or professional will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant. | Statute |
| Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. | 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2227, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 411, 2018 Daily Journal D.A.R. 359, 2018 WL 343754 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018) | Friends of Animals, a non-profit animal advocacy organization, sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service when the Service began issuing permits that allowed the scientific taking of barred owls, both lethally and non-lethally, for the purpose of preserving the habitat of the northern spotted owl, a threatened species. The two species compete with each other in the same territory within Oregon and Northern California. Friends of Animals alleges that these permits are a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which limits the removal of birds from their habitat only for scientific purposes. The theory set forth by the plaintiff is referred to as the ‘same-species theory,’ meaning that the removal of a bird must be for the scientific purposes pertaining to the very species that was taken. This theory is based on language found in the Mexico Convention which is referenced in the MBTA. The lower court granted FWS' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the plain text of the MBTA and Mexico Convention do not demand the same-species theory in the removal of a bird. Specifically, the court concluded that the “used for scientific purposes” exception in Article II(A) of the Mexico Convention includes taking birds to study whether their absence benefits another protected bird species. | Case |
| U.S. v. Korn | 2010 WL 5110048 (D. Idaho Dec. 2010) | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d | The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) brought an administrative action against Defendants for alleged violations of the Animal Welfare Act in connection with Defendants' exotic animal exhibition activities. A judgment was entered for a civil penalty of $57,750 against each Defendant in the administrative action. Defendants have refused to pay, claiming that their due process rights were violated in the underlying administrative proceeding; the judgment, they argued, was therefore void and unenforceable. The United States filed this matter against Defendants seeking to enforce that judgment. Before this Court were the cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion was granted because the Court could not overlook Defendant's absence of any effort to follow up with the Hearing Clerk, considering the many avenues of communication available. There were also no disputed issues of material fact concerning service of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Order, and provision of notice of Defendants' appeal rights. Moreover, this Court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or otherwise vacate the Agency's final order. 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) also permitted the institution of a civil action by the Attorney General to collect the penalty imposed and no other facts were presented disputing the validity of the administrative judgment imposing the civil penalty. | Case |
| Fleet v District Court of New South Wales | [1999] NSWCA 363 |
The appellant's dog was removed by police officers and later euthanised. The dog was emaciated and suffering from numerous ailments. The appellant was charged and convicted with an animal cruelty offence and failure to state his name and address when asked. On appeal, it was found that the court had failed to address the elements of the animal cruelty offence and that the charge of failing to state name and address could not stand. |
Case |