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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SC - Impound - § 47-3-540. Destruction of identifiable dog by animal control officer; prior notification of owner | Code 1976 § 47-3-540 | SC ST § 47-3-540 | This South Carolina statute provides that animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his or her last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner then has two weeks to reclaim his or her dog, after which the animal may be destroyed. | Statute |
| Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. | 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) | 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
Case |
| CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | Animal cruelty against any animal has been considered a crime Under the Criminal Code of Mexico City since 2014. Chapter IV contains the provisions regarding the crimes committed by acts of cruelty or mistreatment against non-human animals. Article 350 BIS establishes that "whoever intentionally mistreats or cruelly acts against any specimen of any animal species causing injury, damage, or alteration in their health will be punished with one to up to three years of imprisonment and three hundred to five hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. In addition, intentional acts of cruelty or mistreatment that cause the death of an animal will be punished with imprisonment from two years to up to six years and six hundred to twelve hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. The penalties will be increased by up to two-thirds in those cases where methods that cause serious suffering to the animal are used prior to the death. Methods that cause serious suffering are understood as all those that lead to non-immediate death and prolong the animal's agony. Using an animal for sexual purposes is punishable with one to three years in prison and five hundred to a thousand times the Units of Measure and Update. Enhanced Penalties: The sanctions stipulated in this article shall be subject to a one-half increase if, in addition to the acts mentioned above, the individual responsible or any other person captures visual evidence with the purpose of publicly disseminating these acts through any means. The same increase applies to the killing of a companion animal for purposes of human consumption." Other articles in this code concerning animals include Article 54. 76, 226 BIS, and 226 TER. | Statute | |
| VA - Cruelty - Article 7. Animal Control Officers and Humane Investigators. | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569 | VA ST § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569 | These chapters relate to the qualifications and duties of animal control officers and the procedures for impounding stray animals. | Statute |
| OK - Game Animals - Part 4. Protected Game. § 5-410. Hawks; falcons; owls; eagles | 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 5-410 | OK ST T. 29 § 5-410 | Oklahoma law prohibits the knowing and willful killing or molestation of hawks, falcons, owls, or eagles, or their nests, eggs, or young. The only exceptions to this prohibition are the taking of a hawk or owl in the act of destroying domestic birds or fowl, or the use of hawks, owls, falcons, or eagles by licensed falconers. | Statute |
| Animal Law Index Volume 16, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 (Spring 2010)
INTRODUCTIONINCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE
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Policy | ||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 57 F.Supp.3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) | Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional | Case | |
| State v. Claiborne | State v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732 (Kan. 1973) |
Animals -- Cruelty to Animals -- Cockfighting -- Gamecocks Not Animals -- No Statutory Prohibition Against Cockfights -- Statute Not Vague. In an action filed pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1701 in which the state seeks a construction of K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 21-4310 (cruelty to animals) making its provisions applicable to cockfighting, the record is examined and for reasons appearing in the opinion it is held: (1) Gamecocks are not animals within the meaning or contemplation of the statute. (2) There is no clear legislative intent that gamecocks be included within the category of animals protected by the statute. (3) The statute does not apply to or prohibit the conducting of cockfights. (4) As construed, the statute is not so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to violate the requirements of due process. |
Case | |
| Ecuador - Environmental - Organic Procedural Code | Ley 0 Registro Oficial Suplemento 506 de 22-may, 2015 | Ecuador's COGEP | This excerpt is from Ecuador's General Procedural. It contains provisions concerning the representation of nature. These provisions state that any person may file a lawsuit claiming damages on behalf of nature. More specifically, under the articles in Chapter II, nature can be legally represented by any person, entity, collectivity, or by the ombudsperson, who may also act on their initiative. Article 30 establishes who can be a plaintiff and a defendant. Nature is within the definition of these parties. | Statute |