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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Ladnier v. Hester 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012)

Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.

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I.B. Sirmans v. State 534 S.E.2d 862(Ga.App.,2000) 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2440

Defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The portion of the sentence depriving defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were abused vacated and case remanded; judgment affirmed in all other respects because the motion to suppress was properly denied, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sever the trial.

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People v. Land 955 N.E.2d 538 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2011) 2011 WL 2555826 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.); 2011 IL App (1st) 101048 (2011)

In 2009, Jenell Land was found guilty by jury of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal, a Class 4 felony under Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act. Specifically, Land placed a towing chain around the neck of her pit bull, which caused a large, gaping hole to form in the dog’s neck (the dog was later euthanized). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the defendant’s conviction and, in so doing, rejected each of Land’s four substantive arguments on appeal. Among the arguments raised, the appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove a specific intent by Land to injure her dog did not rise to the level of "plain error."

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State v. Scott 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561 The appellant pled guilty to one count of animal fighting, one count of cruelty to animals, and one count of keeping unvaccinated dogs, and asked for probation. The trial court denied the appellants request for probation and sentenced him to incarceration. The appellant challenged the trial court's ruling, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny probation, stating that the heinous nature of the crimes warranted incarceration. Case
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc v. Bengal 2011 WL 4867541 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2011)

Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue rescued three dogs from North Carolina and had them delivered to Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement seized them and turned them over to Appellants PSPCA. The District Court ordered Appellants to return the dogs to Sixth Angel based on a state law conversion claim. The motion was affirmed because PSPCA deprived Sixth Angel of its unique property. Returning the dogs to their owner served the public interest by settling property rights and allowing Sixth Angel to fulfill its mission of finding homes for the dogs.

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VT - Hunting - § 4708. Interference with hunting, fishing or trapping 10 V.S.A. § 4708 VT ST T 10 § 4708 This Vermont law reflects the state's hunter harassment provision. The law states that a person shall not intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of fish or wild animals. This includes things like tampering with traps, nets, baits, or firearms; by placing himself or herself in a position, for the purpose of interfering, that hinders or prevents hunting, trapping, or fishing; or by engaging in an activity, for the purpose of interfering, that drives, harasses, disturbs, or is likely to disturb wildlife or fish. Statute
OK - Dangerous dog - § 44. Definitions 4 Okl. St. Ann. § 44 OK ST T. 4 § 44 This Oklahoma statute provides the definitions related to dangerous dog laws in the state, including dangerous dog, potentially dangerous dog, severe injury, and owner, among others. Statute
Sanders v. Frank 37 N.E.3d 1305 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2015)

In this case, Heather Sanders filed suit against Joseph D. Frank after she suffered injuries as a result of rescuing Frank’s horses that were running at large. The lower court dismissed Sander’s complaint with prejudice and Sanders appealed. On appeal, Sanders asserted four main arguments: (1) the doctrine of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should not be applied when defendant negligently violates a statute; (2) the rescue doctrine should preclude the assumption of the risk doctrine even though Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses; (3) the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine; and (4) the trial court erred by preventing recovery of damages. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the complaint. The court found that all four of Sander’s arguments were without merit. The court held that although Frank had negligently violated a statute, allowing his horses to escape and run at large, Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses and was not responding to any immediate emergency or threat to human life. Also, the court pointed out that Sanders had “assumed the risk” based on the fact that she had helped rescue Frank’s horses in the past. As a result, the lower court did not err in dismissing Sander’s claim based on contributory negligence and the assumption of the risk doctrine.

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TN - Vehicle - § 29-34-209. Forcible entry of a motor vehicle for purposes of removing a minor or an animal T. C. A. § 29-34-209 TN ST § 29–34–209 This statute grants a person who forcibly breaks into a motor vehicle to save a minor or animal immunity from civil liability. Statute
Austin v. Bundrick 935 So.2d 836 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2006) 41,064 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/30/06), 2006 WL 1791161 (La.App. 2 Cir.)

This Louisiana case involves a suit against the owner of a cow (Bundrick) that wandered into the road where it was struck by plaintiff Austin's vehicle.  Bundrick and his insurer, Colony Insurance Company, appealed the partial summary judgment finding Bundrick liable for the damages resulting from the accident. In reversing the lower court's order for partial summary judgment and remanding for a trial on the merits, the court noted that it is well settled that when an auto strikes a cow on one of the enumerated "stock law" highways, the burden of proof rests upon the owner of the animal to exculpate himself from even the slightest degree of negligence.

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