Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Griffin | 684 P.2d 32 (Or. 1984) | 69 Or.App. 199 (1984) |
Appeal of a conviction in district court for cruelty to animals. Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals after having been found to have recklessly caused and allowed his dog to kill two cats, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that forfeiture of defendant's dog was an impermissible condition of probation. |
Case |
| Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. | 972 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) | Plaintiff Cisneros purchased a Shih Tzu puppy named "Giant" from Petland Kennesaw, a Kennesaw, Georgia franchise of Petland, Inc. She received a certificate of "veterinary inspection" and a limited health guarantee at the time of purchase. Several days later, problems arose with the puppy and she brought the dog back to the Petland affiliated veterinarian who prescribed antibiotics without making a diagnosis. Shortly thereafter, an emergency pet visit revealed the dog suffered from parvovirus. Cisneros called Petland who told her to take the dog back to the Petland vet if she wanted a refund. She did so and the dog died several days later. Because the State of Georgia requires reporting of parvovirus, Cisneros received a report after the dog died, but she learned the dog's organs had been removed (an uncommon post mortem practice). As a result, plaintiff alleged that actions were the intended result of a nationwide conspiracy involving Petland and its affiliates to sell unhealthy puppies from "puppy mills" where health conditions are rubber stamped by a network of "preferred veterinarians" and buyers are deceived by sales documents that distract from the fraud. Plaintiff broadly asserted three claims: (1) a violation of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (2) a conspiracy to violate the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and (3) with respect to a Georgia subclass of persons who purchased a cat or dog from a Petland franchise in Georgia from July 2013 to the present, a violation of Georgia's state RICO statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4. The district court dismissed Cisneros's federal causes of action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). After applying the six-fold test for a private plaintiff suing under the civil provisions of RICO, this Court found chiefly that Cisneros has alleged no facts that plausibly support the inference that the defendants were collectively trying to make money in pet sales by fraud, which is a common purpose sufficient to find a RICO enterprise. Cisneros was required to allege not just that Petland Kennesaw had a fraudulent purpose, but that it was a common purpose, formed in collaboration with Petland, PAWSitive, and the preferred veterinarians. In the end, Cisneros has alleged only that Petland operates a franchise business like any other franchisor. Even assuming that Cisneros has adequately pled fraud on the part of Petland Kennesaw, she has not alleged that its predicate acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. The action was affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. | Case | |
| NV - Bestiality - 201.455. Bestiality; penalties | N.R.S. 201.455 | NV ST 201.455 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2017, prohibits bestiality. Convicted violators face the relinquishing and permanently forfeiting ownership or possession of all animals which are in the same household as the person to an animal shelter, an organization that takes into custody animals which have been abused or neglected, or a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. The court may also impose a possession ban on owning or keeping any animal for a period determined by the court. Those convicted must undergo a psychological evaluation and any recommended counseling and must pay all reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance of the animal involved in the crime and any other animal relinquished by the person. If the person convicted of the crime of bestiality is not the owner of the animal involved in the crime, reimbursing the owner of the animal for all medical expenses incurred for treating the animal. | Statute |
| NY - Exotic - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-0917 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0917 | This New York laws begin by stating that wild game and other wildlife may only be possessed if lawfully taken in compliance with the Fish and Wildlife Law and the accompanying regulations. Skunk, bobcat, mink, raccoon and muskrat may be bought and sold alive during their respective open seasons. No live wolf, coyote, coydog, fox, skunk, venomous reptile or raccoon shall be possessed or transported, except under a license or permit issued by the department. Every such license or permit shall contain a prominent notice warning the licensee or permittee of his or her duty to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack; failure to do so is a crime under section three hundred seventy of the agriculture and markets law. | Statute |
| MI - Hunting - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M. C. L. A. 324.41701 - 41712 | MI ST 324.41701 - 41712 | These sections set out the guidelines for private shooting preserves, including the species of wild animals and birds permitted to be hunted. | Statute |
| State v. Dye | 309 P.3d 1192 (Wash.,2013) |
The Defendant appealed his conviction for residential burglary. The victim in the case was an adult man with significant developmental disabilities. At trial, the State obtained permission to allow a dog named "Ellie" to sit at the victim's feet during testimony. On appeal of the Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court held that defendant failed to establish that his rights to a fair trial were violated (283 P.3d 1130 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012)). Further, any prejudice that resulted from Ellie's presence was minor and largely mitigated by the limiting instruction that the trial court gave. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed. |
Case | |
| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003) | 758 N.Y.S.2d 276, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 11491 (2003) |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions. |
Case |
| Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 1 |
Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 1 (Fall 2014)ARTICLES
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Policy | ||
| FL - Initiatives - Amendment 13, Ban on Wagering on Dog Races | Amendment 13 | A proposed revision relating to ending dog racing; creating new sections in Article X and Article XII of the State Constitution to prohibit the racing of, and wagering on, greyhounds and other dogs after a specified date. | Statute | |
| ND - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 12.1-21.1. Animal Research Facility Damage | NDCC 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | ND ST 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | This chapter concerns unlawful interference with animal facilities. Under the section, a person may not intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility or the property or animals located therein; exercise control over the animals or property; enter an animal facility not open to the public with the intent on committing prohibited acts; enter a facility and remain concealed to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal at a facility. Violation is a class B felony if damage is $10,000 or more, a class C felony if the damage is at least $500 to under $10,000, and a class A misdemeanor if damage is less than $500. Entering an animal facility and using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment is a class B misdemeanor. | Statute |